A FLC IN AN MLG ON AN AVIONICS CERTIFICATION MISSION GOT OFF COURSE WHEN THEY FORGOT TO PUT A WAYPOINT IN THE FMS. THE ALERT ARTCC CTLR CAUGHT THE ERROR RIGHT AWAY AND CORRECTED THEM.

Date: 1997-10 · Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Anomalies: deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

A FLC IN AN MLG ON AN AVIONICS CERTIFICATION MISSION GOT OFF COURSE WHEN THEY FORGOT TO PUT A WAYPOINT IN THE FMS. THE ALERT ARTCC CTLR CAUGHT THE ERROR RIGHT AWAY AND CORRECTED THEM.

Narrative

THE ACFT HAD COMPLETED A MAJOR REFIT AND NUMEROUS MODIFICATIONS AT A LCL REPAIR FACILITY. THE PURPOSE OF THE FLT WAS TO CERTIFY SEVERAL AVIONICS SYS RECENTLY INSTALLED FOR USE IN IFR CONDITIONS AND IN RVSM AIRSPACE. WE HAD ONBOARD THE CREW OF 3; AS WELL AS AN FAA AVIONICS INSPECTOR AND AN AVIONICS ENGINEER. WE HAD JUST COMPLETED A SERIES OF PRACTICE APCHS AT ACT WITH THE FAA INSPECTOR IN THE L SEAT. AFTER THE LAST APCH WAS COMPLETED A MISSED APCH WAS INITIATED AND CLRNC REQUESTED FOR THE HIGH ALT PORTION OF THE CERTIFICATION FLT. AFTER THE CLRNC WAS RECEIVED AND THE ACFT CLBING THROUGH ABOUT 17000 FT; THE FAA INSPECTOR VACATED THE L SEAT AND I TOOK HIS PLACE. THE CAPT WAS QUITE BUSY DURING THE CREW CHANGE; WATCHING FOR TFC; HANDLING THE RADIOS; NAVING AND FLYING THE ACFT. WE WERE ASSIGNED A VECTOR UNTIL WE GOT THE FMS PROGRAMMED FOR THE NEXT LEG OF THE FLT. I SET ABOUT SETTING UP THE FMS RIGHT AWAY AND IN MY HASTE I LEFT OUT 1 WAYPOINT. OUR RTE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN TO FLY FROM ACT TO ABI TO MAF TO JCT AND THEN ON TO SAN ANTONIO WHERE WE STARTED. I NEGLECTED TO ENTER MAF INTO THE FMS. WE LEVELED OFF AT FL280 AND BEGAN OUR TESTS OF THE ALTIMETERS; ALL THE WHILE APCHING ABI AT 450 KTS. WE WERE QUITE BUSY ANSWERING QUESTIONS FROM OUR INSPECTOR AND ENGINEER; AS WELL AS FLYING THE ACFT AND FLIPPING THE SWITCHES AS DIRECTED. OUR NEXT TEST ALT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE FL410 SO WE REQUESTED THAT FROM THE CTLR AND UPON APPROVAL INITIATED A CLB. AS WE APCHED ABILENE IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WE NEEDED MORE TIME TO COMPLETE THE TESTS AND I GLANCED OVER AT THE FMS AND NOTICED THAT THE PROGRAMMED RTE WAS TO FLY FROM ABILENE TO JUNCTION. I THOUGHT THIS RTE MIGHT HAVE BEEN WRONG AND CONSIDERED REQUESTING A VECTOR AFTER ABILENE TO GIVE ME TIME TO CONFIRM THE PROPER RTE AND CONTINUE THE CLB. HOWEVER; BY THIS TIME THE FREQ WAS VERY CONGESTED; AND THE COCKPIT BUSY SO WHEN WE CROSSED ABILENE SECONDS LATER A TURN WAS INITIATED TO THE S TOWARDS JUNCTION. WE WERE THROUGH ABOUT 60 DEGS OF TURN WHEN THE CTLR HASTILY GAVE US A TURN BACK TO THE R MENTIONING THAT WE HAD TFC IN THE AREA. HE THEN CLRED US TOWARDS MIDLAND AS WE HAD FILED. SEVERAL MINS LATER HE QUESTIONED US AT LENGTH ABOUT OUR REASON FOR TURNING AND OUR FILED FLT PLAN. THESE TYPE OF FLTS INVOLVE A GREAT DEAL OF COM BTWN COCKPIT CREWS; ATC AND THE PEOPLE IN THE COCKPIT CERTIFYING THE EQUIP. ADDITIONALLY; THE RTE IS USUALLY A CIRCULAR ONE ENDING AT THE POINT OF ORIGIN. THEREFORE BIG HEADING CHANGES ARE NOT UNUSUAL OR CAUSE FOR ALARM. TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT FROM BECOMING SERIOUS I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. INSURE ALL SUCH FLTS ARE CONDUCTED UNDER DAY VFR CONDITIONS. COMMUNICATE TO THE CTLR THE NATURE OF THE FLT SO HE CAN BE EXTRA VIGILANT FOR UNUSUAL ACTIONS. ADDITIONALLY THE CTLR CAN PROVIDE VECTORS TO UNUSED AIRSPACE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SEPARATION. CTLRS SHOULD ALSO BE VIGILANT FOR UNUSUAL ROUTINGS THAT MAY INDICATE A TEST FLT. CREW CHANGES SHOULD INCLUDE A BRIEFING OF THE LAST CLRNC RECEIVED. FAA INSPECTORS IN THE COCKPIT SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE VASTLY INCREASED WORKLOAD IMPOSED ON THE CREW BY TEST FLTS AND SHOULD STOP TESTING AND TALKING WHEN THE CREW BECOMES LOADED DOWN. ALL PERSONNEL IN THE COCKPIT SHOULD BE LISTENING ON THE RADIO SO THAT THEY ARE INVOLVED IN THE FLT AND WILL KNOW WHEN THE CREW IS BUSY ON THE RADIO OR JUST TOO BUSY TO TALK. ALL PERSONNEL IN THE COCKPIT SHOULD DIRECT THEIR QUESTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR TESTING TO ONLY 1 MEMBER OF THE FLC AT A TIME. THEREFORE 1 PLT CAN DEVOTE ALL HIS ATTN TO FLYING THE ACFT. IF EVERYONE IS TALKING THEN NO ONE IS FLYING. CREW MEMBERS SHOULD CHK EACH OTHER WHEN PROGRAMMING THE FMS. WHEN UNDER HVY WORKLOADS; CHK YOURSELF. FREQ CONGESTION IS A BIG PROB AND GETTING WORSE. MORE SHOULD BE DONE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF AVAILABLE FREQS. IT'S HARD TO ASK QUESTIONS AND RECONFIRM CLRNCS WHEN YOU CAN'T EVEN GET A WORD IN.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.