CL65 ACFT ON TRAINING FLT FOR 2 NEW FO'S WITH INSTRUCTION BY CHK PLT. AFTER TRAINING AT ANOTHER ARPT FLC RETURNED TO HOME BASE WHERE THE WX WAS POOR AND HOLDING WAS REQUIRED. FLC COULDN'T PROGRAM FMS FOR PROPER HOLDING. CHK PLT TOOK OVER AND FLEW THE APCH; BUT WAS TOO FAR OFF COURSE AND HAD TO DO A GAR. NEXT APCH WAS STILL TOO FAR OFF TO CAPTURE LOC AND GS SO ANOTHER GAR ENSUED. EVENTUALLY THEY LANDED.

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WE THEN DEPARTED LEX FOR GSP AT AROUND XX30 AND EACH OF US WAS BEGINNING TO FEEL FATIGUED. NONETHELESS; WE CONTINUED TO WORK AS A TEAM; INCLUDING THE FO IN THE JUMP SEAT. I WAS THE PF. BY NOW; THE TWR WAS CLOSED AT GSP AND BECAUSE ANOTHER IFR ACFT WAS INBOUND TO GSP AHEAD OF US; ATC ISSUED A HOLD OVER SPA VOR. THE INTENTIONS OF ATC AND THE ATC INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE HOLD WERE UNCLR; HOWEVER; SO WE ASKED THE CTLR FOR CLARIFICATION. THE CTLR REPLIED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT HE MEANT EITHER. AFTER WE LOOKED AT EACH OTHER WITH FATIGUED DISBELIEF; MORE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED OF ATC AND CONSENSUS WAS ACHIEVED. AS THE CAPT ENTERED THE HOLD INTO THE FMS; THE ICE BEGAN. WE CONFIGURED THE ICE PROTECTION SYS AND THEN WATCHED AS THE FMS/AUTOPLT ATTEMPTED TO TURN THE WRONG DIRECTION UPON REACHING THE HOLDING FIX. I DISENGAGED THE FMS FROM THE AUTOPLT AND USED HDG MODE TO FLY THE HOLD. BY THIS TIME COMMENTS WERE BEING MADE LIKE 'WHAT IS IT DOING?' AND 'WHY WON'T IT DO XXXXX?' CONCERNING THE FMS; AND A VERY LARGE PORTION OF OUR CONCENTRATION WAS FOCUSED ON CONVINCING THE FMS TO TRACK THE HOLD. IN THE MIDST OF THIS; ATC CLRED US FOR THE APCH INTO GSP. SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE CHK AIRMAN ASSUMED CTL AS THE PF BECAUSE HE WANTED THE EXPERIENCE OF FLYING THE AIRPLANE SINCE HE SO RARELY GOT TO ACTUALLY FLY. AT THIS POINT; ATC HAD LEFT US HIGH ON THE FEEDER RTE TO THE IAF; WE WERE IN A NON RADAR ENVIRONMENT; THE APCH HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED; THE NECESSARY/APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED. I SPOKE UP AND SAID THAT I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH PROCEEDING DIRECTLY INTO THE APCH BECAUSE I WASN'T 'UP TO SPD' YET. THEN I ALLOWED THE CHK AIRMAN TO SUMMARILY 'CONVINCE' ME THAT I WAS READY AND WE WERE SHOOTING THE APCH. AT THIS POINT; THE ACFT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED NOR WERE THE RADIOS/BEARING POINTERS PROPERLY SET. WE OVERSHOT THE LOC TO THE NW AND THE PF WAS USING FMS TO PLOT OUR COURSE FROM PRESENT POS (FULL DEFLECTION NW OF THE LOC) TO THE DEPICTED RWY THRESHOLD. THE APCH AS FLOWN WAS UNSTABLE AND; AS MUCH AS I ABSOLUTELY DID NOT WANT TO SUGGEST TO A CHK AIRMAN THAT WE NEEDED TO GAR; I REALLY BELIEVED THAT A MISSED APCH WAS NECESSARY. I THEN CALLED 'GO MISSED.' SINCE WE WERE BY THIS POINT RATHER LOW AND WELL NW OF COURSE; I SUGGESTED A CLB TO THE MSA OF 5300 FT. THERE WAS CONFUSION DURING THE MISSED APCH; BUT ATC WAS NOTIFIED AND WE WERE RAPIDLY CLRED FOR ANOTHER APCH. AGAIN; THE CHKLISTS WERE LATE GETTING DONE AS WE SEARCHED FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND SPATIAL ORIENTATION. THE SECOND APCH WAS ALSO HIGH TO BEGIN AND WE AGAIN OVERSHOT THE LOC TO THE NW. THE AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR REFUSED TO CAPTURE THE GS BECAUSE WE WERE TOO FAR ABOVE IT AND THE LOC WAS FULLY DEFLECTED. AT THAT POINT THE PF ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS CANCELING THE FLT DIRECTOR AND FLYING THE APCH 'RAW DATA' TO MINIMUMS. AGAIN THE APCH WAS UNSTABLE AND I CALLED 'GO MISSED.' AGAIN THE MISSED APCH PROC WAS NOT PROPERLY FOLLOWED AS PUBLISHED AND CONFUSION REIGNED. ATC WAS NOTIFIED AND A THIRD APCH CLRNC WAS GIVEN. THIS TIME; WE ALL 3 TOOK A FEW SECONDS TO CALM DOWN AND RELAX. THE APCH WAS BRIEFED AND THE RADIOS PROPERLY SET. THE ACFT WAS PROPERLY CONFIGURED AND THE CHKLISTS THOROUGHLY COMPLETED. OUR APCH PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE AIRPLANE FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE.