FLC OF B737-300 HAS CONCERN REGARDING LAHSO PROCS AT CLT AND IN GENERAL USE. THEY FEEL THE TWR CONDUCTS CLOSELY SPACED TKOFS WITH LAHSO PROCS AND ACRS CAN ENCOUNTER JET BLAST AND BE FORCED INTO LONG LNDG ROLL OR MISSED APCH.

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LAND AND HOLD SHORT OPS WITH AIRLINERS DO NOT PROVIDE THE SAFETY NET WE ENJOY IN OTHER AREAS OF OP. CLT CONDUCTS CLOSELY SPACED TKOFS ON RWY 36R IN CONJUNCTION WITH LAHSO ON RWY 36R. AN AIRLINER COULD EASILY ENCOUNTER JET BLAST FROM A DEP ACFT AND BE FORCED INTO AN EXTENDED GND ROLL OR A MISSED APCH. A GND ROLL OF OVER 6300 FT COULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE GND CONFLICT WITH OPS ON RWY 5; WHILE A MISSED APCH COULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE AIRBORNE CONFLICT WITH TKOF OPS ON RWY 5. LAHSO IS AN ILL-CONCEIVED PLAN TO INCREASE ARPT CAPACITY. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE REDUNDANCY WHICH HAS MADE AIR TRAVEL THE SAFEST WAY TO TRAVEL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HE IS AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR FOR COMPANY AND UNION AND HAS SEEN THE RESULT OF LAHSO OPS THAT DID NOT WORK AS PLANNED. HE FEELS THERE IS NO SAFETY MARGIN. THE FLC MUST CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH A POSSIBLE OVERRUN AND NOW ADDED TO THAT IS A CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT. APPARENTLY THE LNDG COMPUTATIONS FOR LAHSO OPS ARE BASED ON VREF SPDS. THE FOQUA PROGRAMS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT SELDOM ARE ACFT AT VREF WHEN XING THE THRESHOLD; THEY ARE USUALLY MUCH HOTTER. RPTR ALSO FEELS THAT IF LAHSO OPS ARE TO CONTINUE THERE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ESCAPE MANEUVERS FOR A GAR SIT TO AVOID BEING DIRECTLY OVER A DEPARTING ACFT. HE IS WORKING THROUGH THE COMPANY AND THE UNION TO MAKE SOME CHANGES.