ATCT LCL CTLR CLARIFIES VISUAL SEPARATION BTWN 2 CARGO JET ACFT; WHEN ONE ACFT DRIFTS ACROSS FINAL; CONFLICTING WITH OTHER ACFT ON VISUAL APCH TO OTHER RWY. CTLR BELIEVES SAFETY AT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE TYPE OF COORD REQUIRED TO NOTIFY FRT COMPANY AND LACK OF BRITE RADAR DISPLAY IN TWR CAB.

Date: 1998-02 · Aircraft: DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Anomalies: conflict-airborne-conflict|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|other-unspecified

Synopsis

ATCT LCL CTLR CLARIFIES VISUAL SEPARATION BTWN 2 CARGO JET ACFT; WHEN ONE ACFT DRIFTS ACROSS FINAL; CONFLICTING WITH OTHER ACFT ON VISUAL APCH TO OTHER RWY. CTLR BELIEVES SAFETY AT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE TYPE OF COORD REQUIRED TO NOTIFY FRT COMPANY AND LACK OF BRITE RADAR DISPLAY IN TWR CAB.

Narrative

ON INITIAL CONTACT ACFT X RPTED R BASE FOR RWY 4R. I HAD VISUAL ON AN ACFT MAKING A L TURN TO ENTER A MID-FIELD R DOWNWIND. I REQUESTED ACFT X TO CONFIRM RWY. ACFT X REPLIED RWY 4R. I TOLD THE FLT TO MAINTAIN DOWNWIND HEADING; RWY CHANGE HAD BEEN MADE QUITE A WHILE AGO. ACFT X SUGGESTED A 180 DEG TURN. DUE TO UNKNOWN TFC UNDER DAYTON APCH CTL; I INSTRUCTED ACFT X TO MAINTAIN DOWNWIND HEADING; COORDINATING WITH DAYTON. DAYTON APCH REQUESTED ACFT X ON A 180 DEG HDG AND 3000 FT. THESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE RELAYED TO ACFT X. ACFT X THEN CALLED L BASE FOR RWY 22L. VISUAL CONTACT WAS MADE. ACFT X GIVEN LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 22L. ACFT Y CALLED VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 22R. VISUAL CONTACT WAS MADE WITH FLT. ACFT Y GIVEN TFC ON ACFT X ON A DOGLEG TO FINAL FOR RWY 22L; AND LNDG CLRNC GIVEN FOR RWY 22R. I THEN COORDINATED THE LNDG SEQUENCE TO THE GND DEPT TWR. WHILE COORDINATING; I WAS ALERTED BY DAYTON THAT ACTION NEEDED TO BE TAKEN ON A SIT DEVELOPING BTWN ACFT Y AND ACFT X. I OBSERVED ACFT X OVERSHOOTING THE FINAL FOR RWY 22L. ACFT X GIVEN TFC ON ACFT Y; ON R BASE FOR RWY 22R. ACFT X ADVISED TFC WAS IN SIGHT. I ASKED ACFT Y IF THEY HAD THE DC9 OVERSHOOTING FINAL FOR RWY 22L IN SIGHT. ACFT Y ADVISED TFC IN SIGHT. FLTS LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I MAINTAINED VISUAL SEPARATION WITH BOTH FLTS FROM INITIAL CONTACT UNTIL LNDG. AFTER ACFT X OVERSHOT FINAL FOR RWY 22L; I REINFORCED THE VISUAL SEPARATION THAT I WAS APPLYING BY VERIFYING ACFT X AND ACFT Y HAD EACH OTHER IN SIGHT. HAD THE LCL CTLR NOT HAD THEIR ATTN AWAY FROM TFC CALLING THE LNDG SEQUENCE TO THE GND DEPT TWR; CTLR WOULD HAVE SEEN THE SIT DEVELOPING SOONER; AND TAKEN ACTION. INSTALL THE RADAR DISPLAY IN THE TWR CAB. FRT COMPANY A HAS THESE IN STORAGE; SUPPOSEDLY WAITING FOR FAA APPROVAL TO USE THEM. THIS WOULD RELIEVE DAYTON APCH FROM CALLING OVER THE SEQUENCE; AND IMPROVE AIR TFC CTL OF AREA TFC; AND IMPROVE SAFETY. WITH THE AMOUNT OF TFC THAT ILN RECEIVES IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD; SAFETY IS AT ISSUE; WHEN A REQUIRED CTLR TOOL IS NOT AVAILABLE. (RADAR) REF POS RPTS; IT IS OUR WORD AGAINST THEIRS ON WHERE THEY ARE.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.