FO OF AN MD88 OVERSHOT ILS FINAL ON 2 SETS OF PARALLEL RWYS DUE TO HAVING THE WRONG ILS TUNED IN. HIS MISTAKE WAS DISCOVERED WHEN A B727 WAS OBSERVED NEARBY; HIGH AND TO THE R OF THEIR POS. WHEN THE CAPT TUNED IN THE CORRECT ILS; THE PROPER COURSE WAS INTERCEPTED.

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ESTABLISHED ON BASE LEG TO RWY 27L; APCH CTL CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH AND TURNED US TO INTERCEPT TO FINAL HDG OF 300 DEGS. HAVING PREVIOUSLY SEEN AND ACKNOWLEDGED OUR 'TFC TO FOLLOW;' I COMPLIED WITH THE NEW HDG AS I GLANCED INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO CONFIRM MY ROLLOUT HDG OF 300 DEGS AND WHEN I LOOKED BACK OUTSIDE; I REACQUIRED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE PRECEDING ACFT TO FOLLOW. AT THIS DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT; THE RWYS WERE NOT YET VISIBLE AND I WAS USING THE LOC TO CONFIRM THE INTERCEPT TO FINAL. I SAW WHAT I EXPECTED TO SEE ON THE HSI DISPLAY; THAT IS THE CDI DEFLECTED TO THE R. WHAT I DID NOT REALIZE; HOWEVER; WAS THAT I HAD THE WRONG LOC FREQ DIALED IN AND; THEREFORE; MY INSTS WERE GIVING ME INCORRECT INFO. WHEN I NOTICED A B727 AT MY 2 O'CLOCK HIGH POS (I ESTIMATE HE WAS 1000 FT ABOVE AND AT ABOUT 3/4 OF A MI) I KNEW ONE OF US WAS OVERSHOOTING. AT THIS POINT; I CALLED OUT THE TFC TO THE CAPT AND I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO BANK AWAY FROM THE B727 AND LOOKED AGAIN AT MY LOC WHICH STILL DISPLAYED THE CDI TO THE R OF COURSE. THE CAPT AND I WERE BOTH SURPRISED AT SEEING THE B727 AS IT WAS NOW OBVIOUS THAT ONE OF US WAS OVERSHOOTING FINAL. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE; I ASKED THE CAPT TO CONFIRM THE LOC FREQ WHEREUPON HE CONFIRMED WE HAD SET IN THE WRONG ONE. AT THIS TIME; WE COULD NOW SEE ALL 4 RWYS; AND OUR MISTAKE WAS OBVIOUS AS WE CORRECTED BACK. APCH CTL ALSO NOTICED OUR OVERSHOOT AND GAVE US A HDG TO 240 DEGS TO REINTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY 27L. WE RETUNED OUR FREQS AND CORRECTED BACK TO THE CORRECT COURSE FOR AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. HOW THE PROB AROSE: INCORRECT LOC FREQ TUNED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ALTHOUGH VMC CONDITIONS PREVAILED; NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE RWYS AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE; DELAYED OUR DISCOVERY OF THE ERROR. HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: NOTICING THE B727 WHO WAS CONDUCTING AN APCH TO RWY 26R. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: ESTABLISHED A VECTOR AWAY FROM THE B727 AND REINTERCEPTED FINAL FOR RWY 27L. PERCEPTIONS; JUDGEMENTS; DECISIONS: THE PERCEPTION THAT THE TFC I WAS FOLLOWING 2 MI AHEAD WAS CONDUCTING AN APCH TO RWY 27L WHEN HE WAS IN FACT ON RWY 26R. ACTIONS OR INACTION: FAILURE TO RECHK OUR NAVAID SETTINGS BEFORE BEGINNING THE APCH. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT IS A NORMAL PART OF MY XCHK BUT SINCE THIS WAS A 'VISUAL' APCH TO A FAMILIAR FIELD; I WAS COMFORTABLE THAT EVERYTHING WAS IN ORDER SINCE I HAD A VISUAL ON THE TFC AHEAD. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: AGAIN; BEING IN A VERY FAMILIAR ENVIRONMENT AT ATL; I ALLOWED MY CONFIDENCE TO DETRACT FROM NORMAL HABIT PATTERNS -- THAT OF ALWAYS XCHKING THE NAVAIDS. ALTHOUGH I HAVE ONLY 6 MONTHS EXPERIENCE WITH ACR OPS; I HAVE CLOSE TO 2000 HRS OF MIL FLYING EXPERIENCE AND IN FIGHTERS; AND MOST OF IT IS AS AN INSTRUCTOR PLT. FOR YRS; I HAVE TAUGHT MY STUDENTS THE IMPORTANCE OF NEVER GETTING COMPLACENT IN THE COCKPIT AND YET I FELL VICTIM TO IT. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO ALWAYS DOUBLECHK FREQS AND SETTINGS IN THE COCKPIT NO MATTER HOW 'ROUTINE' THE APCH MAY SEEM. THIS WAS A WAKE-UP CALL FOR ME THAT I WON'T SOON FORGET.