AN ARTCC RADAR CTLR AT ZOA CLAIMS THAT STAFFING WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO HANDLE THE TFC AFTER WX UNEXPECTEDLY MOVED INTO THE AREA. SOME ACFT DIVERTED DUE TO LOW FUEL STATUS; AND SOME CTLRS WERE ON THE SECTOR MORE THAN 2 HRS WITHOUT RELIEF.

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ON MAY/XA/98; A DANGEROUS INCIDENT OCCURRED AT ZOA. AREA A WAS HOLDING 19 ACFT DESTINED FOR SFO. 9 ACFT AT SECTOR 12 (LOW ALT); AND 10 ACFT AT SECTOR 14 (HIGH ALT). THERE WAS NO FLOW CTL PROGRAM IN PLACE AT THE TIME; NOR DID ANYONE PUT ONE IN PLACE AFTER BAD WX MOVED IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA. THE SECTOR 12 CTLR HAD 2 HRS AND 10 MINS ON POS WHILE HOLDING 9 ACFT WITH NO RELIEF IN SIGHT BECAUSE OF STAFFING SHORTAGES. THE SECTOR 14 CTLR HAD 2 HRS AND 15 MINS ON POS WHILE HOLDING 10 ACFT; ALSO WITH NO RELIEF IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED BTWN XF15 AND XH35. BOTH CTLRS WERE DUE TO END THEIR SHIFT AT XH30; MEANING THEY HAD ALREADY WORKED 8 AND 9 HRS; WERE FATIGUED AND WAITING TO BE RELIEVED. COMBINE WORKING A FULL SHIFT; HOLDING 9 OR 10 ACFT AT THE END OF IT; A FATIGUED CTLR; AND YOU HAVE A RECIPE FOR A TERRIBLE ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT. COMPOUNDING THIS SIT WAS 7 OUT OF THE 19 ACFT HAD TO DIVERT TO OAK DUE TO FUEL CONSIDERATIONS. THIS; IN TURN; MADE SECTOR 11 VERY BUSY WITH THESE DIVERSIONS MIXING WITH THEIR NORMAL OAK ARR RUSH FROM THE S; AND THEIR NORMAL ROUTINE TFC; REQUIRING 2 CTLRS; THEREBY REDUCING STAFFING EVEN MORE. THIS ALSO MADE SECTOR 13 EXTREMELY BUSY BECAUSE OF THE SATURATION AT SECTOR 11; SECTOR 13 WAS FORCED TO START HOLDING ALL OAK ARRS AT THE PXN VOR. SECTOR 13 WAS BEING WORKED BY ONLY ONE CTLR; AGAIN BECAUSE OF STAFFING SHORTAGES. IN ALL THAT EVENING; AREA A WAS WORKING 1 CTLR BELOW ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES; WITH NO OVERTIME CALLED IN. 4 CTLRS WERE REQUIRED TO WORK VERY HVY VOLUMES OF TFC WHILE EXCEEDING 2 HRS ON POS; AT OR NEAR THE END OF THEIR SHIFTS. THIS CREATED A VERY UNSAFE CONDITION; AND A POTENTIAL FOR A VERY DANGEROUS ACCIDENT OCCURRING. FIRST AND FOREMOST; STAFFING MUST BE INCREASED AT ZOA. IN PLAIN LANGUAGE; WE JUST DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH FPL'S TO STAFF FOR OUR GUIDELINES. WE ROUTINELY WORK BELOW ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES; AND SUPVRS ARE APPREHENSIVE TO CALL IN OVERTIME. SECONDLY; THIS INCIDENT JUST CANNOT BE BLAMED ON AN INCORRECT WX FORECAST. AT XA15; THE SUPVRS AND TFC MGMNT RECEIVED A FORECAST FROM THE NWS INDICATING VFR WX. HOWEVER; WHEN THE BAD WX DID MOVE IN AT APPROX XE30; NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY TMU OR SUPERVISION TO PRECLUDE THIS SIT FROM OCCURRING. AT SHIFT START; AREA A WAS WORKING 1 CTLR BELOW ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES; AND NO OVERTIME WAS CALLED IN. THE SUPVR IN CHARGE SHOULD HAVE CALLED IN OVERTIME TO BRING THE AREA UP TO ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES. ALSO; THE SUPVR SHOULD HAVE HELD OVER 3 CTLRS THAT WENT HOME AT XG00. FINALLY; A 'FLOW CTL PROGRAM' OR 'GND STOP' SHOULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED ASAP AFTER THE WX WORSENED TO ALLEVIATE THE HVY WORKLOAD ON THE CTLRS ALREADY WORKING SHORTHANDED.