A DC9-40 FLC EXPERIENCES THE LOSS OF THEIR R SIDE ELECTRICAL PLUS THE FO'S FLT INSTS AFTER THE R GENERATOR FAILED. THE USE OF THE APU FAILED TO RESTORE THESE LOSSES.
Synopsis
A DC9-40 FLC EXPERIENCES THE LOSS OF THEIR R SIDE ELECTRICAL PLUS THE FO'S FLT INSTS AFTER THE R GENERATOR FAILED. THE USE OF THE APU FAILED TO RESTORE THESE LOSSES.
Narrative
ON TKOF THE R GENERATOR FAILED. PREVIOUS FLT HAD A GALLEY LEAK WHICH LEAKED INTO THE ELECTRICAL COMPARTMENT. WE ALSO HAD WX DEV ON DEP AND BECAME IMC. OUR CHKLIST CALLS TO RESET THE GENERATOR AND LEAVING IT IN THE OFF POS. THE FO WAS THE PF. WHEN THIS WAS DONE WE LOST ALL OF THE R SIDE ELECTRICS INCLUDING THE FO'S FLT INSTS. AT THIS POINT I BECAME THE PF AND MY FO RAN THE CHKLIST FOR OUR NEW SIT; A '4 LIGHT GENERATOR TRIP.' AT THIS TIME I DISCOVERED THAT MY MIKE WENT BAD. I HAD TO USE MY FO'S UNTIL I WAS ABLE TO SWAP WITH OUR SPARE. WE ARE STILL IMC. MY FO INADVERTENTLY STARTED THE APU TOO SOON IN THE PROC. THE APU WAS UNABLE TO PWR THE ACFT'S R SIDE. WE DECLARED A PRECAUTIONARY EMER AND DIVERTED TO DSM (FOR THE REASONS OF OUR GENERATOR PROB; THE PREVIOUS GALLEY LEAK IN OUR E&E COMPARTMENT AND THE POSSIBLE OVERWT LNDG). WE MADE A NORMAL UNDERWT LNDG IN DSM. DURING POSTFLT REVIEW THE FO FELT THAT HE MAY HAVE FOLLOWED THE WRONG COLUMN AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PWR THE R SIDE ELECTRICAL. AFTER EVALUATING OUR CONDITION; AND THE APU WAS NOT CAPABLE OF POWERING THE R ELECTRICAL SYS; WE MADE THE PROPER DECISION TO LAND. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CAPT RPTR STATED THAT THE ACFT WAS A DC9-40 ACFT. THE BASIC PROB AS NOTED IN THE TEXT OF A GALLEY LEAK WAS DETECTED INITIALLY BY THE FO DURING THE PREFLT OF THE ACFT. THERE WAS COFFEE AND SODA STANDING IN THE GALLEY AREA. THIS DRAIN SHARES THE SAME PLUMBING AS THE FORWARD LAVATORY DRAIN SYS AND DRAINS INTO THE AFT PORTION OF THE E&E COMPARTMENT. THE MAINT DEPT WAS CALLED. THEY CLOSED THE DRAIN; INSPECTED THE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT AND GAVE A CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH; STATING THAT THERE WAS '...NO MOISTURE' AND SIGNED OFF THE LOG. THE '4 LIGHT GENERATOR TRIP' AS REFERRED IN THE TEXT MEANT THAT THE ACFT NOW DISPLAYED A CSD FAIL LIGHT; AN AC FAIL LIGHT; A DC FAIL LIGHT AND A GENERATOR FAIL LIGHT. THERE WAS AN ASSOCIATED PROB WITH A 'LOCKED OUT DC CROSS TIE RELAY' THAT WAS MANUALLY SELECTED TO THE CLOSED POS. THIS COULD NOT HOWEVER; RESTORE THE LOST AC PWR TO THE R SIDE. IT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME WHY THE L GENERATOR OF THE APU COULD NOT PROVIDE THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT WITH AC PWR. THE CAPT INDICATED SOME DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE FO'S TURNING ON THE APU TOO SOON; PRIOR TO THEIR GIVING THE R GENERATOR A SECOND CHANCE TO OPERATE THE R SIDE AC PWR. PROC CALLS FOR THAT CHOICE FIRST; THEN THE APU; AFTER THE BUS IS ISOLATED SO AS TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THE APU FROM ANY DOWN LINE FAULTS. HE STATED THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS THE FO WAS PREMATURE IN HIS ACTIONS. ONE; THAT THE COMPANY IS IN THE PROCESS OF 'CLEANING UP' THAT CHKLIST AS IT IS TOO WORDY. THE SECOND; THAT THE FO HAD JUST 1 YR WITH THE COMPANY AND HE WAS OVERLY ANXIOUS TO RESTORE HIS FLT INSTS AS HE WAS THE PF.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.