MD80 CREW HAD 'TAIL COMPARTMENT HIGH TEMP' WARNING. AFTER RETURNING TO DEP STATION THE CAPT DISAGREED ABOUT THE SUITABILITY OF THE MAINT CORRECTIVE ACTION 'COULD NOT DUPLICATE;' AND REFUSED THE ACFT.

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'TAIL COMPARTMENT HIGH TEMP' WARNING ANNUNCIATION ILLUMINATED OUT OF 1000 FT AGL. COMPLIED WITH CHKLISTS AND AIR RETURNED TO RNO. LIGHT EXTINGUISHED WHILE RETURNING TO ARPT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: HIGH OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 95+ DEGS DAY. OVER SENSITIVE TEMP SENSOR. HIGH PNEUMATIC BLEED LOAD DEMANDS. THE CAPT WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE MAINT CORRECTIVE ACTION 'COULD NOT DUPLICATE' AND REFUSED TO TAKE THE ACFT PART 121 WITHOUT A TEST FLT. THE CAPT WAS REMOVED BY CREW SCHEDULING AND REPLACED WITH A CAPT WHO TOOK THE FLT. THE WARNING ILLUMINATED AGAIN BUT THIS TIME THE NEW CAPT BRUSHED IT OFF AS EXCESSIVE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP. HUMAN FACTORS: THE FIRST CAPT WAS A RECENTLY DEPOSED DIRECTOR OF OPS WITH A CHIP ON HIS SHOULDER OVER NEW MGMNT. ALSO; LITTLE LINE EXPERIENCE -- ESPECIALLY WITH NUISANCE TAIL COMPARTMENT LIGHTS. THE SECOND CAPT WAS A LINE CHK AIRMAN WITH PLENTY OF LINE EXPERIENCE. THERE WERE NO OP MGMNT PEOPLE AVAILABLE TO INTERVENE DUE TO CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS. ALL DECISIONS WERE MADE BY THE NON FLYING MGMNT PEOPLE (DISPATCHERS; MECHS). CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: THE FIRST CAPT WOULD HAVE AIR RETURNED A SECOND TIME. THE SECOND CAPT COULD HAVE HAD A BLEED LEAK AND NEVER REALIZED IT. WE SHOULD HAVE TEST FLOWN THE AIRPLANE WITH MAINT; FOUND THE PROB AND FIXED IT.