A CESSNA CITATION IN A HOLD AT 7500 FT DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED IMMEDIATE LNDG DUE TO A L ENG FLAMEOUT CAUSED BY THE L FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION FAILURE AND POOR FUEL QUANTITY MAINT PRACTICES.

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THE CAPT WAS THE PLT AT THE CTLS. THE CAPT OBTAINED FLT RELEASE FOR A 1.2 HR ENRTE FLT. DISPATCH HAD CHANGED THE DEP TIME TO XB00Z. FUEL REQUIRED ACCORDING TO DISPATCH WAS 2799 LBS INCLUDING ENG START; TAXI; ENRTE AND A RESERVE OF 1000 LBS. (THE 1000 LB RESERVE IS A STANDARD RESERVE SET AS A DEFAULT IN THE DISPATCH COMPUTER AND IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF A 45 MIN RESERVE; 800 LBS WILL MEET THIS REQUIREMENT.) CAPT ORDERED 240 GALLONS OF JET A TO BRING THE FUEL TO APPROX 3000 LBS. PIC AND FO COMPLETED PREFLT DUTIES AND WAITED FOR THE PAX TO ARRIVE. PAX ARRIVED AT ABOUT XA54Z. THE CREW STARTED THE ACFT WITHOUT INCIDENT AND FUEL WAS NOTED AT 2800 LBS (1400 LBS IN EACH TANK). DURING THE TKOF RUN AT APPROX 90 KIAS AND 1500 FT DOWN THE RWY; THE CREW INITIATED AN ABORT WHEN A FLOCK OF CANADIAN GEESE WHICH WERE IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE RWY IN TALL GRASS; GOT AIRBORNE. THE ABORT PREVENTED A BIRD STRIKE. THE CREW REQUESTED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO TAXI CLR TO VISUALLY INSPECT THE ACFT. THE CREW DID NOT HEAR OR SEE ANY EVIDENCE DURING THE ABORT THAT WOULD INDICATE A BIRD STRIKE. VISUAL INSPECTION CONFIRMED THIS. THE ACFT WAS RESTARTED AND TAXIED FOR TKOF. TKOF FUEL WAS NOW BTWN 2500-2600 LBS. (STILL LEGAL USING AN 800 LB RESERVE.) AT XB24Z THE FLT FINALLY GOT AIRBORNE. ONCE AIRBORNE; THE CAPT INFORMED THE COMPANY OF THE ABORTED TKOF VIA TELEPHONE. THE HOLDING CLRNC WAS RECEIVED AT APPROX XC25Z. THE CLRNC INCLUDED A HOLDING 'DEP TIME' OF XC39Z. JUST PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF THE CLRNC THE L-HAND 'LOW FUEL QUANTITY' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE L FUEL GAUGE INDICATED 750-800 LBS OF FUEL; THE SAME AS THE R-HAND ONE. THE CREW HAD EXPERIENCED THIS LIGHT IN THIS ACFT AT THE SAME FUEL LEVEL ON 2 PREVIOUS FLTS. THE CAPT'S EXPERIENCE WITH THIS CAUTION LIGHT IN OTHER SII ACFT ILLUMINATING SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE ADVERTISED 185 LBS COUPLED WITH A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH AN SII PROGRAM MGR CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THESE LIGHTS (WHEN THE CAPT QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT THE NEED FOR MAINT ACTION HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A COMMON OCCURRENCE) LED HIM TO BELIEVE THE NORMALLY ACCURATE FUEL GAUGES AND TO HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR CAUTION LIGHT. DURING THE HOLDING; THE CREW WAS CONCERNED THAT THEIR FUEL WAS APCHING 1000 LBS. THE CAPT INSTRUCTED THE FO TO COPY THE ALTERNATE'S ATIS IN CASE THEY WERE GOING TO BE FURTHER DELAYED. THE CAPT SET 800 LBS AS THEIR 'GO TO ALTERNATE FUEL.' AT APPROX XC39Z; ZZZ INSTRUCTED THE CREW TO DEPART THE HOLDING FIX ON A 160 DEG HDG. FEELING THE APCH WAS SOON TO FOLLOW AND WITH APPROX 1100 LBS REMAINING; THE CREW PREPARED FOR THE APCH. AFTER SEVERAL MINS ON THIS HDG; THE CREW WAS INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO THE HOLDING FIX AND EXECUTE A L 360 DEG TURN. FUEL AT THIS TIME WAS INDICATION JUST ABOVE 1100 LBS. AT THE END OF THIS 360 DEG TURN THE CREW WAS INSTRUCTED TO DO ANOTHER 360 DEG TURN TO THE L. THE CAPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO INSTRUCT THE FO TO CALL ZZZ WHEN THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 7000 FT. DURING THE DSCNT THE L ENG FLAMED OUT. THE FUEL REMAINING INDICATED AT LEAST 1000 LBS (500 LBS PER SIDE). THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE ENG FAILURE/PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN CHKLIST; INSTRUCTED THE FO TO DECLARE AN EMER AND REQUEST IMMEDIATE LNDG. THE CAPT SQUAWKED 7700 AND TURNED TOWARDS THE VOR. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE SINGLE ENG APCH AND LNDG CHKLIST. ZZZ CLRED THE ACFT FOR THE ILS RWY 33L APCH AND FOR LNDG. WHEN THE ACFT WAS WITHIN GLIDE DISTANCE THE CAPT DSNDED AND LANDED ON RWY 33L AT XD00Z. AFTER SHUTDOWN THE L FUEL GAUGE INDICATED 500 LBS AND THE R FUEL GAUGE INDICATED 300 LBS. THE FACTS INDICATE TO ME; THE CAPT; THAT THE MAIN AND EQUALLY CONTRIBUTING CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE A MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION OF THE L FUEL GAUGE; SUPERVISORY ERROR ON THE PART OF THE PROGRAM MGR; AND PLT ERROR ON THE PART OF THE CAPT.