FLC RPT ON A TAILSTRIKE ON LNDG IN AN SF340. A PROB EXISTS WITHIN THE AIRLINE MGMNT POLICY PROC IN LOADING PROCS PAX CARGO.

Date: 1998-10 · Aircraft: SF 340A

Anomalies: conflict-ground-conflict|critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown

Synopsis

FLC RPT ON A TAILSTRIKE ON LNDG IN AN SF340. A PROB EXISTS WITHIN THE AIRLINE MGMNT POLICY PROC IN LOADING PROCS PAX CARGO.

Narrative

ON OCT/XA/98; DURING LNDG ROLLOUT; THE ACFT REACTED AS LOADED BEYOND AFT CTR OF GRAVITY AND STRUCK THE TAIL SECTION ON RWY 13 AT BTR. ACFT RECOVERED WITH FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE CTL YOKE. THE ACFT WAS LOADED; WT AND BAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY POLICY AND PROCS WITH CTR OF GRAVITY LOCATED IN THE AFT CAUTION AREA. THE CAPT AND THE LOAD ROOM AT DFW DISCUSSED THE SIT BEFORE DEPARTING DFW AND A WT SHIFT WAS PERFORMED TO REMEDY THE CTR OF GRAVITY PROB. HOWEVER; AFTER THE WT SHIFT; THE ACFT WAS STILL SLIGHTLY IN THE AFT CTR OF GRAVITY CAUTION AREA. UPON REACHING THE RAMP AT BTR; ALL BAGS WERE WEIGHED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CARRY-ON BAGS. WT CAME IN 50 LBS OVER WHAT WAS PASSED TO THE CREW AT DFW FOR THE ORIGINAL CALCULATIONS. MOREOVER; OUT OF THE 33 PAX; 8 WERE LARGER THAN THE STANDARD 180 LBS USED FOR CALCULATIONS. ALL WERE SEATED IN THE AFT SECTION OF THE ACFT. COMPANY PROC ALLOWS THE GATE AGENT TO ASSIGN SEATS TO THE PAX WITH NO CONSIDERATION FOR ACFT WT AND BAL. THE CREW NEVER GETS TO SEE THE PAX AND THE ONLY INFO THEY RECEIVE IS A BREAKDOWN OF PAX IN EACH SECTION PASSED TO THE CREW BY THE FLT ATTENDANT. OVERSIZED PAX ARE NOT ADJUSTED FOR; JUST NUMBERS PER SECTION. IN THE SAME SPIRIT; BAGGAGE LOADERS COUNT BAGS IN CARGO AREA #1 AND #2 AND MULTIPLY THE NUMBER WITH 23.5 LBS FOR A STANDARD NUMBER. HOWEVER; OVERSIZED CARGO CAN BE OVERLOOKED; AFFECTING THE FINAL LOAD NUMBER. THE CREW DEPARTED DFW WITH THE ACFT WITHIN CTR OF GRAVITY LIMITS ON PAPER; HOWEVER; IN REALITY THE ACFT WAS FURTHER AFT LOADED THAN EXPECTED. THIS RESULTED IN THE TAILSTRIKE SIT THAT NIGHT. WHEN PAX CHK IN AT THE GATE; BAG WTS CAN BE TAKEN AND A SIMPLE WT AND BAL PROGRAM CAN BE IMPLEMENTED INTO THE CHK-IN PROCESS AT THE COUNTER; RESULTING IN A MORE ACCURATE WT AND BAL COMPUTATION; ALLEVIATING THIS SIT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.