A B727-200 FREIGHTER WAS ON TAXI OUT FOR TKOF WHEN BRAKING HARD HEARD THE CARGO CONTAINERS MOVING DUE TO CARGO LOADED IMPROPERLY.

Date: 1998-10 · Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|other-unspecified

Synopsis

A B727-200 FREIGHTER WAS ON TAXI OUT FOR TKOF WHEN BRAKING HARD HEARD THE CARGO CONTAINERS MOVING DUE TO CARGO LOADED IMPROPERLY.

Narrative

WHILE BRINGING THE ACFT TO A STOP DURING OUR TAXI FOR TKOF; WE NOTICED THE SOUND OF A CONTAINER MOVING IN THE UPPER CARGO DECK. WE IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE CARGO APRON AND INVESTIGATED. WE DETERMINED THAT THE BUTT LOCKS IN POS #1; #3; #4; #5 AND #10; #11; #12 WERE VERIFIED UP. A HIDDEN AND UNKNOWN EMPTY POS WAS PRESENT IN POS #7. THERE WAS 1 CONTAINER IN FRONT OF AND 2 BEHIND POS #7. THE LOAD SHEET AND WT AND BAL INDICATED OTHERWISE. THE ACFT WAS NOT LOADED ACCORDING TO THE COMPUTER GENERATED ACR LOAD SHEET ISSUED TO US (SEE ATTACHED LOAD SHEET AND WT AND BAL). ADDITIONALLY; POS #7 DID NOT HAVE ITS LOCKS UP ALLOWING POS #6 TO MOVE BACK AND FORTH BTWN POS #6 AND #7. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A COMBINATION OF FAILURES CAUSED THIS INCIDENT. OUR PREARRANGED TRANSPORTATION FROM THE HOTEL TO THE ARPT (FBO) WAS LATE. AFTER REPOSITIONING THE ACFT FOR LOADING; EVERYONE INVOLVED IN THE LOADING PROCESS WAS OPERATING QUICKLY TO AVOID FURTHER DELAYS. THE FE (AS DESIGNATED BY ME) WAS PROACTIVE IN MONITORING THE LOADING PROCESS. AT ONE POINT HE CLBED THE K-LOADER AND ENTERED THE MAIN CARGO AREA DURING LOADING. HOWEVER; AS STATED IN AOM BULLETIN; HIS OTHER REQUIRED PLT DUTIES KEPT HIM FROM THIS FOR ONLY A SHORT TIME. A FBO MGR (GND HANDLER MZMZ) AND ACR MGR (KYZK) WERE BOTH PRESENT AND ACTIVELY MONITORED THE ENTIRE LOADING PROCESS. THEY EVEN INDICATED TO US THAT THE 'HANDS ON' LOADERS ARE REQUIRED ARPT AUTH TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES AND ARE NOT OF THE HIGHEST QUALITY. ALL OF THIS; COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT LOADED ACCORDING TO THE ACR LOAD PLAN AND THAT THE LOAD PLAN WAS (AND TYPICALLY IS) GIVEN TO THE REMAINING 2 CREW MEMBERS IN THE COCKPIT AFTER THE LOADING PROCESS WAS/IS NEARLY COMPLETE; DID CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO THIS INCIDENT. BRUSSELS DISPATCH WAS NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY AND THE ACFT WAS COMPLETELY RELOADED BEFORE DEPARTING AGAIN FOR BRUSSELS.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.