FK10 AND AN MD80 CAME WITHIN 100 FT HORIZ AND 60 FT VERT OF COLLIDING IN A LAHSO AT CLT.

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HOLDING IN POS FOR TKOF. LAHSO IN EFFECT. CLRED FOR TKOF AND ADVISED LNDG TFC WILL HOLD SHORT OF OUR (INTERSECTING) RWY. AROUND 120 KTS; OPPOSING MD80 ACFT BECAME VISIBLE FROM BEHIND HANGARS. THE CLOSER WE GOT TO THE INTXN OF THE RWYS; THE MORE APPARENT IT BECAME THE MD80 WAS NOT GOING TO HOLD SHORT OF OUR RWY. V1 WAS CALLED AND CAPT AGGRESSIVELY ROTATED TO TKOF ALT. WE PASSED PROBABLY 100 FT IN FRONT OF THE MD80 AND 60-100 FT AGL. AT NO TIME WAS CONTACT IMMINENT; HOWEVER; WE PASSED VERY CLOSE TO THE MD80. OBVIOUSLY THE TWR THOUGHT THE LNDG ACFT WOULD HOLD SHORT AND THE LNDG ACFT THOUGHT IT HAD FULL LENGTH AVAILABLE. THERE WAS A MIX-UP IN COMS BTWN THE TWR; THE LNDG ACFT AND ANOTHER ACFT FARTHER OUT ON FINAL WHO WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO LAND WITH FULL LENGTH AVAILABLE. THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF LAHSO NEEDS TO BE RE-EVALUATED TO DETERMINE IF THE MINIMAL ADVANTAGES GAINED IN TFC HANDLING JUSTIFY THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 420831: THE CLT TWR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 36R TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5/23. THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WERE CHKED AND WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE LAND HOLD SHORT CLRNC. WHILE ON FINAL APCH WE RECEIVED A XMISSION WHICH WE BELIEVED AUTHORIZED THE USE OF THE FULL LENGTH OF RWY 36R. THIS XMISSION WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY OUR FLT. AFTER LNDG; AS WE APCHED THE RWY 5 INTXN; ANOTHER ACFT CROSSED IN FRONT OF AND VERY CLOSE TO OUR ACFT. UPON REACHING THE GATE; I PHONED THE TWR AND TALKED WITH THE SUPVR.