BE02 FO TAKES ISSUE WITH CAPT'S DECISION TO INITIATE AN APCH IN N90 AIRSPACE.

Narrative

THIS PROB BEGAN WHEN UNFORECASTED GND FOG MOVED IN ON OUR DEST ARPT REDUCING VISIBILITY TO 1/4 MI ACCORDING TO ASOS. I ASKED THE CAPT WHAT HE WANTED TO DO AND HE IMMEDIATELY QUESTIONED THE RELIABILITY OF THE ASOS RPTING STATION. HE SAID HE WANTED TO FLY OVER THE ARPT AND HAVE A LOOK. I COULD SEE THAT HE WAS THINKING ABOUT TRYING THE APCH. I INFORMED HIM THAT OUR ONLY 2 OPTIONS WERE TO HOLD UNTIL THE ASOS VISIBILITY IMPROVED TO APCH MINIMUMS OR GO TO OUR ALTERNATE. I INSISTED THAT AN APCH TO 'HAVE A LOOK' WAS NOT ONLY UNSAFE; BUT ILLEGAL. AT THIS TIME HE OPTED FOR THE HOLD OPTION AND WE WERE PROCEEDING TO STANE INTXN WHEN NEW YORK APCH INFORMED US THAT THE LAST OFFICIAL WX RPT (PRIOR TO TWR CLOSING) WAS 2 MI VISIBILITY IN MIST. THE TWR HAD CLOSED ONLY ABOUT 20 MINS PRIOR TO THIS TIME AND IN SPITE OF THE MORE RECENT ASOS RPT WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED VIA TELEPHONE/RADIO PATCH FROM COMPANY; THE CAPT DECIDED IT WAS NOW LEGAL TO ACCEPT THE ILS TO RWY 6. I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THIS; BUT RESIGNED MYSELF TO HIS DECISION. WE COULD SEE THE ARPT STRAIGHT DOWN THROUGH THE FOG; AND COULD SEE THE REILS THROUGHOUT THE APCH; BUT AT 100 FT WE COULD STILL ONLY SEE REILS (NO OTHER RWY LIGHTS AT ALL); SO WE EXECUTED THE MISSED APCH. FROM THIS POINT ON; IT WAS A ROUTINE MISSED APCH -- HOLD; CALL COMPANY; GO TO THE ALTERNATE. I LOST A LOT OF SLEEP THAT NIGHT AS I MULLED OVER THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DECISION TO ACCEPT THE APCH. IN HINDSIGHT; I FEEL THAT ACCEPTING WAS CLRLY THE WRONG DECISION. THE ISSUES I CONSIDERED ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE ASOS WX WAS MORE CURRENT AND IS OUR APPROVED SOURCE OF WX FOR OPS AT BDR AFTER THE TWR HAS CLOSED. 2) I STARTED OUT RIGHT AWAY USING GOOD CRM BY STATING THE ONLY 2 SAFE AND PRUDENT OPTIONS CLRLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY; BUT ENDED UP GIVING IN TO THE ONE OPTION I MOST WANTED TO AVOID (WHICH WAS ACCEPTING THE APCH). 3) NEW YORK APCH CONTRIBUTED TO MY LOSING MY POS BY TELLING US THAT HIS LAST 'OFFICIAL WX' WAS 2 MI VISIBILITY IN MIST. (WITHOUT THIS RPT FROM NEW YORK APCH; I BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED THE APCH.) 4) ONCE WE HAD ACCEPTED THE APCH; I WAS EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE DECISION. THIS CAUSED ME A GREAT DEAL OF DISTR THROUGHOUT THE MANEUVERS REQUIRED FOR THE APCH; AND SERIOUS DEGRADED MY PERFORMANCE AS A CREW MEMBER IN THE PNF ROLE. 5) I BELIEVE THAT 'GET HOMEITIS' CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE CAPT'S STATED DISTRUST OF THE ASOS RPT. (IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF THE DAY AND WE WERE RETURNING HOME TO BEGIN 3 DAYS OFF.) HE ALSO DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS ONLY 1/4 MI WHEN HE COULD SEE THE ARPT QUITE WELL FROM ABOVE. I WAS SURPRISED THAT HE FELT THIS WAY GIVEN HIS EXPERIENCE. I HAVE MUCH LESS FLT TIME AND HAVE SEEN SIMILAR CONDITIONS AT LEAST TWICE BEFORE; AND DID NOT ATTEMPT AN APCH IN EITHER CASE. 6) REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT HE TRUSTED THE ASOS; IT WAS AND IS OUR APPROVED WX SOURCE AND MUST BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE. ITEM #4 WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTOR TO A REDUCTION IN SAFETY OF FLT. I AM QUITE CONFIDENT THAT SHOOTING AN APCH TO MINIMUMS; EVEN IN ZERO/ZERO CONDITIONS; IS NOT AN INHERENTLY UNSAFE ACT. IN FACT; IT IS QUITE SAFE IF ALL MINIMUMS ARE ADHERED TO ABSOLUTELY AND ALL PROCS ARE EXECUTED PROPERLY BY A WELL TRAINED CREW. THE PROB IN THIS CASE IS THAT WE DID AN APCH TO MINIMUMS WITH ME PERFORMING POORLY DUE TO THE DISTRS OF THE WHOLE SIT. I WILL NOT ALLOW MYSELF TO BE TALKED OUT OF WHAT I KNOW IS THE RIGHT DECISION AGAIN. THE FACT THAT I WAS PREOCCUPIED AND UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE DECISION FROM THE BEGINNING MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO PERFORM MY DUTIES AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.