FO OF A JETSTREAM BA32 LANDED ON THE WRONG PARALLEL RWY DUE TO LACK OF COMS WITH THE CAPT WHO WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS.

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THE EVENT IN QUESTION OCCURRED ON A PAX CARRYING PART 121 FLT WHERE I WAS THE FO AND THE PF. ALTHOUGH THE EVENT IN QUESTION DID NOT CAUSE ANY DAMAGE TO ACFT(S); ARPT; PERSONS OR PROPERTY; THE GND CTLR ASKED US TO CONTACT THE TWR AFTER SHUTDOWN. THIS PROB WAS DISCOVERED UPON THE CAPT'S CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR CTLR BY PHONE. ON A VISUAL APCH TO FAT; WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 29L; WHICH IS CLOSER TO THE GATES. THE VISUAL APCH WAS BRIEFED BY THIS PF FOR EITHER RWY 29R OR RWY 29L. AT OR NEAR CZQ THE FLT IN QUESTION WAS SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. PRIOR TO THE CAPT (THE PNF) CHKING ON WITH TWR; I ASKED THE CAPT IF WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO THE LONGER RWY (RWY 29R). I CANNOT CLRLY RECALL THE CAPT'S RESPONSE; THE CAPT MAY HAVE SAID YES TO VISUAL APCH RWY 29R. PER COMPANY REQUIREMENTS; I REPEATED THE LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 29L SUBSEQUENT TO RECEIPT FROM TWR. HOWEVER; I DID LEAVE OUT THE RWY ASSIGNMENT FROM MY READBACK. I PROCEEDED TO AND LANDED ON RWY 29R; THE LONGER RWY SERVED BY THE ILS. AT 200 FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN ZONE; I RECONFIRMED 'CLRED TO LAND' (NOT REQUIRED BY COMPANY). BUT I LEFT OUT THE RWY ASSIGNMENT -- AGAIN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE: 1) MY FAILURE TO MENTION RWY ASSIGNMENT TWICE -- ONCE WHEN I GOT CLRED FOR LNDG AND ONCE AT 200 FT ABOVE TDZE. 2) MY FAILURE TO CLARIFY THE CAPT'S RESPONSE ON WHICH VISUAL APCH WE WERE CLRED FOR. 3) THE CAPT'S FAILURE IN READING BACK RWY 29L TWICE (ONCE FOR THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC AND ONCE FOR THE LNDG CLRNC) AND ALLOWING CONTINUANCE OF APCH AND LNDG TO AN UNASSIGNED RWY. 4) MY FAILURE TO HAVE LISTENED MORE CAREFULLY TO ATC AND CAPT'S COM. 5) THE CAPT HAD AN ONSET OF A HEAD COLD. THERE WERE A FEW OCCASIONS DURING OTHER LEGS OF THE TRIP WHEN THE CAPT HAD NOT HEARD OTHER ATC CLEARANCES. IN AIRLINE FLYING; THE CREW CONCEPT CONSTITUTES THAT EVERYONE WORKS AS A TEAM. NO ONE PERSON CAN TAKE ALL THE BLAME OR GLORY. I BELIEVE THAT I AM IN AS MUCH FAULT AS THE CAPT. I WISH THAT I HAD BEEN ABLE TO INTERFERE WITH THE OCCURRENCE OF THIS EVENT. ALTHOUGH I AM A VERY STRONG ADVOCATE OF COM; I HAVE TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF A COMS BREAKDOWN. I WAS UNSURE OF WHICH VISUAL APCH WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR AND I QUESTIONED THE CAPT. IN RETROSPECT I SHOULD HAVE PURSUED IT RATHER THAN TO LET IT GO. I BELIEVE THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE NORMAL ARPT TFC WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS HEIGHTENED COMPLACENCY. ADDITIONALLY; I HAD TWO OPPORTUNITIES WHERE I SAID 'CLRED TO LAND.' THESE WERE WASTED OPPORTUNITIES AS I LEFT OUT THE ASSIGNED OR BELIEVED TO BE ASSIGNED RWY OUT. ALTHOUGH BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE DESTINED FOR RWY 29R; I BELIEVE MY RWY ASSIGNMENT READBACKS (HAD THEY NOT BEEN LEFT OUT) MAY HAVE POSSIBLY ALARMED THE CAPT FOR CLARIFICATION. THIS WAS A VERY HUMBLING EXPERIENCE. A CREW THAT SEEMINGLY WORKED WELL TOGETHER HAD A CHAIN OF VERY SUBTLE BREAKDOWN IN COM THAT LEAD TO LNDG ON AN UNASSIGNED RWY. I SUPPOSE THAT THE LESSON LEARNED IS THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS BEING TOO CAREFUL OR TOO MUCH COM; AND IF THERE EXISTS ANY DOUBT -- CLARIFY!