L1011 AND MIL F16 HAD NMAC NEAR HIF.

Narrative

AFTER TKOF ON RWY 34R OUT OF SLC; WE WERE CLBING OUT ON THE SID TO THE N TOWARDS HILL AFB WHEN DEP CTL INFORMED US OF VFR TFC TO OUR R; 1-2 O'CLOCK POS. WE VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE TFC OVER THE MOUNTAINS WHICH LIE TO THE E OF SLC AND HILL AFB. I REMARKED TO THE CAPT THAT THE TFC APPEARED TO BE A FAST MOVER. WE WATCHED THE ACFT TURN TOWARD US RAPIDLY. OUR TCASII SOON RESPONDED WITH A TA AND THEN SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY AN RA. THE CAPT (PF) FOLLOWED THE COMMANDS GIVEN BY THE TCASII IN THIS RAPIDLY DEVELOPING NEAR MIDAIR. THE VFR TFC TURNED OUT TO BE AN F16. THE F16 WAS ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH OUR ACFT UNTIL LAST SECOND MANEUVERING BY THE F16 AND OUR RESPONSE TO THE TCASII. THE F16 PASSED DOWN THE FO'S SIDE OF ACFT; SLIGHTLY HIGH AND BELLY UP TO US. THE FIGHTER WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO USE THAT WE COULD HEAR HIS ENG AS HE PASSED US. WE TOLD ATC THAT WE HAD RESPONDED TO AN RA DUE TO THE F16. ATC THEN INFORMED US THAT THE F16 WAS IN A SIMULATED FLAMEOUT PATTERN AT HILL AFB. EVEN THOUGH WE HAD THE VFR TFC VISUALLY; IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE HIS FLT PATH AND PREDICT HIS FUTURE FLT PATH. WITH HIS SPD AND MANEUVERABILITY; HE RAPIDLY CHANGED FROM NO THREAT TO A MAJOR SAFETY CONCERN. WHEN WE FIRST OBTAINED OUR VISUAL; HE WAS HIGHER; PARALLEL TO US; AND HDG THE SAME DIRECTION. THANKFULLY; WE KEPT HIM IN SIGHT AND DID NOT DISREGARD HIM AS NO THREAT. MIXING OF MIL HIGH PERFORMANCE; VFR TFC AND LOADED PAX; DEPARTING IFR TFC AT SLC SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. I HAVE DOUBTS THAT THE F16 PLT WAS AWARE OF OUR EXISTENCE UNTIL THE LAST COUPLE OF SECONDS.