LJ25 CREW WENT OFF THE SIDE OF THE RWY AT PTK.

Narrative

THE FOLLOWING IS A RPT OF THE INCIDENT THAT TOOK PLACE ON JAN/FRI/99 AT PONTIAC; MI; IN LEARJET NABCD AT XA31 ON RWY 9R. I WAS THE CAPT ON THIS FLT. FOR THE FLT FROM TOL TO PTK; WHEN I GOT MY WX BRIEFING FOR THE FLT I WAS TOLD THE WX AT PTK HAD BEEN AND WAS CURRENTLY 400 FT OVCST WITH 5 SM VISIBILITY AND THE WINDS WERE 110 DEGS AT 16 KTS WITH GUSTS TO 27 KTS. IT WAS FORECASTED TO BE 600 FT OVCST WITH AN OCCASIONAL 300 FT OVCST AND 3 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT RAIN AND MIST. IND WAS THE FILED ALTERNATE. I HAD ENOUGH FUEL ON THE AIRPLANE TO DO 1 MISSED APCH AND THEN GO TO THE ALTERNATE WITH LEGAL RESERVE. UPON REACHING PTK; THE ATIS WAS GIVING THE WX AS 200 FT OVCST; 2 1/2 MI VISIBILITY WITH WINDS AT 150 DEGS AT 16 KTS GUSTING TO 24 KTS; AND IT WAS NOTED THAT IT WAS TURBULENT WITH WINDSHEAR RPTED ON THE APCH. IT WAS VERY TURBULENT WITH STRONG WIND GUST AND WIND CHANGES THROUGHOUT THE APCH. THE LOC WAS CAPTURED; AND THE APCH OUTSIDE THE MARKER WAS NORMAL. INSIDE ABOUT 1/3 OF THE WAY DOWN; THE CDI JUMPED FROM NEARLY CTRED TO ABOUT A 1 1/2 DOT DEFLECTION TO THE L. IT TOOK A VERY MAJOR CORRECTION BEFORE THE NEEDLE STARTED TO MOVE BACK TO THE R; AT WHICH POINT IT MOVED VERY RAPIDLY BACK TO THE R SIDE OF THE COURSE. I THEN CORRECTED IN THE CORRECT DIRECTION. AT 200 FT AGL; THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT SO A MISSED APCH WAS DONE. ON THE GAR I HAD THE FO ASK FOR ANOTHER APCH; AT THE SAME TIME GIVING SOME THOUGHT ABOUT GOING TO THE ALTERNATE. DURING THIS TIME OF DECISION; I HEARD ANOTHER ACFT HAD MADE THE APCH SUCCESSFULLY. BY THE TIME WE HAD BEEN RADAR VECTORED FOR THE INTERCEPT; A SECOND ACFT HAD MADE THE APCH. SINCE 2 OTHER ACFT LANDED SUCCESSFULLY; I FELT THE CONDITIONS WARRANTED THE APCH; BUT AGAIN WE ENCOUNTERED THE SAME CONDITIONS STATED ABOVE. UPON GS INTERCEPT; THE FO ASKED ME IF WE WERE GOING TO START DOWN. I LOOKED AT HIS GS AND IT WAS SHOWING WE HAD NOT ONLY INTERCEPTED BUT WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH ON THE GS. RELYING ON HIS INSTS; I STARTED THE DSCNT; AND MY GS STARTED WORKING -- OR SO I THOUGHT. THE GS WAS MORE ERRATIC ON THIS APCH THAN ON THE PREVIOUS ONE. ON THIS APCH WE HAD BASICALLY THE SAME THING HAPPEN WITH THE CDI. THIS TIME WE GOT A VISUAL AT 200 FT SLIGHTLY R OF THE RWY. WHEN THE FO CALLED RWY AT 10 O'CLOCK; MY CDI WAS SHOWING US L OF COURSE. AT THIS TIME I FELT I COULD SAFELY MAKE THE RWY. I MADE AN ABRUPT TURN TO THE L AND OVERSHOT THE RWY. IN THE TURN BACK TO THE R; THE SHAKER WENT OFF; I LEVELED THE WINGS; AND AT THIS POINT WE SETTLED ONTO THE RWY WITH THE NOSE COCKED TO THE L AND L OF CTRLINE. WHEN I TRIED TO STRAIGHTEN THE NOSE; WE SLID OFF THE RWY INTO THE SNOW AND CAME TO A REST. THE R MAIN OUTER GEAR DOOR WAS DISLODGED AND AT SOME POINT THE BOTTOM OF THE R TIP TANK WAS SLIGHTLY SCRAPED. THE ACFT WAS PULLED BACK ONTO THE RWY AND WAS STARTED WITH BATTERY PWR; THEN TAXIED TO THE HANGAR. ALL ASPECTS OF THE TAXI; STEERING AND BRAKING WERE NORMAL. THE ACFT WAS FLOWN TO DALLAS LOVE FIELD WITH A FERRY PERMIT 4 DAYS LATER WITH NO REPAIRS NECESSARY FOR FLT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: I HAD ONLY 2 HRS SLEEP IN THE PREVIOUS 25 HRS. I HAD SPENT MOST OF THE LAST 2 1/2 WKS WORKING OUT OF TOWN. THE DAY AND NIGHT OF JAN/THU/99 WAS SPENT CATCHING UP WITH DOMESTIC CHORES. THE MORNING OF JAN/THU/99 I WAS TOLD I WOULD BE SECOND UP. LATER I DISCOVERED I HAD BEEN FIRST UP ALL DAY BUT HAD NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE CHANGE IN STATUS; WHICH IS THE MAIN REASON I GOT NO SLEEP DURING THE DAY. I WENT TO BED LATE AND GOT PAGED FOR THE FLT EARLY IN THE MORNING ON JAN/FRI/99. WE TOOK FREIGHT FROM ADDISON; TX; TO TOL AND THEN WERE TOLD TO GO GET SOMETHING TO EAT WHILE THEY TRIED TO SELL THE ACFT OUT ON OTHER TRIP. AT SOMEWHERE JUST PAST XB00 I WAS TOLD WE WERE GOING TO PTK; PICKING UP FREIGHT AND TAKING IT TO EL PASO; TX. 'HOW QUICK WILL YOU BE AIRBORNE' WAS THE FIRST QUESTION FROM DISPATCH. MY RESPONSE WAS 'FIRST I HAVE TO GET FUEL' AND DISPATCH ASKED 'WHY DON'T YOU HAVE IT ALREADY?' MY RESPONSE WAS 'I DID NOT KNOW WHERE WE WERE GOING.'WITH WHAT SEEMED TO BE A FAIRLY EASY APCH INTO PTK; I BASED MY FUEL LOAD ON THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM SO WE COULD BE AIRBORNE FASTER. THIS PROVED TO BE A BAD CHOICE. BUT I WAS TIRED AND NOT THINKING CLRLY; PLUS THE FO WASN'T BEING MUCH HELP. HE WAS COMPLAINING AND WANTED TO GO HOME; WHICH MADE ME RUSH EVEN MORE TRYING TO TAKE CARE OF EVERYTHING MYSELF. THE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE APCH EVEN AFTER THE GS PROB WAS NOT A VERY WISE ONE; AND WHEN WE SAW THE RWY; I SHOULD HAVE DONE A MISSED APCH BUT DID NOT WISH TO ENDURE THE TURB AND EQUIP PROBS AGAIN. IF I HAD BEEN THINKING CLRER; I WOULD NOT HAVE LET DISPATCH PRESS ME INTO 'HOW QUICK CAN YOU BE AIRBORNE;' BECAUSE I NORMALLY DON'T LET THEIR ASSERTIVENESS BOTHER ME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 426199: IN MY OPINION; WE WERE NOT IN A POS WHERE WE COULD MAKE A NORMAL APCH TO LNDG AND I (THE FO) CALLED 'GO MISSED.' NOW BELOW DECISION ALT (MAYBE 1500 FT AGL); THE CAPT BANKED TO THE L IN EXCESS OF 30 DEGS. NOW TURNED TOWARDS THE RWY; THE CAPT CONTINUED THE APCH; AND I AGAIN CALLED 'GO MISSED.' AT THIS POINT; WE WERE OVERSHOOTING THE RWY TO THE L SIDE AND APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY AND 50-70 FT AGL WHEN THE CAPT MADE AN AGGRESSIVE TURN BACK TO THE R. THE STICK SHAKER ENGAGED; WINGS LEVELED; AND THE ACFT SETTLED TO THE GND ON THE RWY AND TO THE L OF CTRLINE. WE THEN SLID OFF INTO THE SNOW FOR SOME DISTANCE AND CAME TO A REST. UPON INITIAL OBSERVATION; THE DAMAGE INCLUDED THE R MAIN GEAR DOOR MISSING; SOME CORD SHOWING ON THE INBOARD R MAIN TIRE; AND THE BOTTOM OF THE R TIP TANK HAD PAINT GROUND OFF AS WELL.