A CLBING B737-400 HAS A POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH A DSNDING; XING MD80 NEAR 8000 FT. THE B737 HAD A HIGH CLB RATE AND WAS ISSUED A VISUAL SEPARATION CLB TO 13000 FT.

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I WAS THE CAPT AND PNF OF THE SUBJECT FLT. THIS WAS MY THIRD AND FINAL LEG OF THE DAY. IT WAS THE SECOND AND FINAL LEG FOR THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS. IT WAS ALSO OUR SECOND LEG AS A CREW. THE JUMP SEAT WAS OCCUPIED BY A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN CONDUCTING A 2-LEG LINE CHK ON ME. THE FIRST LEG; WITH ME FLYING AS PF; HAD GONE WELL; WITH MINOR DISCREPANCIES BRIEFED DURING OUR GND TIME AT PSP. MY FO; DURING OUR CRM BRIEFING CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE FIRST LEG; HAD MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN WITH THE COMPANY ABOUT 6 MONTHS AND WAS SOLICITING INPUT AND ADVICE IN ALL PHASES OF THE OP. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY FAMILIAR WITH PSP AND AS A RESULT ELECTED TO FLY THE SECOND; MORE FAMILIAR LEG; IE; PSP-SEA. OUR INITIAL CLRNC WAS ON THE PALM 3.PSP DEP WITH A CLRNC TO CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT. AFTER RECEIPT OF THE CLRNC; MY FO AND I DISCUSSED PWR SETTINGS AND DEP STRATEGIES. DUE TO FAIRLY STRONG GUSTY WINDS AT PSP; AND SOME TURB EXPERIENCED DURING OUR PRECEDING APCH AND LNDG; WE DECIDED TO TAKE OFF USING MAX PWR AND TO CLB AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE OUT OF THE VALLEY FOR TURB AVOIDANCE. WE DEPARTED RWY 31L. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH DEP CTL WE WERE GIVEN A HDG OF 360 DEGS TO INTERCEPT V386 AND AN AMENDED ALT OF 7000 FT. AS WE ROLLED OUT ON OUR 360 DEG HDG; AND LNAV WAS ENGAGED FOR FLT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE; DEP CTL POINTED OUT COMPANY TFC AT 10-11 O'CLOCK; XING L TO R; AND DSNDING TO 8000 FT. I ACQUIRED THE TFC; RPTED IT IN SIGHT; AND THEN CAME INSIDE TO NOTE THAT WE WERE PASSING 6000 FT AND CLBING AT +3000 FPM. DEP CTL THEN ISSUED US 'MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION; CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT.' ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED: 1) I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC; DIALED 13000 FT INTO THE ALT ALERTER; AND LOOKED OUTSIDE TO REACQUIRE THE TFC. 2) THE CHK AIRMAN ON THE JUMP SEAT SAID 'THIS ISN'T WORKING OUT.' 3) THE FO BEGAN A SMOOTH; POSITIVE PITCH OVER TO REDUCE THE VERT SPD. 4) I ENGAGED HDG SELECT (WHICH DISENGAGED LNAV); ROLLED THE HDG SELECTOR APPROX 45 DEGS L OF COURSE TO INITIATE A TURN BEHIND THE TFC; AND CALLED DEP CTL AND STATED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'WE NEED A TURN TO THE L TO AVOID THE TFC.' DEP CTL RESPONDED WITH A CLRNC TO TURN L TO 300 DEGS AS THE TCASII RA BEGAN. THE RA CONSISTED OF 'REDUCE CLB;' FOLLOWED BY 'MONITOR VERT SPD' FOLLOWED BY 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' IN THE MIDST OF THE RA THE COMPANY XMITTED; 'DO YOU GUYS SEE US?' AND I RESPONDED ON THE FREQ; 'YEAH; WE SURE DO.' THE COMPANY TFC IN QUESTION WAS INITIALLY DISPLAYED ON OUR TCASII AT +1.9 AND THE RA WAS RESOLVED WITH THE TFC DISPLAYED AT +1.2. WE PASSED HORIZLY APPROX 1 - 1.3 NM BEHIND THE TFC. OUR MAX ALT DURING THIS EVENT WAS 7400 FT WITH NO ALT LOSS. THE ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 20 SECONDS. UPON CONCLUSION OF THE RA; WE RESUMED COURSE AND RE-ESTABLISHED THE CLB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430181: WE (CAPT; FO; AND MYSELF) REALIZED AT THE SAME TIME THAT A CLB WOULD NOT WORK. THE CAPT AND MYSELF VERBALIZED TO TURN MORE L AND LEVEL OFF. THE FO INCREASED OUR TURN RATE AND STARTED TO LEVEL OFF. IF OUR RATE OF CLB WAS REDUCED FROM 3300 FPM TO 1000 FPM THE TCASII WOULD NOT HAVE GONE OFF AND IF PSP DEP WOULD'VE ISSUED A CLRNC FOR US TO DEV AS NEEDED AND MAINTAIN VISUAL. THE CAPT OF OUR FLT SUGGESTED A CRM PROB. BECAUSE THE FO IS NEW TO THE COMPANY (6 MONTHS) AND I (THE CHK AIRMAN) WAS IN THE JUMP SEAT GIVING A LINE CHK. THE CAPT DIDN'T WANT TO TELL THE FO HOW TO FLY THE AIRPLANE; IE; REDUCE OUR CLB RATE SO WE WOULDN'T GET AN RA. THE FO ADDED THAT IN THE FUTURE HE WOULD BE MORE VIGILANT IN REDUCING RATES OF CLB. THE CAPT SAID WHEN PSP DEP GAVE US THE CLRNC TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON COMPANY TFC CLB AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT; THE CAPT MIND SET WAS THAT THE PHRASEOLOGY LURED HIM INTO A MIND SET THAT THERE WAS SEPARATION AND WE COULDN'T DEVIATE FROM OUR 360 DEG HDG. THE FO AGREED. A BETTER ATC PHRASEOLOGY WOULD'VE BEEN: 'MAINTAIN VISUAL; CLB TO 13000 FT WHEN CLR OF TFC;' OR 'MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT; PLT'S DISCRETION; CLB AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430452: I'VE HAD SOME TIME TO THINK ABOUT WHAT OCCURRED THAT DAY AND BELIEVE THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS INVOLVED. I BELIEVE IT WAS A BIT OF A SET-UP ON ATC'S PART. THE MIND SET ON AN IFR DEP IS THAT ATC WILL DO A REASONABLE JOB AT KEEPING IFR TFC SEPARATED. FROM THIS EXPERIENCE; I HAVE A MUCH HIGHER AWARENESS IN THE NEED TO IDENT POTENTIAL CONFLICTS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO MAXIMIZE AVOIDANCE! ATC CAN HELP AS WELL BY RESTRICTING A HIGHER ALT UNTIL VISUALLY CLR OF TFC.