B767 CREW BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD DSNDED BELOW THE IAF PUBLISHED ALT DURING APCH TO RWY 25L AT EDDF.

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CREW DSNDED BELOW ESTABLISHED IAF ALT BECAUSE OF POOR CTLR HANDLING; ISSUED WRONG APCH TO PROPER RWY; THEN CREW WAS RUSHED INTO REBRIEFING AND CONFUSED BY WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN AN INCORRECT DME INDICATION. CREW MAINTAINED VFR CONDITIONS WITH THE RWY INSIGHT THROUGHOUT THE APCH. CREW MONITORED ATIS BUT THERE WAS NO APCH INFO GIVEN; NOR ANY MENTION OF THE ILS APCH FACILITY BEING INOP. PREPARATIONS REQUIRED FOR ARR; INCLUDING BRIEFINGS FOR ARR PROC; ILS TO BOTH RWYS; INCLUDING MISSED APCH AND HOLDS. CREW HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT THE ENTIRE TIME SINCE THE ACFT LEFT IAF ALT. LAST MIN CONFUSION IN EXTRACTING THE APCH PLATE BY THE REST OF THE CREW PROMPTED ME TO STAY 'HEADS UP' WHILE WE TRIED TO REBRIEFED. HAD WE BEEN IN IFR CONDITIONS; WE WOULD HAVE ABORTED THE APCH. THE VASI WAS USED TO FLY THE LATTER STAGES OF THE VISUAL APCH. THE CTLR'S INQUIRY OF ALT AND AIRSPD ON THE APCH CAME AFTER OUR DISCOVERY OF A POSSIBLE ALTDEV FROM PUBLISHED APCH PROC. OUR DSCNT WAS ALREADY ARRESTED AND A DISCUSSION OF THE SIT UNDERWAY. TASK SATURATION WAS EXPERIENCED BY LATE NOTIFICATION OF THE PROPER APCH PROC AGGRAVATED BY CONFLICTING TFC ON THE FINAL; DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE CTLR; AND BEING NEW TO THE ACFT (FIRST TRIP AFTER MY IOE) AND MY FIRST TRIP TO THIS ARPT. A MUCH GREATER APPLICATION IS NOW REALIZED FOR THE NEED TO EXAMINE INTL NOTAMS; NOT RELY ON ATIS FOR APCH INFO; AND TO EXPECT VERY LITTLE OR NO APCH FACILITY INFO FROM INTL CTLRS.