THIS AIRLINE B737-300 CREW FOUND THEMSELVES TOO HIGH AT CIVET INTXN BECAUSE OF A PREVIOUS RESTR. THEY DID NOT ADVISE THE APCH CTLR OF THEIR PENDING DEV; HOWEVER.

Date: 1999-04 · Aircraft: B737-300 · Phase: descent

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-undershoot|deviation-altitude-crossing-restriction-not-met|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

THIS AIRLINE B737-300 CREW FOUND THEMSELVES TOO HIGH AT CIVET INTXN BECAUSE OF A PREVIOUS RESTR. THEY DID NOT ADVISE THE APCH CTLR OF THEIR PENDING DEV; HOWEVER.

Narrative

HAD BEGUN DSCNT INTO LAX AND HAD PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED THE FMC TO ARRIVE CIVET AT 14000 FT (LOWEST PUBLISHED XING ALT). SOMEWHERE AROUND FL260-300 ZLA ISSUED A CLRNC TO 'CROSS CIVET AT AND MAINTAIN FL180' WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL AND BOTH OF US AGREED IT WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT TO GET DOWN FROM CIVET TO MAKE THE LOWER OF THE XING ALTS ON THE PROFILE DSCNT. (EXPERIENCE HERE HAS TAUGHT US THAT AS WE TRY TO 'DSND VIA THE CIVET 4 ARR' THE TENDENCY IS TO ARRIVE MUCH TOO HIGH AND MUCH TOO FAST) -- BUT; THE LION'S SHARE OF THIS DIFFICULTY RESTS WITH THE CTLRS TRYING IN EARNEST TO SPACE THE ACFT FOR MAX FLOW INTO LAX (MORE ON THIS IN MOMENT). ON THE HDOF TO SOCAL THE SOCAL CTLR DIRECTS US TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 4. I THINK WE WERE ABOUT FL210 OF FL220. THE CIVET 4 PROFILE REQUIRES US TO CROSS CIVET AT OR BELOW 17000 FT AND AT OR ABOVE 14000 FT. AT THIS POINT I MADE 2 ERRORS IN JUDGEMENT. FIRST; I THOUGHT I HAD TIME TO REPROGRAM THE FMC AND SECOND THAT I COULD LEAVE THE AUTOMATION IN CHARGE AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL (AUTOPLT; AUTOTHROTTLES; LNAV; VNAV). WE CROSSED CIVET AT ABOUT 17700 FT. THE OTHER MAJOR MISTAKE I MADE WAS NOT TO SIMPLY CALL SOCAL AND TELL THEM WE COULD NOT MAKE CIVET AT OR BELOW 17000 FT. IT IS THE 'SET-UP' THAT BOTHERS ME MOST. DOES ZLA NOT EXPECT US TO BE CLRED TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 4? WHY CLR US TO 'CROSS CIVET AT AND MAINTAIN FL180?' THIS ARR CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF THE MOST CHALLENGING ARRS WE FLY; BUT IT PROBABLY WOULDN'T BE IF THE CTLRS COULD LET US DO OUR OWN SPD MGMNT. IF ALL THIS ISN'T BAD ENOUGH; WE MOVE FROM BAD TO WORSE AS WE TRANSITION TO THE ILS RWY 25L. IN 20.8 MI WE DO 4 STEP-DOWNS. SHOULDN'T BE THAT HARD EXCEPT THAT ONCE AGAIN THE CTLRS ARE CHANGING OUR SPD CONTINUALLY. THAT WOULDN'T BE SO BAD IF WE COULD SIMPLY FLY THE GS DOWN FROM ARNES OR SUZZI; BUT TO DO THAT PUTS US EVER SO SLIGHTLY BELOW THE MINIMUM STEP DOWN ALTS. WE SIMPLY NEED TO ELIMINATE 1 OR 2 OF THE VARIABLES HERE -- JUST FLY IT IN VNAV? WELL OUR AIRLINE HAS TAKEN ALL OF THE APCH DATA FOR ALL OTHER THAN HUB ARPTS OUT OF THE B737-300'S. WE'RE NOT SUPPOSED TO 'BUILD THE ILS APCHS.' FURTHERMORE; AS IS FREQUENTLY THE CASE; THE CTLRS ARE LIKELY TO CHANGE OUR LNDG RWY AT LEAST 2 TIMES. HUMAN FACTORS -- ALL OF US THINK WE'RE SUPERMAN AND WE BLINDLY TRY TO COMPLY -- IT'S OUR JOB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS CAPT HAD LAST FLOWN INTO LAX 8 YRS EARLIER IN A B747 AS AN FO. HE KNEW THAT HE COULD NOT DSND ON THE ILS GS SINCE ITS ANGLE HAD CHANGED; BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED FOR THE OTHER CHANGES HE ENCOUNTERED. HE COMPLAINED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO FLY THE STAR AS DESIGNED BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS CHANGES BY THE ARTCC AND TRACON CTLRS. HE ADMITTED THAT HE ATTEMPTED TO USE HIS FMC TO ADJUST THE ACFT'S PROFILE AND HE RECOGNIZES THAT HE SHOULD HAVE MADE INPUTS INTO THE AUTOPLT HIMSELF OR FLOWN THE ACFT MANUALLY TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT LAST MIN RWY CHANGES THAT TEMPT CREWS TO REPROGRAM THEIR FMC'S IN ORDER TO CONFORM TO THEIR AIRLINE'S TRAINING AND MGMNT POLICIES. THE OLDER AUTOMATED AIRLINER'S FMC'S HAVE SMALLER MEMORIES AND AS THE RTE STRUCTURES EXPAND THE FMC IS UNABLE TO ACCEPT ALL OF THE RTE AND APCH DATA IN THEIR LIMITED STORAGE CAPACITY SO ONLY THE MOST USED APCHS ARE STORED AND THIS REQUIRES THE CREWS TO ENTER THE REQUIRED DATA FOR EACH OF THESE LESS USED ARPTS. THE CREWS ARE AWARE THAT THEY MUST AVOID BEING HEAD-DOWN DURING LOW-ALT; CLOSE-IN SITS AND THEY ARE TOLD NOT TO 'BUILD' ILS APCHS. THE RPTR EXPRESSED HIS FRUSTRATION WITH THIS APPARENT POLICY CONFLICT BECAUSE OF HIS OWN AIRLINE'S INFO BULLETINS REQUIRING THE CREWS TO MAKE AUTOMATED APCHS WHEN POSSIBLE.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.