BE36 NMAC WITH FALCON 50 NEAR TEB.

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I OBSERVED NO EVASIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE FALCON'S CREW; ALTHOUGH OUR HEAD-ON CONVERGENCE AND THE ESTIMATED CLOSURE RATE OF 6 MI PER MIN SUGGEST I MIGHT HAVE HAD AS MUCH DIFFICULTY DISCERNING THE OTHER ACFT'S FLT ATTITUDE AS I DID DETECTING ITS PRESENCE IN THE FIRST PLACE. I SUSPECT TCASII WAS NOT INSTALLED OR WAS NOT OPERABLE ONBOARD THE FALCON; AS OUR SEPARATION WAS WELL INSIDE THE LIMITS I KNOW TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ACFT EQUIPPED WITH THAT TECHNOLOGY. AS I WAS NOT IN CONTACT WITH ANY CTLING ATC FACILITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT (NOR WAS I REQUIRED TO BE); I MADE NO RPT UNTIL MY FILING WITH NASA OF AN AVIATION SAFETY RPTING SYS (ASRS) FORM. HERE'S MY ANALYSIS OF THIS NMAC INCIDENT. CHAIN OF EVENTS: THE PROB AROSE DUE TO CONGESTED; HIGH-DENSITY AIRSPACE IN WHICH A MIX OF ACFT TYPES OPERATES INTO AND OUT OF NUMEROUS FACILITIES. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED USING SEE-AND-AVOID TECHNIQUES. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED THE APPARENT ABSENCE OF OPERABLE TCASII EQUIP AND THE LACK OF ATC RADAR SEPARATION. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INVOLVED PROMPT IDENT OF THE TFC CONFLICT AND BASIC AIRMANSHIP. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: PERCEPTIONS; JUDGEMENTS; AND DECISIONS WERE FUNDAMENTALLY SOUND. ACTIONS WERE APPROPRIATE. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE; INCLUDED PRIMARILY MY DESIRE TO MINIMIZE THE COST AND INCONVENIENCE OF SYSTEMATIC ATC DELAYS BY OPERATING VFR AS CONDITIONS ALLOWED. MY CONTINUOUS VISUAL SCAN FOR TFC; AND THAT OF MY PAX; WERE WHAT SAVED OUR BACON. AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT; I NOW CONDUCT ALL BUT LCL FLTS IN BUSY TERMINAL AREAS UNDER IFR; AND I HAVE ADDED TCASII TO THE LIST OF REQUIRED EQUIP ONBOARD ANY AIRPLANE I OWN IN THE FUTURE. I HAVE ALSO COMMITTED TO INCREASE THE TIME I SPEND VISUALLY SCANNING OUTSIDE THE ACFT; AND TO ENLIST THE ASSISTANCE OF ANY WILLING AND ABLE PAX IN SCANNING FOR POTENTIAL TFC CONFLICTS.