RPTR'S ACFT X LEFT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WITHOUT A CLRNC.

Date: 1999-07 · Aircraft: Beech 1900 · Phase: approach

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-excursion-from-assigned-altitude|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence

Synopsis

RPTR'S ACFT X LEFT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT WITHOUT A CLRNC.

Narrative

WHILE ON A ROUTINE SCHEDULED ACR PAX FLT FROM MKE TO GRB; I WAS THE FO AND PNF FOR ACR X. THE CAPT ACTED AS THE PF FOR THE ENTIRE FLT. WHILE IN CRUISE; THE CAPT WAS WORKING ON HIS COMPANY PAY SHEETS. HE DECLINED MY OFFER TO TAKE THE CTLS. HE CONTINUED TO DO THIS NON ESSENTIAL PAPERWORK THROUGHOUT THE DSCNT AND FIRST VECTOR FOR THE APCH (ILS 6 AT GRB). WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT VECTORS FOR THE ILS 6 AND TO DSND TO 2500 FT MSL. THIS ALT PUT US VERY NEAR THE BASE OF A SCATTERED LAYER OF CLOUDS. WE REQUESTED LOWER TO ACQUIRE THE ARPT VISUALLY. WE WERE TOLD THAT 2500 FT WAS THE CTLR'S MVA AND TO REMAIN AT 2500 FT. SHORTLY AFTER; WE RECEIVED THIS CLRNC AND READ IT BACK; 'ACR X; TURN TO HDG 030 DEGS; MAINTAIN 2500 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC; CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 5; CONTACT TWR 118.7.' I LEFT THE ALT ALERTER SET AT 2500 FT; POINTED AT IT AND VERBALLY CONFIRMED '2500 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED.' I THEN DIALED IN TWR FREQ AND CHKED ON WITH THEM; '030 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT.' THEN THE ALT ALERT CHIME WENT OFF AND I CALLED 'ALT' AS WE PASSED THROUGH 2200 FT MSL. THE CAPT SAID WE WERE VISUAL AND TO DISREGARD (WE DID; NOW; HAVE VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE RWY). I REMINDED HIM THAT WE WERE NOT ON THE LOC YET (FULL SCALE NEEDLE DEFLECTION) AND THAT WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED. THE CAPT INSISTED THAT WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH. I DISAGREED WITH HIM AND SAID THAT WE HAD NEVER RPTED THE FIELD IN SIGHT OR BEEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. HE STILL INSISTED HE WAS 'VISUAL' AND CALLED FOR THE LNDG FINAL ITEMS CHKLIST. I RAN THE CHKLIST AND REMAINED QUIET THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF APCH AND LNDG; WHICH WAS WELL BELOW THE GS AND R OUT CTR. A SHORT DISCUSSION ON THE GND STILL DID NOT CONVINCE THE CAPT OF HIS ERROR AND THE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH IT. I HAVE HAD CONTINUOUS PROBS WITH THIS CAPT'S LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CRM. I WILL BE TAKING THIS MATTER UP WITH MY COMPANY AND MY UNION'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.