RPTR'S ACFT X WAS ASSIGNED A SPD RESTR; WHICH THEY DID NOT ADHERE TO.

Date: 1999-07 · Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng · Phase: initial_climb

Anomalies: deviation-speed-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

RPTR'S ACFT X WAS ASSIGNED A SPD RESTR; WHICH THEY DID NOT ADHERE TO.

Narrative

ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH DEP; CTLR ASSIGNED 250 KIAS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. I WAS FLYING (FO). I USED A SPD INTERVENTION IN VNAV CLB AND SET 250 KTS IN THE WINDOW. APCHING 10000 FT MSL; THE CAPT WAS 'EYES OUT' PROVIDING ME WITH STEERING GUIDANCE TO AVOID THE MULTIPLE TWRING CUMULO NIMBUS TO OUR N. AT 10000 FT MSL; I'D FORGOTTEN WE WERE STILL SPD RESTR AND I SET THE SPD WINDOW TO 300 KTS. I DID NOT COMMUNICATE THIS ACTION TO THE CAPT AND HE WAS STILL 'EYES OUT' CONCENTRATING ON THE DEV FOR WX. AS OUR SPD APCHED 300 KTS; CTR CALLED TO INQUIRE IF HE HAD ASSIGNED NORMAL SPD. I REALIZED THEN I'D EXCEEDED THE SPD RESTR AND SET 250 KTS AND CORRECTED THE DEV. I ALSO ADVISED THE CAPT (OBVIOUSLY TOO LATE) THAT I SET AN INCORRECT SPD. THERE WAS A FLT AHEAD OF US; BUT I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY LOSS OF SEPARATION. THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT WAS SIMPLE -- I DID NOT COMMUNICATE MY ACTIONS TO THE CAPT. HAD I DONE SO; HE WOULD HAVE REMINDED ME OF THE SPD RESTR. ALSO; A COMMON PRACTICE (BUT NOT PROC) IS TO SET 249 KTS IN THE WINDOW IF GIVEN A SPD RESTR OF 250 KTS. THE ODD NUMBER CERTAINLY WORKS IN ALERTING THE FLC OF A RESTR SPD. I'VE USED IT IN THE PAST AND IT WORKS WELL; SO I'LL READOPT THIS PRACTICE AS A MENTAL REMINDER. AS FAR AS CREW COM GOES; I'LL RETURN TO A SIMPLE PROC WE USED IN MIL COM; WHICH WORKED VERY WELL: 1) WHAT DO I KNOW? 2) WHO NEEDS TO KNOW IT? AND 3) HAVE I TOLD THEM YET?

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.