DC9 CREW HAD L GEAR COLLAPSE ON LNDG.

Narrative

FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL TURNING FINAL AT BNA. THE FO WAS FLYING. ACFT WAS A LITTLE FAST ON FINAL; AND HE REDUCED PWR SUBSTANTIALLY TO COMPENSATE. ONCE BACK ON SPD; HE ADDED PWR BACK IN SLOWLY; BUT NOT QUITE ENOUGH TO KEEP SPD FROM SLOWLY DECAYING. ON VERY SHORT FINAL; SINK BEGAN DEVELOPING AND HE ADDED SOME PWR. I URGED HIM TO ADD MORE. WE LANDED HARD AND BOUNCED. I GOT ON THE CTLS WITH HIM. AFTER THE SECOND TOUCHDOWN I FELT VIBRATIONS FROM THE L WING AND HAD PROBS WITH DIRECTIONAL CTL AS WELL AS TROUBLE KEEPING THE WINGS LEVEL. WE STOPPED THE ACFT STRAIGHT AHEAD USING R BRAKE. I ASKED THE TWR FOR THE EMER VEHICLES; WHICH WERE ALREADY ON THE WAY. THE TRUCKS ARRIVED AND WE SAW NO VISIBLE SMOKE OR FIRE; SO ELECTED NOT TO EVAC. THE AFT FLT ATTENDANT SAID SHE SAW FUEL; SO WE TURNED OFF ALL SYS AND THE FIRE CREWS FOAMED THE PLANE. LATER; WE MADE AN ORDERLY EVAC USING THE FORWARD L ESCAPE SLIDE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES DURING EVAC. THE ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO THE L MAIN LNDG GEAR; L WING; AND L ENG. IN RETROSPECT; THERE WERE WARNING SIGNS THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS. THE SLOW SPD DECAY WITHOUT ADEQUATE CORRECTION WAS PRIMARY. I ASSUMED THE FO RECOGNIZED THIS ALSO. I HAVE SEEN SIMILAR APCHS AND TECHNIQUES USED BY OTHERS. I EXPECTED A BIG FLARE; BUT HIS FLARE WAS MINOR. I SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATED MY MISGIVINGS TO MAKE SURE HE WAS PERCEIVING THE SAME PROB. THEN I WOULD'VE KNOWN IT TO BE NECESSARY FOR ME TO COMPLETE THE LNDG. OF COURSE; YOU NEVER WANT TO HAVE TO TAKE AN ACFT AWAY FROM THE FO; AND BEING A NEW CAPT; I NEVER HAD. PERHAPS I DIDN'T KNOW WHERE MY LIMITS ARE. I THINK PERHAPS THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING WORTHWHILE TO PRACTICE IN THE SIMULATOR DURING CAPT TRAINING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 448664: DAYLIGHT VFR CONDITIONS PREVAILED AND THE LATEST WIND INFO FROM CURRENT ATIS INDICATED 360 DEGS AT 9 KTS GUST TO 16 KTS. WE WERE CLRED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 2L FROM A L TURN ON TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL. WE PROCEEDED TO JOIN THE LOC AND VISUALLY NAV THE CTRLINE FOR RWY 2L. THE APCH WAS IN REASONABLY SMOOTH AIR WITH ONLY LIGHT TURB. A STANDARD LNDG CONFIGN OF FLAPS 40 DEGS WAS ESTABLISHED BY 1500 FT AGL AND AIRSPD COMFORTABLY DECELERATING TO THE CALCULATED FINAL APCH SPD FOR OUR LNDG WT OF 76000 LBS. AT 500 FT; THE APCH INDICATIONS WERE WITHIN NORMAL STABILIZED LIMITS WITH REF TO SPD; SINK RATE; AND GS. SOME USE OF PWR WAS MADE TO 'CHK' THE SINK RATE DURING LNDG FLARE. ACTUAL TOUCHDOWN WAS DECEPTIVELY EARLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY HARD WITH A SHORT REBOUND; SECOND CONTACT WAS LIGHT. DURING THE ROLLOUT A VIBRATION WAS EVIDENT AND CONSIDERABLE INPUTS WERE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. THE VIBRATION THEN CEASED AFTER A FEW SECONDS (THE APPARENT DEP OF THE L GEAR ASSEMBLY). CONTINUOUS CTL INPUTS WERE REQUIRED TO KEEP IT STRAIGHT AND IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE L WING WAS SLOWLY SETTLING TO THE RWY SURFACE. START LEVERS WERE PULLED TO SHUTOFF AND THE COCKPIT DOOR OPENED TO COORDINATE WITH FLT ATTENDANTS. CFR WAS FAST ON THE SCENE AND INDICATED THAT NO FIRE OR SMOKE WAS EVIDENT. WE COMPLETED THE EVAC CHKLIST; BUT CHOSE NOT TO EVAC. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS WE DEPLANED BY L1 SLIDE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF CFR DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF FUEL. EVAC WAS ORDERLY.