A DC10 WITH ITS ANTISKID INOP TAKES OFF WITH INCORRECT TKOF DATA AND COMPUTED WTS FOR LNDG AT DEST ARPT; ZZZ; US.
Synopsis
A DC10 WITH ITS ANTISKID INOP TAKES OFF WITH INCORRECT TKOF DATA AND COMPUTED WTS FOR LNDG AT DEST ARPT; ZZZ; US.
Narrative
I COMPLETED MY FE CHKRIDE 2 MONTHS BEFORE THIS OCCURRENCE AND I HAVE FLOWN 5 TRIPS ON THIS ACFT SINCE THIS CHKOUT. THE PARTICULAR ACFT WE WERE USING HAD NUMEROUS MEL'S; INCLUDING THE ANTISKID BEING INOP. OUR COMPANY USES A NOTEBOOK COMPUTER TO COMPUTE OUR PERFORMANCE NUMBERS INCLUDING: TKOF AND LNDG NUMBERS; WTS AND REQUIRED RWY LENGTHS FOR BOTH DISPATCH AND LNDG PURPOSES. WITH THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER PROGRAM OUR COMPANY UTILIZES; THE FE SCROLLS THROUGH 13 PAGES ON THE COMPUTER SCREEN TO COME UP WITH THE FINAL WTS AND NUMBERS WHICH ARE XFERRED TO A FLT MANIFEST WHICH THE CAPT SIGNS. HOWEVER; I FAILED TO ENTER THE PROPER INFO INTO THE COMPUTER AND THE COMPUTER WAS NOT TOLD THAT THE ANTISKID WAS INOP. THE CAPT HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT THE FE HAS OR HAS NOT ENTERED INTO THE COMPUTER BECAUSE HE IS ONLY SEEING THE FINAL NUMBERS ON THE FLT MANIFEST. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM DEFAULTS AUTOMATICALLY TO THE NORMAL SIT; WHICH IS THE ANTISKID BEING OPERATIVE. THEREFORE; FOR DISPATCH LNDG PURPOSES WE WERE OVERWT. OUR DISPATCHERS ALSO FAILED TO ENTER THE PROPER DATA INTO THEIR COMPUTERS (SAME COMPUTER PROGRAM) AND ANOTHER CHK FAILED TO CATCH THIS ERROR. OUR COMPANY REALIZED THE PROB ENRTE TO OUR DEST AND NOTIFIED US VIA ACARS. WE (THE CREW) VERIFIED ON THE COMPUTER (WITH THE ANTISKID INOP) THAT THE ACFT WAS WITHIN LNDG WTS AT OUR ARR ARPT. THE COMPANY IS INVESTIGATING HOW TO BRING THE CAPT INTO THE LOOP WITH WHAT EXACTLY THE FE HAS ENTERED INTO THE COMPUTER. THIS WAY THERE IS A THIRD SET OF EYES TO CHK THE TKOF NUMBERS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE DATA.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.