MD80 CREW FOLLOWED THEIR LAHSO CLRNC TO THE LETTER AND HELD AT THE HOLD SHORT POINT AT RWY 9R AT ORD.

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UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ORD TWR; WE WERE GIVEN LNDG CLRNC AND TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY S. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE HOLD SHORT. AFTER TOUCHDOWN THE ACFT WAS SLOW TO DECELERATE AND AS WE WERE GOING BY HIGH SPD TURNOFF TXWY M6; AT AROUND 80 KTS; THE TWR CTLR ASKED US IF WE COULD MAKE THE TXWY M6 TURNOFF. I BELIEVE MY FO SAID 'UNABLE.' THE TWR CTLR THEN WAS OCCUPIED WITH CLRNCS TO OTHER ACFT AND AS WE APCHED THE LAHSO LINE BY THE END OF THE RWY 9R WE STOPPED THE ACFT ON THE RWY HOLDING SHORT OF THE WHITE FLASHING LAHSO LIGHT GOING ACROSS THE RWY. AS WE WERE LITERALLY PARKED THERE ON THE RWY; THE TWR ASKED US SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF WHY WE WERE NOT CLRING THE RWY. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE COMPLYING WITH LAST RECEIVED CLRNC 'TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY S.' ACFT BEHIND US ON FINAL WAS TOLD TO GO AROUND; AND THE TWR AGAIN NOW APPEARING QUITE ANNOYED TOLD US TO TURN L OFF THE RWY. AMONG THE MANY THOUGHTS AND QUESTIONS THAT COME TO MY MIND IS FIRST OF ALL; WERE WE CORRECT IN STOPPING ON THE RWY HOLDING SHORT OF THE LAHSO WHITE FLASHING LIGHTS; OR SHOULD WE HAVE CROSSED THE LAHSO LINE AND CLRED THE RWY? I BELIEVE WE COMPLIED WITH LAST RECEIVED CLRNC AND DID NOT VIOLATE ANY RULES. MY SECOND QUESTION IS; ON ANY LAHSO CLRNC GIVEN TO ANY ACFT ON ANY RWY; IF GIVEN A LAHSO CLRNC FOR LNDG; IF WE ARE UNABLE TO EXIT THE RWY PRIOR TO REACHING THE LAHSO POINT; WE ARE THEN REQUIRED BY VIRTUE OF THE CLRNC TO HOLD ON THE RWY; SHORT OF THE LAHSO POINT. MY LAST QUESTION IS FOR A LAHSO CLRNC GIVEN ON ANY RWY FOR ANY ACFT. AM I CORRECT IN SAYING THAT IF THE ACFT GIVEN THE LAHSO CLRNC TO IS NOT ABLE TO EXIT THE RWY PRIOR TO THE LAHSO POINT; THEN ABSENT ANY AMENDED CLRNC FROM THE CTLR; THE ACFT IS REQUIRED BY VIRTUE OF THAT LAHSO CLRNC TO STOP ON THE RWY HOLDING SHORT OF THE LAHSO HOLD LINE. IN OUR CASE THE WHITE FLASHING LIGHTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CREW RECEIVED THE LAHSO CLRNC ON THE FIRST CONTACT WITH THE TWR. IT WAS NOT MENTIONED FURTHER. THE CREW VERIFIED THAT THE ACFT WAS LEGAL TO ACCEPT THE REDUCED RWY LENGTH. WX CONDITIONS WERE CALM WIND WITH A STABLE ATMOSPHERE. THEY WERE 3-4 MI IN TRAIL OF AN AIRBUS A320. WHEN ON THE GS THEY WERE GETTING MODERATE OR HEAVIER WAKE TURB. ONLY BY FLYING 1/2 DOT HIGH WERE THEY ABLE TO AVOID THE TURB. THE CAPT ADDED A REF SPD ADJUSTMENT ALSO. AS THE ACFT WAS IN THE LNDG FLARE THEY RE-ENTERED THE WAKE TURB. THIS REQUIRED A THRUST ADDITION. THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN BEFORE THE INTXN OF RWY 32L. BECAUSE OF THE LONGER THAN NORMAL LNDG AND SPD ADDITIONS; THE ACFT WAS TOO FAST FOR HIGH SPD INTXNS M5; OR M6. AT THIS POINT THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP JUST BEFORE THE LAHSO HOLD SHORT LIGHT BAR. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE TWR CTLR LOST TRACK OF THEM; AND DID NOT KNOW THEY WERE STILL HOLDING SHORT AS PREVIOUSLY CLRED. ONLY AFTER THEY SAID SOMETHING TO THE TWR; WAS THE ACFT BEHIND THEM TOLD TO GO AROUND. THE CAPT FURTHER STATED THAT HE HAS NEVER HELD AT A HOLD POINT; AND FROM THE WAY THE TWR REACTED THEY HAD NEVER SEEN THIS BEFORE EITHER. IT WAS NIGHTTIME; SO AN ACFT HOLDING WOULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY VISIBLE.