B737 CREW DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE PUBLISHED ALT XING RESTR OR SPD.

Date: 1999-09 · Aircraft: B737-300

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-undershoot|deviation-speed-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

B737 CREW DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE PUBLISHED ALT XING RESTR OR SPD.

Narrative

ZTL WAS THE CTLING ATC AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ARR. I NOTED WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR OF SHINE; 40 MI FROM CLT AT 11000 FT; 250 KTS; AND EXPRESSED THIS TO THE CAPT WHO WAS THE PF. HE TOLD ME TO ADVISE ATC WE COULD GIVE SPD OR ALT; BUT NOT BOTH. THEY (THE CTLR) SAID THEY NEEDED ALT FIRST THEN TO SLOW TO 250 KTS. AT ABOUT 7 MI FROM THE FIX (SHINE); I ONCE AGAIN NOTED THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE ALT OF 11000 FT AT SHINE. HOWEVER; THE CAPT DID NOT BOTHER TO CORRECT THE PROB OR SEEM CONCERNED. WITH A DSCNT RATE OF OVER 4000 FPM; I CHKED ON TO APCH WITH FLT NUMBER AND ALT OF LEVELING AT 11000 FT. HE SAID HE SHOWED US AT 12400 FT. WE WERE PASSING BTWN 11500-11700 FT AT THE TIME WITH THE HIGH DSCNT RATE. I DON'T THINK THERE WAS A CONFLICT AT THE TIME. THIS WHOLE THING COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY JUST ADVISING THE CTLR OF THE ALT XING PROB BEFORE IT OCCURRED. WHY SOME PLTS HAVE A PROB LETTING THE ATC CTLR KNOW ABOUT PROBS LIKE THIS IS BEYOND ME. THEY ARE THERE TO HELP. THAT'S THEIR JOB. HOWEVER; SOME PLTS DO NOT RECOGNIZE THIS. I CAN ASSURE EVERYONE THAT WHEN I MOVE TO THE L SEAT I WILL USE THE MIKE FOR WHAT IT IS INTENDED TO BE USED FOR -- TO TALK TO THE CTLRS!

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.