CREW OF MD88 CONFRONTED WITH ENG PWR LOSS AND POSSIBLE IMPENDING FAILURE AND POSSIBLE SMOKE IN CABIN AT VR SPD ON TKOF FROM PVD.

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WE WERE DEPARTING PVD AT XA15 ON FLT XX TO ATL. THE WX WAS 600 FT OVCST; 7 MI VISIBILITY; WINDS 020 DEGS AT 8 KTS; 12 DEGS C WITH A DEWPOINT OF 11 DEGS. THE RWY WAS WET WITH PATCHES OF STANDING WATER. WE TOOK OFF FROM RWY 5R USING NORMAL PWR; FLAPS 11 DEGS; SLIPPERY WET TKOF DATA AND A TKOF GROSS WT OF APPROX 147000 LBS. (MAX TKOF WT FOR THIS ACFT IS 149500 LBS.) IT WAS MY LEG AND AS WE ACCELERATED TO VR; I BEGAN TO RAISE THE NOSE TIRE OFF THE RWY; AT WHICH TIME I HEARD A MUFFLED BANG AND FELT THE ACFT BEGIN TO YAW TO THE R. I APPLIED L RUDDER AND CONTINUED THE ROTATION. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE BEGAN TO HEAR A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF COMMOTION AND YELLING FROM THE PAX CABIN. WE COULD CLRLY HEAR SEVERAL PEOPLE YELLING 'FIRE.' THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO CONTINUE FLYING THE ACFT. AT THAT TIME WE CONFIRMED A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB AND RAISED THE LNDG GEAR. THE COMMOTION CONTINUED IN THE MAIN CABIN AND I ALSO HEARD THE COCKPIT CALL CHIME SEVERAL TIMES AND REPEATED BANGING ON THE COCKPIT DOOR. WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH PVD TWR AND AS THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO RESTORE ORDER IN THE CABIN AND CALM THE FLT ATTENDANT IN CHARGE; I REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE VECTOR FROM THE TWR TO THE DOWNWIND AND INFORMED THEM THAT WE HAD A RPT OF SMOKE/FIRE IN THE CABIN; AS WELL AS A FAILURE OF THE R ENG AND WOULD BE RETURNING TO PVD FOR AN EMER LNDG. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF THE R ENG BEGAN TO EXPERIENCE REPEATED COMPRESSOR STALLS AS IT ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN PWR. I BEGAN MY UPWIND TURN AT APPROX 1000 FT THEN LEVELED OFF AT 2000 FT IN THE DOWNWIND AND ACCELERATED TO 180 KTS. DURING THAT TIME THE CAPT CONFERRED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS; ASSESSED THE SIT IN THE CABIN AND MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO CALM THE PAX. HE WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT WE IN FACT DID NOT HAVE A FIRE IN THE CABIN AND THE SMALL AMOUNT OF SMOKE APPEARED TO BE COMING FROM THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS AS A RESULT OF THE #2 ENG FAILURE. AT THAT TIME WE INFORMED PVD TWR THAT THE SMOKE WAS A RESULT OF THE ENG FAILURE AND NOT A FIRE AND REQUESTED A DIVERT TO BOS. DURING MY DEP BRIEFING I HAD DISCUSSED BOS AS OUR DIVERT FIELD IN THE EVENT OF AN EMER DUE TO OUR ACFT WT; THE SHORT RWY AT PVD AND THE WET FIELD CONDITIONS. THE CAPT COMPLETED THE AFTER TKOF AND ENG FAILURE/SHUTDOWN/DAMAGE CHKLIST. AT THAT TIME; THE #2 ENG FIRE HANDLE WAS PULLED AS WE SUSPECTED THE ENG HAD SUSTAINED SEVERE DAMAGE DUE TO THE REPEATED COMPRESSOR STALLS. HE AGAIN BRIEFED THE PAX OF OUR SIT AND THE NEED TO DIVERT TO BOS. WE RECEIVED CLRNC FROM DEP CTL TO CLB TO 5000 FT AND RECEIVED RADAR VECTORS TO BOS. THE FMS WAS REPROGRAMMED WITH BOS AS OUR NEW DEST AND AN ILS APCH TO RWY 4R WAS LOADED. THE RPTED CEILING AND VISIBILITY AT BOS WAS 400 FT OVCST AND 1 1/4 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT RAIN. AFTER INTERCEPTING THE LOC; WE WERE CLRED TO 3000 FT AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE CAPT HAD COMPLETED ALL OF THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST ITEMS AND BRIEFED THE SINGLE ENG ILS APCH AND MISSED APCH CONSIDERATIONS. AT THAT POINT HE TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND I COMPLETED THE DSCNT; APCH AND LNDG CHKLISTS. AFTER LNDG; AS AN EXTRA PRECAUTION; THE BOSTON CRASH CREW PERFORMED A HEAT SCAN OF OUR #2 ENG TO CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS NO RESIDUAL HEAT/FIRE. AT THAT POINT THE CAPT TAXIED TO THE GATE AND I MADE AN ADDITIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX TO SUMMARIZE THE EVENTS OF THE FLT; RELAY THE INFO ABOUT THE HEAT SCAN OF THE ENG AND TO AGAIN EXPLAIN THE REASON FOR OUR NEED TO DIVERT TO BOS. UPON OUR ARR AT THE GATE WE INSPECTED THE EXTERIOR OF THE ACFT AND DISCOVERED THAT THE #4 MAIN TIRE TREAD HAD SEPARATED FROM THE TIRE AND WAS INGESTED INTO THE #2 ENG WHICH CAUSED THE ENG TO FAIL/COMPRESSOR STALL. THIS WAS ALSO THE CAUSE OF THE INITIAL SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND THE MISTAKEN BELIEF BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX THAT THERE WAS A FIRE IN THE ACFT CABIN.