A B737-400 DEVIATES FROM LOC ON INITIAL APCH TO CLT IN IMC.

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WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 18R AT CLT IN LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN AND IFR CONDITIONS. THE RAIN CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE APCH AND LNDG. ALL WAS NORMAL AS WE HAD COMPLETED THE PRELIMINARY LNDG CHKLIST AND APCH BRIEFING SOMETIME EARLIER. I HAD ASKED THE FO TO CHK ON CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY IN THE CLT TERMINAL AREA UPON CHKING IN WITH CLT APCH. THERE WAS NONE RPTED AS I CONSULTED OUR ADVERSE WX DECISION TREE IN THE FLT OPS MANUAL. I WAS PREPARED TO HOLD IF ANY ADVERSE CONDITIONS WERE DESCRIBED BY ATC. I FEEL THAT THIS CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE WINDSHEAR AND TSTMS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO WHAT HAPPENED LATER. AS WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE ILS; WE WERE TOLD OF B767 HVY TFC AHEAD. I PUT THE TCASII TO THE 5 NM RANGE AND SAW A TARGET ACFT ABOUT 2 1/2 MI IN FRONT OF US. THIS GREATLY CONCERNED ME SINCE I DIDN'T WANT TO BE THIS CLOSE TO A HVY ACFT. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH BY ATC AS I CALLED FOR GEAR; FLAPS; ETC. ALTHOUGH WE FLEW THE HDG ASSIGNED BY ATC; THE LOC DIDN'T APPEAR TO BE 'COMING IN.' THE FO THEN NOTICED HE STILL HAD HIS 'VOR/ILS/NAV' SWITCH IN THE 'NAV' POS (HIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN 'VOR/ILS' TO SHOW LOC INTERCEPT). WE ALSO NOTICED THAT I (THE CAPT) HAD FAILED (DURING THE APCH BRIEFING) TO DIAL IN THE PROPER INBOUND LOC COURSE ON MY HSI. (MY SWITCH WAS IN THE PROPER 'VOR/ILS' POS.) TO COMPOUND MATTERS; THE HDG SELECTOR KNOB HAD BEEN SET TO THE 10 DEG POS BY THE PREVIOUS CREW. I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF SWITCHING THIS TO 30 DEGS; CALLING FOR FLAPS; DIALING IN THE INBOUND LOC COURSE WHILE SORTING OUT THE B767 DISTANCE (THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US). THE FO WAS BUSY WITH THE CHKLIST AND ATC. ALL WORKED OUT WELL EXCEPT FOR THIS: WE HAD DEVIATED FROM THE RWY 18R LOC DURING ALL OF THIS. (I WAS TOLD LATER BY THE TRACON SUPVR THAT AT NO TIME WAS SEPARATION LOST WITH THE NEARBY ACFT.) WE INTERCEPTED AND FLEW A NORMAL ILS TO LNDG. THE ONLY THING ABOUT THE LNDG THAT WAS NOT NORMAL WAS THE TOUCHDOWN ON THE WET RWY (IN RAIN) WAS SO SMOOTH IT COULD NOT BE FELT. THE SPD BRAKES DID NOT DEPLOY (WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY CALLED BY THE FO). I CALLED 'GET THEM UP' AS HE WAS DEPLOYING THEM. THE FO GOT THEM UP SO QUICKLY THAT I DON'T BELIEVE WE LOST MORE THAN 1/2 SECOND OVER AUTOMATIC DEPLOYMENT. I BELIEVE SAFETY COULD BE ENHANCED BY SOME SORT OF ALERT WITH REGARD TO 'SPD BRAKES' NOT DEPLOYING. I HAD CALLED FOR THE AUTOBRAKE TO BE SET FOR #3 SETTING DURING THE APCH BRIEFING (HAPPY WITH THAT DECISION) AND EVEN THOUGH WE WERE AT THE ACFT'S MAX LNDG WT OF 121000 LBS; WE STOPPED WITH QUITE A BIT OF RWY TO SPARE. WE WERE ASKED TO CALL CLT TRACON AFTER LNDG. THE CAPT CALLED AND SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR AND DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED ON VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE ILS AND THE SUPVR SAID NO RPTS WOULD BE FILED AS NO LEGAL SEPARATION WAS LOST. THE TFC ON THE TCASII 2 1/2 MI AWAY THAT WE SAW WAS A DASH 8 LNDG ON RWY 18L. THE FO AND I CONDUCTED A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING AFTER THIS EVENT AND WE WILL CONSIDER IT AN IMPORTANT LEARNING EXPERIENCE.