A B737 CAPT PERFORMS A DESTABILIZED APCH AND MAKES A LONG LNDG AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE FO AT SFO; CA.

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UPON DISCOVERY THAT WE WERE HIGH ON APCH AND IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT ANY FURTHER ATTEMPT AT COMPLETING THE LNDG WOULD BE AN UNSTABLE APCH; I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE 'OUT OF LUCK;' IMPLYING THAT A GAR WOULD BE NECESSARY. THE CAPT STATED 'WE'LL BE FINE' AND PROCEEDED TO SLIP THE B737. I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS MANEUVER AND THE MANEUVER WAS CEASED. AT 500 FT AGL; WHERE THE VISUAL APCH IS REQUIRED TO BE STABLE AT +/-5 KT AIRSPACE; ON GLIDE PATH AND ENGS SPOOLED UP. I OBSERVED US TO BE +30 KTS HIGH ON GLIDE PATH AND ENGS AT IDLE. I MADE MY 500 FT CALLOUT AND INFORMED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE +30 KTS ABOVE TARGET SPD. THE CAPT STATED 'WE'LL BE ALL RIGHT.' AND PROCEEDED WITH THE LNDG. I THEN REQUESTED AND RECEIVED CLRNC FOR A 'LONG LNDG.' THE ENGS WERE SPOOLED UP JUST PAST RWY THRESHOLD AND WE TOUCHED DOWN 4000 FT DOWN THE RWY AT TARGET +15 KTS. WE TURNED OFF AT TXWY K AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. THE DEBRIEF FROM THE CAPT INCLUDED A 'THANK YOU FOR SPEAKING UP; BUT I'VE SLIPPED THESE AIRPLANES BEFORE AND HAVEN'T HAD ANY PROBS.' NO EXPLANATION WAS OFFERED FOR WHY THE GAR WAS NOT EXECUTED. THE NEXT DAY I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT I THOUGHT WE SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A GAR AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT ADVOCATING MY POS IN A STRONGER; MORE INFORMATIVE MANNER. THIS ACTION WAS WELL RECEIVED AND THAT WAS THE END OF THE INCIDENT. AN UNRPTED TAILWIND OVER THE OM OPPOSITE TO RPTED ARPT WINDS WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. THE FO NOT CLRLY ADVOCATING THE DESIRE FOR A GAR AND THE CAPT EITHER FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE FO'S MEANING WITH HIS CALLOUTS OR JUST PLAIN REFUSING TO FOLLOW SOP'S WERE THE BIGGEST CONTRIBUTORS.