A B737-400 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A NON STANDARD AND UNAUTH REPAIR TO THE HORIZ STABILIZER TRIM CTL SYS.

Date: 2000-03 · Aircraft: B737-400 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

A B737-400 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A NON STANDARD AND UNAUTH REPAIR TO THE HORIZ STABILIZER TRIM CTL SYS.

Narrative

PER NORMAL MURPHY'S LAW OPS; I WAS INFORMED BY AN INSPECTOR WHO IS ON THE ACR SAFETY COMMITTEE AT THE CLOSE OF SHIFT ON A FRIDAY THAT AN ACFT IN THE HANGAR (XYZ) HAD SOME QUESTIONABLE MAINT PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED IN ABC. HE EXPLAINED THAT 'THEY' HAD CUT 3 INCHES OF CABLE IN AN ATTEMPT TO 'RIG' THE FORWARD DRUM; AND 'THEY' FILED ON STRUCTURE AS AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE CLRNC FOR THE DRUM DRIVE CHAIN. I IMMEDIATELY GRABBED A FLASHLIGHT TO INSPECT THE ACFT. I FOUND AS HE HAD SAID; A MODIFIED STRUCTURE; VERY TIGHT CABLES AND A BAD FEELING INSIDE. ON THE WAY HOME; I CALLED MY SUPVR AND ASKED HIM WHAT ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN ON THIS ISSUE. HE STATED THAT THERE WAS NO PAPERWORK ('SQUAWK') FOR THAT ISSUE. I THEN CALLED THE ACR 800 SAFETY HOTLINE AND GOT A RECORDING. I FELT THAT NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN UNTIL 'NORMAL' BUSINESS HRS. I THEN PULLED INTO A CLOSED GAS STATION AND LEFT AN ANONYMOUS MESSAGE ON THE FAA HOTLINE NUMBER. I HOPE THAT INSPECTION WAS NOT INVOLVED WITH THE MODIFICATION I VIEWED IN THE NOSE OF THAT ACFT. I FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT SOMEONE WOULD GO TO SUCH EXTREMES TO MAKE A MISTAKE OPERATE IN SUCH A FASHION ON A PART 121 ACFT. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO ME THAT ABC HAD REMOVED AND REPLACED THE STABILIZER TRIM ACTUATOR. THEY HAD TROUBLE WITH THE CABLE RIG AND 'PROGRAMMED' IT TO BE CHKED LATER. XXX CHKED IT ON A ROUTINE OVERNIGHT CHK AND EVIDENTLY SIGNED IT OFF. NOW IT IS IN ZZZ FOR A YAW DAMPER AND CARGO FIRE MODIFICATION AND THERE IS NO CONCERN ABOUT THIS PROB; EXCEPT A CERTAIN FEW PEOPLE IN THE FLT SAFETY PROGRAM. I MUST ASK -- WHERE IS MAINT SUPERVISION? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED WHEN ABC REPLACED THE JACKSCREW ASSEMBLY IT WAS DONE WITH POOR WORKMANSHIP. THE RPTR SAID 3 INCHES OF CABLE WERE CUT OFF IN ORDER TO KEEP THE CABLES FROM DROOPING AFTER RIGGING. THE RPTR SAID EITHER THE WRONG CABLE WAS INSTALLED OR A LOOP WAS MISSED ON THE FORWARD DRUM OR THE AFT STABILIZER DRUM. THE RPTR STATED THERE IS NO RECORD OF ENGINEERING AUTH TO ALLOW FILING AND ALTERATION ON THE FORWARD DRUM SUPPORT STRUCTURE FOR DRIVE CHAIN CLRNC. THE RPTR SAID THE FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR LOOKED THE JOB OVER AND REQUIRED THE REPLACEMENT AND RERIG OF THE CABLE DRIVE SYS.

More incidents for this aircraft family →

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.