CPR CREW ENTERS R5107D WHEN MISTAKING HLM AFB FOR ALM ARPT.

Date: 2000-03 · Aircraft: Learjet 31 · Phase: approach

Anomalies: conflict-airborne-conflict|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

CPR CREW ENTERS R5107D WHEN MISTAKING HLM AFB FOR ALM ARPT.

Narrative

WE WERE ON RADAR VECTORS FOR VOR APCH TO ALM WITH HOLLIMAN APCH GIVING US VECTORS. WE WERE CLRED FOR APCH AND TOLD TO CANCEL WHEN ABLE. COPLT AND I BOTH SPOTTED A RWY AND I DECLARED ARPT IN SIGHT. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. I TURNED OFF THE APCH HDG AND LINED UP FOR THE RWY AND CALLED FOR FINAL CHKLIST. I THEN REALIZED THAT I WAS LINED UP FOR HOLLIMAN AFB'S ARPT AND IMMEDIATELY TRIED TO CALL A MISSED APCH. HOLLIMAN APCH WAS TALKING TO MIL ACFT (UHF) AND COULD NOT GET US. EVENTUALLY THEY HEARD US AND ASKED US OUR POS. WE RESPONDED THAT WE WERE OVERHEAD AND COULD SEE ALM BUT WERE TOO CLOSE TO MIL ACFT. THEY RECLRED US VISUAL APCH. WE CONTINUED TO ALM AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I DID NOT REALIZE WHEN I SAW THE RWY THAT IT WAS IN THE WRONG LOCATION AS MY INSTS SHOWED. I DEVIATED AND DID NOT REALIZE THE MISTAKE UNTIL I PUT MY PLANE AND THE MIL ACFT IN JEOPARDY. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE MIL APCH CTL STILL HAD US IN RADAR AND WOULD ALERT US TO A DEV. I WILL NOT ALLOW MYSELF TO BE LULLED INTO THIS MODE AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 465736: UNFORTUNATELY WE BOTH ASSUMED THAT THE FIRST ARPT WE SAW WAS THE CORRECT ONE. AS SOON AS WE HAD IT IN SIGHT I STOPPED LOOKING AT THE INSTS AND FOCUSED ON THE ARPT. I HAD NOTICED ONLY A MOMENT BEFORE WE SPOTTED THE ARPT THAT WE WERE STILL W OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE ACCORDING TO THE VOR AND I SHOULD HAVE CHKED THAT AGAIN AND REALIZED THAT WE WERE PASSING HOLLIMAN. I FIXATED ON THE RWY AND DIDN'T EVEN LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENT. IF I HAD SEEN THE 'BIG PICTURE' I WOULD HAVE NOTICED A TWR; MIL ACFT ON GND; ETC; AND REALIZED WHAT WE HAD DONE. I ALSO ASSUMED THAT HOLLIMAN WOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP IF WE WERE IN THE WRONG PLACE. ALL BAD MISTAKES. AS A CFII; I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE CLASSIC 'BELIEVING YOU SEE WHAT YOU WANT TO SEE' SIT AND QUESTIONED OUR JUDGEMENT. I SHOULD HAVE BACKED UP OUR BELIEVED POS WITH THE INSTS. I SHOULD NOT HAVE EXPECTED HOLLIMAN TO NOTICE OUR DEV.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.