AN AIRLINE FO RPTED THAT; AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 35 AT MHT; HE WAS NOTIFIED THAT BOTH THE GLIDE SLOPE AND DME WERE OTS. GIVEN THESE CONDITIONS; THE RPTR CORRECTLY POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS ISSUED AN INCORRECT APCH.

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ON THE APCH TO MHT WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE APCH IN USE WAS THE ILS RWY 35 TO MHT. ACCORDING TO THE ATIS THE GLIDE SLOPE WAS OUT OF SVC AS WELL AS THE DME. DURING THE APCH CLRNC WE WERE CLRED FOR JUST THE ILS RWY 35. ON THE HANDOFF TO THE TWR WE WERE TOLD THE DME WAS OTS AND THE GLIDE SLOPE UNUSABLE. AFTER PICKING UP THE FIELD VISUALLY WE DSNDED WITHOUT INCIDENT TO THE ARPT. AFTER LNDG WE DISCUSSED THE APCH. THE FINAL APCH FIX (GRENI) HAS ONLY 2 MEANS OF ID; EITHER DME OR ALT ON THE GLIDE SLOPE. THIS MEANS WE WERE ISSUED AN INCORRECT APCH CLRNC; 1) FOR THE ILS RWY 35 AND NOT ILS RWY 35 GLIDE SLOPE OTS AND 2) NO MEANS TO SHOOT A TIMED LOCALIZER APCH BECAUSE THE FINAL APCH FIX WAS NOT IDENTIFIABLE. THIS APCH CAN'T BE SHOT WITH BOTH THE GLIDE SLOPE AND DME INOP. A CALL WAS PLACED TO THE TWR AND THEY WERE ADVISED OF OUR CONCLUSION AND AGREED WITH OUR FINDINGS AND THE PROB WAS DISCUSSED. THE WX FOR THE APCH AT THAT TIME WAS 3000 FT BROKEN AND GOOD VISIBILITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: DURING HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE CTLRS AT MHT; THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME EMBARRASSMENT ON THEIR PART. THE CTLRS STATED THAT THEY WERE AWARE THAT DME AND GLIDE SLOPE INFO WERE REQUIRED FOR THE ILS RWY 35 APCH. THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT ADMIT TO HAVING MADE A MISTAKE; THE RPTR WAS SATISFIED THAT THIS WAS A ONE TIME EVENT.