RELIEF PLT MONITORING ARR TO GUAM HAS CONCERNS ABOUT THE CREW'S OP AS LED BY THE CAPT.

Date: 2000-05 · Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng · Phase: approach

Anomalies: deviation-speed-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far

Synopsis

RELIEF PLT MONITORING ARR TO GUAM HAS CONCERNS ABOUT THE CREW'S OP AS LED BY THE CAPT.

Narrative

AS THE IRO ON A ROUND TRIP FROM GUAM TO HKG; WE WERE ON THE FINAL LEG OF OUR TRIP ON THE WAY TO GUAM. I HAD RELIEVED THE CAPT FOR CREW REST ENRTE AND HE RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT ABOUT 200 MI OUT OF GUAM. JUST PRIOR TO HIS RETURN; CTR HAD REQUESTED US TO SLOW 30 KTS FOR SEQUENCING; WHICH I DID. THE FO THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE REQUEST THE R RWY WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO MAINTAIN OUR SPD (AS THEY HAD DONE THE PREVIOUS NIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAPT'S DESIRE). AFTER THIS WAS RELAYED TO CTR; WE RESUMED OUR SPD AND THE CAPT RELIEVED ME AT THE CTLS. FROM THIS TIME ON; THE OTHER ACFT INVOLVED WAS IN SIGHT OFF OUR L SIDE; STARTING AT ABOUT 20 MI SEPARATION (SAME TYPE ACFT). THERE WAS COM BTWN ACFT AND CTR REGARDING SEQUENCING AND SEPARATION. THE OTHER ACFT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT TOO CLOSE TO US -- REFING A SIMILAR SIT FROM A PREVIOUS NIGHT. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR DSCNT AND EXPECTING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 6L TO FOLLOW THE OTHER FLT; THE CAPT OF OUR ACFT MAINTAINED SPD IN DSCNT (POSSIBLY IN VNAV AUTOPLT) AND AT ONE POINT RECEIVED A SPD 'CLACKER' WARNING. AT THIS POINT I OBSERVED THAT HE HAND FLEW THE ACFT OUT OF THE SPD WARNING REGIME. WITH THE DISCUSSIONS BTWN ACFT; CTLRS; AND TRYING TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE OTHER ACFT IN VMC; OUR ACFT DID NOT SLOW BELOW 250 KTS WITHIN 12 MI AND 10000 FT. THIS ALL MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF A 'HURRY-UP COMPETITIVENESS' ON THE PART OF THE CAPT. PRIOR TO TURNING FINAL; OUR CAPT EXECUTED A R-HAND 360 DEG TURN TO OBTAIN MORE LNDG SEPARATION FROM THE OTHER ACFT. AS A THIRD CREW MEMBER ON THIS FLT; I THOUGHT MOST OF THE ACFT-TO-ACFT COM WAS A FRIENDLY 'COMPETITIVENESS' UNTIL I FOUND OUT LATER THAT THERE WAS A REAL CONCERN FOR CLRNC ON THE PART OF THE OTHER CREW. THE CAPT OF OUR FLT DID NOT USE GOOD JUDGEMENT IN HIS DSCNT AND APCH; THE FO WENT ALONG WITH IT AS IT WAS THE 'CAPT'S NATURE;' AND THE IRO DID NOT SPEAK UP TO INTERRUPT THE FLOW OF EVENTS; NOT THINKING IT WAS A SAFETY ISSUE; AND ALSO KNOWING THE CAPT'S PERSONALITY. ALL THIS LED TO A CONFLICT WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY AVOIDED BY NOT BEING IN SUCH A HURRY TO GET HOME; USING CRM AND STICKING TO STANDARD PROCS.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.