LGA TWR CAB COORDINATOR COMPLAINS ABOUT STAFFING PROB WHEN HE HAD NOT NOTICED A DEPARTING ACR DC9 TURNING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION AFTER TKOF. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO HIS ATTN BY N90 DEP CTLR COMPLAINING ABOUT POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH ARR ACFT.

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I AM AN ATC CTLR AT LGA. ON JUL/XA/00 AT APPROX XA50 I WAS WORKING THE CAB COORDINATOR POS WHEN A VERY UNSAFE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SIT OCCURRED. I RPTED THE INCIDENT TO THE CONTROLLER IN CHARGE AND THE ACTING FACILITY MGR. I WAS ASSIGNED THE CAB COORDINATOR POS. MY OBLIGATIONS INCLUDED: 1) TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES BTWN CAB COORDINATOR; LCL CTLR AND CLASS B AIRSPACE; 2) TO MANAGE OPS BTWN LGA; NEW YORK TRACON; THE USERS AND THE ARPT OPERATOR (PORT AUTH OF NY; NJ). HOWEVER; THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERN OF THE CAB COORDINATOR IS TO OVERSEE THE SAFETY OF THE OP. THIS REQUIRES SCANNING RWYS; TXWYS AND THE RADAR. AND PRUDENCE DICTATES THAT THE CAB COORDINATOR MONITOR THE CTL POS; FREQS; FLT PROGRESS STRIPS AND THE OVERALL SIT. AS HAS BECOME THE CUSTOM AT LGA; I WAS ALSO PERFORMING CLERICAL ENTRIES ON THE DEP SPACING PROGRAM. THIS ACTIVITY PREVENTED ME FROM PERFORMING MY PRIMARY DUTY -- ENSURING SAFETY. THIS WAS A DANGEROUS PREDICAMENT. OF LATE; THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAPPEN TOO OFTEN. ON THIS OCCASION; THE ARPT CONFIGN WAS: DEPARTING RWY 4; AND LNDG RWY 31. THE DEPS WERE TURNING R TO A 055 DEG HDG; OR L TURN TO A 360 DEG HDG. THE GND CTL POS WERE COMBINED. THE ATC SPECIALIST WORKING GND CTL WAS CERTIFIED JUST 1 WK EARLIER. TO HIS IMMEDIATE R IS LCL CTLR. THE LCL CTLR WAS CERTIFIED FOR APPROX 3 WKS. THE 2 MOST IMPORTANT CTLRS HAD A COMBINED POS EXPERIENCE OF 1 MONTH. I; WORKING CAB COORDINATOR POS; SHOULD HAVE BEEN STANDING DIRECTLY BEHIND AND OBSERVING THESE INDIVIDUALS. INSTEAD; I WAS PERFORMING DEP SPACE PROGRAM ENTRIES. DURING THIS TIME THE N90 DEP CTLR SCREAMED TO ME '...WATCH THOSE HDGS; ACFT GOT OFF WITH R 360 DEG....' BECAUSE OF DEP SPACE PROGRAM I DID NOT CATCH OR NOTICE ACFT DEPART AND CLB TURNING R RATHER THAN L. I DID NOT SEE THIS ON THE RADAR NOR OUT THE TWR WINDOWS. I CAN ENVISION THIS DC9 SOARING RIGHT THROUGH OUR RWY 31 ARRS. THIS DEP SPACE PROGRAM EQUIP HAS PRACTICALLY NO ROLE AT LGA; AND COMBINING ITS CHORES WITH OTHER POS AT THE EXPENSE OF SAFETY IS NEGLIGENCE. THIS IS A DANGEROUS POLICY; AND SAFETY IS SURELY COMPROMISED WHEN THE CAB COORDINATOR IS OCCUPIED WITH THESE COMPUTER ENTRIES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN MIXED WITH RELATIVE CTLR INEXPERIENCE.