A B737 CAPT MISREAD THE MEL IN THE LOGBOOK AND RPTED TO DISPATCH THAT THE #4 LEADING EDGE DEVICE WAS MELD'S WHEN; IN FACT; IT WAS THE #5.
Synopsis
A B737 CAPT MISREAD THE MEL IN THE LOGBOOK AND RPTED TO DISPATCH THAT THE #4 LEADING EDGE DEVICE WAS MELD'S WHEN; IN FACT; IT WAS THE #5.
Narrative
WE PICKED UP AN ACFT WITH A LEADING EDGE DEVICE INDICATOR MEL'ED. I READ THE WRITE-UP IN THE LOGBOOK AND DISCUSSED FUEL PLANNING WITH THE SPD AND ALT RESTRS WITH DISPATCH. WE COMPLIED WITH THE MEL REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH FLT. ON THE SECOND LEG; A JUMP SEATER MONITORED THE LEADING EDGE DEVICE PANEL DURING THE EXTENSION FOR TKOF. HAVING OVERHEARD MY PRETKOF BRIEFING WHERE I INCLUDED THE MEL; HE POINTED OUT THAT I HAD BRIEFED THE #4 LEADING EDGE DEVICE INDICATOR AS BEING MELD'S; BUT IN FACT THE #5 LEADING EDGE DEVICE INDICATOR WAS NOT INDICATING PROPERLY. I CHKED THE LOGBOOK AGAIN AND NOTED THAT IT WAS THE #5 LEADING EDGE DEVICE THAT HAD BEEN DEFERRED AND NOT THE #4 LEADING EDGE DEVICE THAT WAS BEING CARRIED ON THE RELEASE. SO THE RELEASE HAD BEEN INCORRECT FOR 2 OF MY LEGS BEFORE I WAS ABLE TO CORRECT THE ERROR WITH DISPATCH AND HAVE THE #5 LEADING EDGE DEVICE LISTED ON THE RELEASE. I SHOULD HAVE CAUGHT IT SOONER; BUT I HAD MISSED THE DIFFERENCE BTWN THE WRITE-UP AND THE RELEASE AND KEPT PERPETUATING THE OVERSIGHT.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.