DC10 CREW HAD AN ABORTED TKOF AT AFW.

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THIS INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON OCT/TUE/00 AT XA43Z. ACR ABCD WAS A REPOSITIONING FLT AFTER A WEEKEND AIR SHOW AT ALLIANCE FT WORTH ARPT. THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY FROM AFW TO DFW WITHOUT CARGO; THEN LOAD CARGO AND PROCEED TO MEM. THE ACFT AND COCKPIT HAD BEEN OPEN TO THE PUBLIC DURING THE AIR SHOW; SO EACH CREW MEMBER WAS ESPECIALLY THOROUGH DURING PREFLT PREPARATION. THE FLT FROM AFW TO DFW IS APPROX 10 MINS; BUT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY BUSY. PRIOR TO TAXI; THE CREW BRIEFED BOTH THE DEP FROM AFW; AS WELL AS THE APCH TO DFW. AS THE FE; I WAS CONCERNED THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE TIME TO COMPLETE ALL MY DUTIES PRIOR TO LNDG; SO THE CAPT DIRECTED THAT I COMPLETE A LNDG DATA CARD ON THE GND AT AFW; USING PREDICTED FUEL BURN TO CALCULATE LNDG WT AND BAL. THE ACFT WAS VERY LIGHT (FOR A DC10); WITH A ZFW (ZERO FUEL WT) OF 221820 LBS AND TKOF FUEL OF 27500 LBS. TKOF GROSS WT WAS 249320 LBS. I DO NOT RECALL THE EXACT V1 OR VR; BUT IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY LOW DUE TO THE LOW GROSS WT. WHILE COMPLETING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST; I DECIDED IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO TURN ON THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS IN EACH TANK; USUALLY DONE DURING THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST. I THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD WAY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TASKS I WOULD HAVE TO COMPLETE DURING THE SHORT FLT; AND ENABLE ME TO HAVE MORE TIME TO ASSIST THE CREW IN LOOKING FOR TFC AND MONITORING THE APCH. I TURNED ON THE PUMPS; AND I ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS TO THE CREW. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION. DURING THE TKOF ROLL; EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UP TO THE 80 KT CALLOUT. APCHING 100 KTS; THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT AND FUEL CUE LIGHTS CAME ON; AND THE REJECTED TKOF WAS IMMEDIATELY INITIATED BY THE CAPT. AS SOON AS THE CAUTION LIGHT CAME ON; I SCANNED MY PANEL TO DETERMINE THE PROB; AND REALIZED IMMEDIATELY THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS. BECAUSE THE FUEL LOAD WAS SO LIGHT; LESS THAN 10000 LBS PER TANK; THE FUEL HAD BEEN FORCED AFT BY INERTIA DURING THE TKOF ROLL; UNCOVERING THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS; AND TRIGGERING THE MASTER CAUTION. I IMMEDIATELY REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED; BUT BY THE TIME I COULD VERBALIZE MY CONCLUSION; THE REJECTED TKOF WAS ALREADY IN PROGRESS. THE REST OF THE REJECTED TKOF WAS BY THE BOOK; AND WE RETURNED TO THE RAMP FOR THE REQUIRED BRAKE COOLING AND MAINT CHKS. WE DISCUSSED WHAT HAPPENED; AND I TOOK FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY ERROR. THE CAPT STATED THAT WITH THE V1 AND VR SO LOW; HE FELT HE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TIME TO ANALYZE THE SIT; AND THAT; COMBINED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PLANE HAD JUST COME OUT OF AN AIR SHOW; PRECIPITATED HIS INSTANTANEOUS DECISION TO REJECT THE TKOF. THE REJECTED TKOF WAS MY FAULT; BECAUSE I TRIED TO GET AHEAD OF MY CHKLISTS AND REDUCE MY WORKLOAD DURING THE SHORT FLT. THE CAPT AND FO PERFORMED ALL THEIR DUTIES ADMIRABLY; AND AFTER THE BRAKE COOLING WAS COMPLETE; THE FLTS TO DFW AND MEM WERE COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT; ALBEIT A BIT LATE. THIS EXPERIENCE HAS TAUGHT ME THAT EVEN THOUGH THE AFM MAY NOT SAY WHY A PROC SHOULD BE DONE A CERTAIN WAY; THERE IS AN UNDERLYING REASON. IF I HAD WAITED UNTIL THE PROPER TIME TO TURN ON THE FORWARD BOOST PUMPS; THE REJECTED TKOF WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. I CONSIDER MYSELF A VERY PROFESSIONAL AVIATOR AND PERFECTIONIST; AND I AM ASHAMED BY THE STUPIDITY OF THIS MISTAKE.