NMAC IN THE YUMA TFC PATTERN BTWN A DHC8 ON DOWNWIND LEG AND 3 MIL FIGHTERS CLBING OUT AFTER TKOF FROM A CROSS RWY AND TURNING R TOWARD THE APCHING DASH 8.

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FLT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH AT YUMA; AZ. WE WERE CLRED TO PROCEED VIA BARD (BZA) VORTAC AND FROM THERE ENTER A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35. THIS RWY IS TYPICALLY USED BY CIVILIAN ACFT. APPROX OVER BZA (7 MI N OF THE FIELD) WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE TWR. CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE TWR; WE WERE AGAIN INSTRUCTED TO ENTER A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35 AND RPT 2 MI N OF THE FIELD. WE COMMENCED A DSCNT TO PATTERN ALT FOR THE R DOWNWIND. BY USING A R DOWNWIND; IT PLACED OUR ACFT OVER THE LARGE MIL INSTALLATION AT THE ARPT; INCLUDING THE TWR; BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY; OVER THE END OF RWYS 3/21; WHICH WERE PRESENTLY IN USE BY MIL ACFT (RWY 3 ACTIVE). AT APPROX 2 MI N OF THE ARPT; WE WERE ALMOST AT PATTERN ALT AND ABOUT TO MAKE OUR POS RPT WHEN OUR TCASII ALERTED US WITH A TA. BOTH PLTS ATTEMPTED TO VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE TARGET ACFT; WHICH THE TCASII INDICATED WAS AT OUR 10-11 O'CLOCK POS AND 500 FT BELOW US. BOTH MY FO AND I ACQUIRED WHAT WE BELIEVED TO BE THE THREAT ACFT. A FIGHTER JET HAD PERFORMED A LOW APCH (POSSIBILITY A TKOF) ON RWY 3 (RWY 3L OR RWY 3R IS UNKNOWN); AND ON THEIR CLBOUT; HAD COMMENCED A L TURN TOWARDS OUR ACFT. WE WERE ABLE TO HEAR THE TWR CTLR ADVISE THE MIL ACFT OF OUR POS. BEFORE THE CTLR WAS ABLE TO ADVISE US; OUR TA NOW REVERTED TO AN RA; AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO REDUCE VERT DSCNT. THE FO (PF) COMPLIED. WE CONTINUED TO VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE ACFT; AND RPTED TO EACH OTHER THAT WE HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT. AT THIS TIME OUR TCASII NOW COMMANDED ANOTHER RA; THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE VSI REQUIRED THE ACFT TO BE PLACED INTO A 1500-2000 FPM CLB. FULL PWR WAS APPLIED; AND A CLB COMMENCED. AT THIS TIME; YUMA TWR ADVISED US OF THE CONFLICT ACFT. WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE ACFT WAS TURNING TOWARDS US ON THEIR CLBOUT; AND CONSISTED OF NOT ONE (AS WE HAD THOUGHT); BUT A FLT OF 3 ACFT! THE CAPT (PNF) ADVISED YUMA TWR THAT WE HAD RECEIVED AN RA BASED ON THE INTRUDER ACFT. AFTER THE TCASII RPTED CLR OF CONFLICT WE RE-ESTABLISHED OUR ACFT ON THE R DOWNWIND AND CONDUCTED A NORMAL LNDG. I FOUND THE ADVISORIES PROVIDED TO US FROM THE TWR CTLRS UNSATISFACTORY FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. THE DASH IS A RELATIVELY SLOW MOVING ACFT; AND HAVING ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH TWR APPROX 7 MI N OF THE ARPT; I BELIEVE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TIME TO ADVISE US OF THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT FROM THE DEPARTING OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC. GIVEN THAT WE WERE SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED TWICE TO PERFORM A R DOWNWIND; WHY WAS THE DEPARTING TFC REQUIRED TO MAKE A L CLBING DEP DIRECTLY INTO OUR FLT PATH? I FELT THIS WAS ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS BASED ON THE FACT THAT WE WERE DSNDING FOR OUR DOWNWIND ENTRY; WHILST THEY WERE CLBING; MAKING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR EITHER ACFT(S) TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANEUVERS. OF GREATEST CONCERN WAS THE NUMBER OF ACFT IN THE MIL FLT. AS A MIL FLT OPERATES WITH ONLY 1 XPONDER ACTIVE; OUR TCASII WAS UNABLE TO IDENT THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS THREAT ACFT. INITIALLY LEAD TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ONLY 1 THREAT ACFT. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE THREAT ACFT PASSED DIRECTLY UNDERNEATH US; WITH A VERT PROX OF 300-400 FT. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT MIL ACFT OPERATE ON UHF; MAKING OPS AT JOINT CIVIL/MIL FACILITIES MORE CHALLENGING DUE TO THE FACT THAT PLTS ARE UNABLE TO DEVELOP A MENTAL IMAGE OF LCL TFC CONDITIONS WITH THE ONE-SIDED COMS THAT ARE AVAILABLE ON THE CIVIL FREQ RANGE.