MULTIPLE DISTRS AND A NIGHT VISUAL APCH FOLLOWED BY WRONG RWY LINEUP AND TFC CONFLICT LEAD TO A MISSED APCH AT LAX; CA.

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I WAS CAPT ON A B747 CARGO FLT FROM ANC TO LAX. FLT CONDITIONS WERE NIGHT VMC WITH 8 MI VISIBILITY AND FEW CLOUDS AT 1000 FT. LAX ATIS RPTED ILS APCHS TO RWYS 25L AND 24R WERE IN USE. WE STARTED A DSCNT FROM FL370 ON THE SADDE 6 STAR; WITH A CLRNC TO CROSS THE FIM VOR AT 250 KTS AND SYMON INTXN AT 12000 FT. SUBSEQUENTLY; WE WERE CLRED TO DEPART THE SMO VOR ON A 060 DEG HDG AND A DSCNT TO 4000 FT AFTER SMO. WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS APCH TO RWY 24R. PRIOR TO THE TOP OF DSCNT; WE ASKED ZLA TO COORDINATE WITH SOCAL APCH CTL FOR AN ILS TO RWY 25L. THIS REQUEST WAS MADE DUE TO OUR LNDG WT. OUR ACFT WAS VERY CLOSE TO OUR MAX LNDG WT; AND WHILE NOT TOO HVY FOR RWY 24R; THE MUCH LONGER RWY 25L WAS DESIRABLE TO MINIMIZE BRAKE OVERHEATING. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH SOCAL APCH THE REQUEST FOR RWY 25L WAS REITERATED. WE WERE INFORMED THAT SOCAL WAS UNABLE RWY 25L DUE TO HVY TFC. WE AGAIN EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT OUR LNDG WT AND USING RWY 24R. SOCAL APCH SAID THEY WOULD KEEP OUR REQUEST IN MIND. AFTER DEPARTING SMO VOR ON A HDG OF 060 DEGS; SOCAL SAID THIS WILL BE VECTORS FOR AN ILS TO RWY 24R AND THAT THEY WERE UNABLE RWY 25L DUE TO TFC. WE SET UP AND BRIEFED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 24R. WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 8 MI E OF THE SMO VOR ON DOWNWIND; SOCAL APCH ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO ACCEPT THE VISUAL APCH AS WE COULD SEE THE ARPT WHEN OVER THE SMO VOR. WE WERE GIVEN A 160 DEG HDG FROM SOCAL APCH AND ASKED IF WE COULD SEE THE ARPT. WHILE IN THE TURN; I COULD SEE THE RWY LIGHTS FOR RWY 24R AND INSTRUCTED THE FO TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT. THE FO SAID 'I DON'T SEE THE RWY.' THIS WAS MISUNDERSTOOD BY ME AS 'I SEE THE RWY.' SOCAL APCH ISSUED A HDG OF 220 DEGS AND CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. WE HAD THE 108.5 IOSS ILS FREQ TUNED ON BOTH PLTS' NAV RADIOS AND 249 DEGS SET IN THE COURSE WINDOW. AS WE STARTED THE TURN TO 220 DEGS THE FO'S MASTER INST WARNING LIGHT CAME ON. THE FO INFORMED THE SO AND ME OF THE WARNING LIGHT. AT THE SAME TIME SOCAL APCH TOLD US TO CONTACT THE LOS ANGELES TWR ON 133.9. AS I THOUGHT WE MIGHT HAVE A SERIOUS PROB; I LOOKED INSIDE AT THE FO'S FLT INSTS TO COMPARE THEM WITH MY OWN. THE FO TURNED HIS ATTN INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO CHANGE RADIO FREQ TO LAX TWR. HIS ATTN WAS DIVERTED LONGER THAN NORMAL DUE TO HIS SELECTION OF THE WRONG FREQ ON THE VHF COM RADIO (EG; 123.9 VERSUS 133.9). DURING THIS TIME; THE SO WAS CHKING THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL TO DEAL WITH THE FLT INST WARNING. HE WAS CHKING THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL DUE TO HIS MISUNDERSTANDING OF A REQUEST BY THE FO AND MYSELF TO CHK THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. UPON REDIRECTING MY ATTN OUTSIDE THE ACFT; I DISCOVERED THAT RWY 24R WAS NO LONGER IN VISUAL CONTACT. A BROKEN LAYER OF STRATUS CLOUDS (THAT WE WERE NOT AWARE OF WHEN ACCEPTING THE VISUAL APCH) HAD MOVED ON SHORE AND OBSCURED THE APCH END OF RWY 24R. AFTER APPROX 5 SECONDS OF LOOKING FOR RWY 24R; I REALIZED WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE RWY 24R LOC. I COULD SEE THE RWY 25L APCH LIGHTS AND RWY LIGHTS; AND I COULD SEE THAT WE WERE ABOUT TO ENCROACH ON THE RWY 25L FINAL APCH COURSE. I STARTED A TURN TO THE R FROM OUR 220 DEG INTERCEPT HDG TOWARD THE MISSED APCH HDG OF 250 DEGS. I ALSO ARRESTED MY DSCNT AND STARTED A CLB TOWARD 2500 FT. AS WE STARTED THE TURN; LAX TWR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN R TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS AND CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 2500 FT. WE RPTED THAT WE WERE EXECUTING A MISSED APCH AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE HDG AND ALT ISSUED BY LAX TWR. DURING THE TURN TO THE 270 DEG HDG; I OBSERVED AN ACFT AT OUR 8 O'CLOCK POS AND 3/4 MI; 500 FT BELOW US; ON OUR TCASII. AFTER THE GAR; WE WERE RADAR VECTORED TO AN ILS RWY 25R; AND A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WERE MADE. AFTER LNDG; WE WERE GIVEN A TELEPHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT THE WATCH SUPVR AT SOCAL APCH. WE DISCUSSED THE EVENTS OF OUR FIRST APCH. HE TOLD ME THAT TFC WAS HVY BUT OUR REQUEST FOR RWY 25L SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. MOREOVER; SOCAL APCH WAS REQUESTING ACFT TO ACCEPT VISUAL APCHS SO AS TO INCREASE THEIR ACCEPTANCE RATE.THIS WAS BEING DONE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT COASTAL STRATUS EXISTED ALONG THE SHORELINE; SOMETIMES OBSCURING THE RWYS. THE WATCH SUPVR ACCEPTED OUR EXPLANATION OF BEING DISTR BY OUR FLT INST WARNING LIGHTS; RESULTING IN AN OVERSHOOT OF THE RWY 24R FINAL APCH COURSE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: A LAST MIN CHANGE TO A VISUAL APCH WHEN EXPECTING AN ILS. THE CAPT MISUNDERSTANDING THE FO WHEN HE SAID; 'I DON'T HAVE THE ARPT;' THINKING HE SAID; 'I HAVE THE ARPT.' THE STRATUS CLOUDS MOVING ONSHORE BUT NOT BEING RPTED BY ATC. THE FO'S AND SO'S DISTR BY THE INST WARNING LIGHT; LEADING THE FO TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF HIS NAV AND FLT INSTS. THE FO BEING FURTHER DISTR BY MISTUNING THE VHF COM RADIO. ALL OF THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERSHOOT OF THE RWY 24R FINAL APCH COURSE. FACTORS; WHICH AVOIDED ADDITIONAL PROBS; ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE CAPT'S FAMILIARITY WITH THE LAX ARPT ENVIRONMENT. TCASII THAT PROVIDED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF OTHER ACFT; FACILITATING THE DECISION TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. THE TWR'S MONITORING OF ACFT ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE.