B747 CREW HAD TRACK DEV ON APCH AT LAX.

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NIGHT VMC ARR INTO LAX. ASKED BY SOCAL IF WE COULD ACCEPT VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. CAPT RPTED YES WITH RWY IN SIGHT. FO AND SO DID NOT HAVE RWY 24R IN SIGHT. PROPER LOC FREQ WAS SET IN BOTH CAPT/FO NAVAIDS AS A BACKUP. ON AN INTERCEPT HDG FROM THE N; RECEIVED A RED FLASHING INST WARNING ON THE FO'S ANNUNCIATOR. AS SO REFED COCKPIT OPS MANUAL FOR GUIDANCE; FO WAS GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE TO TWR. AFTER INCORRECTLY SETTING TWR FREQ; FO AGAIN LOOKED DOWN TO SET PROPER FREQ. CAPT ALSO LOOKED INSIDE TO REF FO'S INSTS FOR ANY MALFUNCTIONS DUE TO PREVIOUS INST WARNING. AS ALL 3 PLT'S ATTN RETURNED OUTSIDE; THE ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE CAPT STILL HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. THE ACFT HAD ACTUALLY PASSED THROUGH THE RWY 24R LOC AND NEARED RWY 25R. RECEIVED TCASII TA. CAPT REALIZED ALIGNMENT ERROR AND EXECUTED HARD TURN TO R TO REALIGN ON RWY 24R. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WERE GIVEN IMMEDIATE TURN TO R BY TWR. EVENTUALLY EXECUTED A GAR FOR RESEQUENCING AND UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 24R. CAPT WAS OVERCONFIDENT IN ACCEPTING VISUAL AND THOUGHT HE KNEW GND REFS. FO DISTR BY INCORRECT SETTING OF TWR FREQ. SO DISTR BY REFING COCKPIT MANUAL. SCATTERED DECK/MARINE LAYER THAT UNKNOWINGLY DIMMED APCH LIGHTING TO RWY 24R. FO/SO OVERRELIANT ON CAPT TO NAV TO RWY 24R; SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON ILS APCH INSTEAD OF VISUAL.