AN A330-300 FO RPT ON THE INABILITY OF THE CREW TO TURN THEIR ACFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RADAR VECTORS IN THE LONDON AREA OF GATWICK; EGKK; FO.

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NEARING THE END OF A 7 HR FLT FROM PHL TO LGW; UNITED KINGDOM; THE GATWICK/LONDON DIRECTOR ATC AREA; WE WERE ADVISED TO ENTER HOLDING AT THE HOLLY/WILLO ARR CIRCUIT DUE TO TFC CONGESTION. THE HOLLY/WILLO ARR IS HARD PROGRAMMED INTO OUR SOFTWARE. UPON THE SECOND CIRCUIT (SECOND L TURN IN HOLDING PATTERN) AFTER JUST PASSING WILLO INTXN; WE WERE GIVEN AN APPROX HDG OF 044 DEGS TO HEAD US TOWARD MAYFIELD (MAY) INTXN ON THE RNAV RWY 26L ARR. UPON PULLING AND DRAGGING THE HDG TRACK SELECTOR KNOB TO THE L; THE ACFT WAS VIRTUALLY NON RESPONSIVE. THE CTLR; THINKING THAT WE HAD MISSED HIS INSTRUCTION; ASKED US IF WE WERE IN A L TURN; AT WHICH TIME WE WERE SLOWLY TURNING. THE CTLR THEN ASKED US TO TURN TO THE R OVER 180 DEGS TOWARD MAYFIELD (ON ASSIGNED HDG NOT DIRECT). THE PLANE AGAIN WAS VIRTUALLY UNRESPONSIVE (VERY SLOW TO TURN). IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD A CHK AIRMAN WHO WAS IN THE COCKPIT TO CERTIFY THE RNAV CAPABILITIES OF THE AIRBUS 330 OVERSEAS AT GATWICK. OVER THE 14 YRS THAT I'VE BEEN FLYING TO GATWICK WITH THIS CARRIER; THIS (WILLO/HOLLY) ARR HAS ALWAYS BEEN A PROB AREA OF UNDERSTANDING. THE LONDON CTLRS ARE EXCELLENT AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN THIS AREA. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE EXPERIENCING NAV/HDG PROBS IN SEQUENCING OVER THE NORTH ATLANTIC. APPARENTLY SOFTWARE UPGRADES/CHANGES ARE BEING MADE. LONDON CTLRS SHOULD BE ADVISED OF THIS PROB AND SHOULD AVOID GIVING US 180 DEG TURNS IMMEDIATELY (A TURN WITH 45 DEGS SHOULD BE INITIALLY GIVEN TO GET ACFT TURNING IN CORRECT DIRECTION AND THEN FOLLOWED BY FINAL DESIRED TURN). THIS WAS CAPT'S SECOND TRIP TO EUROPE ON THIS ACFT. 4 HIGHLY QUALIFIED PLTS IN COCKPIT (91 YRS OF EXPERIENCE). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO STATED THAT THIS PROB WITH THE SLOW TURN RATE WAS PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DESIGN OF THE SOFTWARE WITHIN THE FMS/IRS SYS OF THE A330-300. THIS SOFTWARE PROB WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN AT LEAST 2 KNOWN 'FAILURES TO SEQUENCE THE NAT' (WHEN OVER 1 WAYPOINT THE FMS FAILED TO SHIFT TO THE NEXT WAYPOINT). NAT TRACK DEVS EXPERIENCED BY 2 SEPARATE OTHER AIRLINE CHK AIRMEN ON THIS EQUIP. IT WAS ALLEGED THAT THESE 2 TRACK DEVS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH SOFTWARE INTERFACE MALFUNCTIONS AND THAT THE MANUFACTURER OF THE SOFTWARE DID NOT COORD WITH RPTR'S AIRLINE. RPTR STATED THAT 'A MAJOR SOFTWARE CHANGE IS FORTHCOMING TO CORRECT THIS PROB.' IN THIS EVENT; DURING ONE OF MANY REQUIRED RNAV EQUIP CERTIFICATION FLTS; THE FLYING FO DID NOT DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT TO MAKE A MANUAL HDG CHANGE. HE ADMITS THAT HE SHOULD HAVE. HE CITED AN OLD INBRED TRAINING ISSUE OF NOT DISCONNECTING THE AUTOMATED SYS. HE ALSO SAID TO 'FORGET ALL THE OLD XYZ ACFT STUFF.' FO FEELS THAT THE AUTOPLT/FMS THOUGHT THE ACFT WAS STILL IN THE HOLDING PATTERN DURING THE ATTEMPTED TURN. THE FO (TERMED A 'WHIZ ON THE COMPUTERS') AND THE CHK AIRMAN WERE JUMP SEATING AND COULD NOT MAKE OUT WHY THE ACFT WAS NOT RESPONDING AS IT SHOULD HAVE. EVERYONE IS 'NEW' TO THIS ACFT; THE CAPT HAVING ABOUT 60 HRS TOTAL IN TYPE. SO FAR AS THE RPTR KNOWS; THE ONLY FEEDBACK TO ACFT MANUFACTURER ON THESE EVENTS IS THE METHODOLOGY USED IN SELECTING THE NEW HDG. ACFT MANUFACTURER SAYS TO 'SELECT HDG FIRST; THEN PULL THE HDG/TRACK SELECTOR KNOB.' THE COMPANY IS MONITORING THE SIT BUT IS 'HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT AN ALL NEW AIRLINE SAFETY BOARD IS IN PLACE.' A COPY OF THIS RPT WAS ALSO SENT TO THE UNION SAFETY OFFICE.