PA23 INSTRUCTOR AND TRAINEE RAN OUT OF GAS AND HAD #2 ENG FAIL IN ZHN CLASS E AIRSPACE.
Synopsis
PA23 INSTRUCTOR AND TRAINEE RAN OUT OF GAS AND HAD #2 ENG FAIL IN ZHN CLASS E AIRSPACE.
Narrative
THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE FLYING AN OLDER PA23R160 ON A MULTI ENG XCOUNTRY TRAINING FLT FROM HNL TO LIH TO LNY TO HNL ON DEC/XA/00. PRIOR TO LEAVING HNL; I CHKED BOTH MAIN FUEL TANKS; AND I SAW FUEL IN BOTH CELLS SLIGHTLY BELOW TOP-OFF LEVEL. THE ACFT'S MAIN CELLS EACH HOLD 37 GALLONS; OF WHICH 36 GALLONS ARE USABLE; AND THAT GIVES BTWN 4.5 AND 5 HRS OF ENG TIME AT 7-8 GPH PER ENG. BEFORE WE LEFT HNL; I SPOKE TO THE MEI WHO FLEW THE ACFT ON THE PRECEDING FLT; AND HE SAID HE HAD TOPPED OFF THE 2 MAIN TANKS AFTER HIS FIRST INSTRUCTION FLT OF THE DAY; AND HE HAD PUT ONLY .2 ON THE ENGS SINCE THEN. NO ONE ELSE HAD FLOWN THE ACFT THAT DAY. HE DID NOT TAKE THE SECOND INSTRUCTIONAL FLT BECAUSE OF AN OUT OF LIMITS MAGNETO DROP ON THE L ENG. THE ACFT HAD BEEN DOWNED; AND 2 PLUGS REPLACED ON THE L ENG. THAT WORK WAS JUST BEING COMPLETED WHEN MY STUDENT AND I ARRIVED FOR OUR FLT AT ABOUT XA20. I ESTIMATED THE XCOUNTRY WOULD TAKE ABOUT 3.4 HRS; AND WITH ONLY .2 ON THE ENGS AFTER THE MAIN FUEL CELLS WERE TOPPED OFF; WE HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH FUEL FOR THE PROPOSED XCOUNTRY AND THE REQUIRED RESERVE. AS WE WERE PREPARING TO LEAVE HNL; THE FBO FUEL TRUCK CAME BY; AND AS A PRECAUTION; I ASKED THE DRIVER TO TOP OFF BOTH MAIN FUEL CELLS; AND HE SAID YES. I TOOK THE CAPS OFF OF BOTH TANKS AND LEFT THEM ON THE WINGS NEXT TO THE FILLER TUBES WITH THE ACCESS DOORS OPEN. THE DRIVER GOT OUT OF HIS TRUCK; AND STARTED REFUELING PROCS. WE DID NOT SEE HIM PUT FUEL IN THE CELLS. MY STUDENT AND I WALKED AROUND THE CORNER OF THE HANGAR TO TALK TO ANOTHER INSTRUCTOR ABOUT A DIFFERENT ACFT; AND WHEN WE RETURNED JUST A FEW MINS LATER; THE FILL CAPS WERE IN PLACE AND THE ACCESS DOORS WERE CLOSED. WE DID NOT CHK THE FUEL LEVELS AGAIN BEFORE LEAVING HNL. HOWEVER; I WAS CONFIDENT THAT EVEN IF THE CELLS HAD NOT BEEN TOPPED OFF; WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR THE XCOUNTRY. MY STUDENT AND I GOT IN THE ACFT; RECEIVED OUR IFR CLRNC TO LIH; EXECUTED A NORMAL RUN-UP (L ENG MAGNETOS WERE GOOD); AND STARTED THE FLT A LITTLE BEFORE XB00. THE 1.1 HR FLT TO LIH WAS UNEVENTFUL; AND ON LNDG WE TAXIED TO THE DOWNWIND END OF THE RWY; PICKED UP OUR IFR CLRNC TO LNY; AND THEN TOOK OFF. THERE WAS NO AVGAS AT LIH THAT EVENING BECAUSE THE GENERATOR ON THE FUEL PUMP WAS INOP. THE ENG MIXTURES WERE PROPERLY LEANED THROUGH THE CRUISE PORTION OF THE FLT TO LIH. THE 1.6 HR FLT TO LNY WAS ALSO UNEVENTFUL; AND AFTER WE LANDED; WE SHUT DOWN THE ACFT AND STRETCHED OUR LEGS. WE HAD 2.7 HRS ON THE HOBBS METER WHEN WE SHUT DOWN ON LNY; AND THAT WOULD PUT US BACK IN HNL WITH ABOUT 3.4 HRS ON THE ENGS; AS I EXPECTED. AGAIN; THE ENGS WERE PROPERLY LEANED FOR THE CRUISE PORTION OF THE FLT TO LNY. WHILE AT LNY WE PREFLTED THE ACFT; CHKED OIL LEVELS; AND LOOKED IN THE FUEL CELLS. WE DID NOT SEE ANY FUEL IN THE CELLS; BUT THAT IS COMMON WITH THE OLD APACHES; BECAUSE THE SLOPE OF THE CELLS IS STEEP; AND THE LAST 1/2 - 1/3 OF THE FUEL IS NOT VISIBLE THROUGH THE FILLER CAP. WE DRAINED FUEL SAMPLES FROM BOTH ENG FUEL SUMPS. WE LET LNY VFR A LITTLE BEFORE XC00 AND CALLED ZHN FOR FLT FOLLOWING. WE WERE CLBING TO 4500 FT MSL; BUT LEVELED OFF AT 3500 FT MSL TO AVOID A SMALL LINE OF CLOUDS ON OUR COURSE. ABOUT 10 MINS AFTER LIFTING OFF LNY; THE R ENG SHUT DOWN. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT WHEN THE R ENG SHUT DOWN; AND AFTER GOING THROUGH THE ENG OUT PROCS AND CHKLIST; I DECIDED TO FEATHER THE R ENG AND LAND ASAP. I CALLED ZHN; DECLARED AN EMER; AND TURNED TOWARD THE MKK ARPT; WHICH WAS ABOUT 15 NM NE OF OUR POS. WE WERE ABOUT 30 MI FROM LNY AND ABOUT 35 MI FROM HNL. WE PROCEEDED TO THE MKK ARPT ON THE L ENG WITH THE R ENG FEATHERED. I KNOW THE TERRAIN AROUND THE MKK ARPT VERY WELL; SO I MAINTAINED 3500 FT MSL UNTIL WE WERE WITHIN 4 MI OF THE ARPT; AND I THEN MADE A STRAIGHT-IN APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 5. THE TWR AT MKK ARPT WAS UNMANNED; BECAUSE IT WAS AFTER CLOSING; SO I ACTIVATED THE RWY LIGHTS WITH MY XMITTER ON THE TWR FREQ 125.7. WE LANDED THE ACFT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT AND TAXIED TO THE TRANSIENT PARKING AREA. WE SECURED THE ACFT AND DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL MORNING TO INSPECT THE ACFT CLOSELY. I NOTIFIED THE ACFT OWNER BY VOICE MAIL MESSAGE ON HIS BUSINESS TELEPHONE AND ON HIS CELL PHONE. THE NEXT MORNING WE PREFLT THE ACFT; WHICH INCLUDED DRAINING FUEL SAMPLES FROM THE SUMPS ON BOTH ENGS. I TURNED ON THE MASTER SWITCH AND THE ENG FUEL BOOST PUMPS AND CHKED THE FUEL PRESSURE ON BOTH ENGS. PRESSURE ON THE L ENG WAS WITHIN LIMITATIONS; BUT THE PRESSURE ON THE R ENG WAS ZERO. ALSO; I COULD HEAR FROM THE HIGH SPD OF THE R BOOST PUMP THAT IT WAS NOT PUMPING GAS. A FRIEND OF MINE FLEW IN FROM HNL; AND I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT THE R ENG SHUTDOWN MAY HAVE OCCURRED FROM FUEL STARVATION. WE XFERRED ABOUT 1 1/2 GALLONS OF FUEL FROM ONE OF HIS FUEL CELLS TO THE R FUEL CELL ON THE APACHE AND STARTED THE ENG. THE PROP UNFEATHERED PROPERLY; AND THE ENG RAN FINE; WITH ALL ENG INSTS READING WITHIN LIMITATIONS. EVEN THOUGH IT DIDN'T MAKE SENSE TO ME; I CONTINUED TO THINK THAT THE R ENG HAD SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF FUEL STARVATION. I STARTED THE L ENG; BUT IT RAN ROUGH. I CHKED THE MAGNETOS; BUT THEY SEEMED TO BE FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. I SECURED THE ENGS AND TIED DOWN THE ACFT. MY STUDENT AND I RETURNED TO HNL WITH MY FRIEND; AND I AGAIN NOTIFIED THE OWNER OF THE ACFT BY VOICE MAIL AT THE 2 NUMBERS. THE FOLLOWING DAY; I RETURNED TO MKK ARPT AND XFERRED 20 GALLONS OF FUEL FROM THE CELLS ON THE ACFT I HAD FLOWN TO MKK TO THE APACHE; PUTTING 10 GALLONS IN EACH OF THE APACHE'S MAIN FUEL CELLS. I STARTED THE L ENG; AND IT CONTINUED TO RUN ROUGH; SO I SHUT IT DOWN. I SECURED THE APACHE AND RETURNED TO HNL. THE NEXT DAY; I FINALLY MADE CONTACT WITH THE OWNER OF THE APACHE; AND HE TOLD ME THE R FUEL CELL DRAINS FASTER THAN THE L FUEL CELL. WE DISCUSSED THE FUEL USAGE OF THE ACFT; AND HE SAID THE ENGS MAY USE AS MUCH AS 9 GPH. IF THE R CELL WAS TOPPED OFF WITH 36 GALLONS OF FUEL; AND IF ALL OF THE FUEL WAS BURNED BY THE ENG IN 3 HRS; THE FUEL FLOW WOULD HAVE AVERAGED 12 GPH. THAT RATE OF FUEL FLOW WOULD HAVE OVER ENRICHED THE ENG; FOULED THE PLUGS; AND PROBABLY CAUSED AN ENG FAILURE. THE PROB AROSE FROM FUEL STARVATION IN THE R ENG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE NOT KNOWING THAT THE R FUEL CELL WOULD LOSE OR USE FUEL AT A RATE CLOSE TO 12 GPH. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED WHEN THE R ENG SHUT DOWN; AND MY CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS FEATHER THE R ENG AND LAND ASAP. THERE WERE NO INJURIES OR PROPERTY DAMAGE. THE ROUGH RUNNING L ENG WAS DUE TO A FOULED PLUG; WHICH DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL THE MORNING AFTER THE INCIDENT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDED PLANNING AND CALCULATIONS FOR FUEL USAGE BASED ON 7-8 GPH PER ENG; WHICH WAS INCORRECT. AS FOR ACTION OR INACTION; WE HAD KNOWN THE CONDITION OF THE R FUEL CELL; WE WOULD HAVE PLANNED A SHORTER XCOUNTRY OR RETURNED TO HNL. THE ONLY EXPLANATION THAT MAKES SENSE IS: 1) THE R FUEL CELL DID NOT HAVE 36 GALLONS IN IT WHEN WE STARTED THE XCOUNTRY; OR 2) THE R FUEL CELL HAD 36 GALLONS BUT LEAKED ABOUT 9 GALLONS; OR 3) THE CAPACITY OF THE R FUEL CELL IS NOT 36 USABLE GALLONS OF FUEL.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.