ACR BROKE OFF ATL RWY 26 FINAL DUE TO PROX OF ANOTHER ACFT BEING CROSSED UNDER TO ANOTHER RWY. ARPT AND TFC NOT IN SIGHT DURING EVENT UNTIL LAST MOMENT.

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APCH SEQUENCE BEGAN AT 7000 FT MSL; ABEAM ATL ARPT WITH RADAR VECTORS (AT 250 KTS) BY ATL APCH CTL. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING THIS ABEAM POINT; APCH ISSUED A DSCNT CLRNC. HE ALSO TOLD US TO EXPEDITE DSCNT (AS ATL APCH OFTEN ISSUES A 'SLAM DUNK APCH' FOR THIS APCH). WHILE DSNDING AT MAX RATE (THROTTLES IDLE; SPD BRAKES FULL; ETC) THROUGH 6000 FT; APCH ISSUED BASE LEG AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT. (WE DID NOT VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE ARPT UNTIL AFTER THE EVENT WAS OVER.) WE SAID WE DIDN'T HAVE THE ARPT. APCH THEN ASKED IF WE HAD PARALLEL TFC ON RWY 27L. AGAIN WE SAID WE DIDN'T HAVE TFC. APCH THEN ISSUED A 230 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT RWY 26R. WE STILL DID NOT HAVE THE ARPT OR THE OTHER AIRPLANE IN SIGHT. (KEEP IN MIND THAT WE WERE STILL DSNDING MAX RATE; LOWERING THE LNDG GEAR; TRYING TO RUN THE 'FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST' AND SLOWING THE ACFT DOWN.) AS WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC FOR RWY 26R; APCH ASKED IF WE SAW OUR PARALLEL TFC. RIGHT AT THAT MOMENT; WE RECEIVED A TCASII TFC ALERT. WE RESPONDED TO APCH BY SAYING 'WE DO NOT HAVE TFC IN SIGHT AND WE JUST RECEIVED A TA.' AS I WAS RESPONDING TO APCH (I WAS THE PNF); I NOTICED OUR TFC ON THE SCREEN 600 FT BELOW AND LESS THAN 1 MI HORIZ. IN ADDITION; I NOTICED THE 'WIND ARROW' INDICATING A 30 KT (R) DIRECT XWIND TO THE RWY 26R LOC. FOLLOWING MY RESPONSE; APCH IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A CLB AND 30 DEG R TURN. SHORTLY AFTER OUR 'BREAKOUT MANEUVER;' WE SAW THE ARPT AND RPTED SO. ATL APCH THEN RECLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 26R. SUMMARY: I SUSPECT (AFTER REVIEWING BOTH THE RWY 26R AND RWY 27L APCHS AND RECALLING THE EVENTS STATED ABOVE) THE FOLLOWING: 1) ATL APCH WAS 'SLAM DUNKING' US FOR RWY 26R. 2) ATL APCH WAS UNAWARE OR FORGOT ABOUT THE 30 KT N WIND WHICH ADDED 30 KTS ON THE TAIL ON BASE. 3) WE WERE UNABLE TO SEE ARPT/AIRPLANE DUE TO HAZE AND TASK SATURATION. 4) OTHER ACFT WAS DSNDING FROM HIS INTERMEDIATE ALT TO HIS GS INTERCEPT ALT VIA THE GS; AS OPPOSED TO AN IDLE PWR DSCNT STEPDOWN. 5) ATC SHOULD BE MORE CAREFUL WHEN ISSUING THE 'SLAM DUNK' APCHS. THIS CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT TOOL IS PUSHING THE SAFETY ENVELOPE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 502194: THE FO AND I AGREED WE COULDN'T HAVE DONE ANYTHING BETTER AND THAT APCH DIDN'T REALIZE THE STRENGTH OF THE WIND FROM THE N AND THAT THE B737 FOR RWY 26L PROBABLY SLOWED HIS DSCNT TO CAPTURE THE GS ARE THE 2 THINGS THAT MADE US GET CLOSE.