MD88 CREW HAD A RWY STABILIZER AURAL WARNING AT HIGH SPD ON TKOF ROLL AT JFK.

Date: 2001-04 · Aircraft: MD-88

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

MD88 CREW HAD A RWY STABILIZER AURAL WARNING AT HIGH SPD ON TKOF ROLL AT JFK.

Narrative

WE WERE TAKING OFF FROM JFK ON RWY 31L AND WE WERE CLRED THE BREEZY POINT CLB ON THE KENNEDY 8 DEP. THE FIRST PART OF OUR TKOF WAS A NORMAL ONE; BUT SUDDENLY AT HIGH SPD AND APCHING TO V1 WE HAD AN UNSCHEDULED 'STABILIZER' AURAL WARNING. THE COPLT WAS THE PLT TAKING OFF. THE AURAL WARNING STOPPED SO I MADE AS PIC THE GO DECISION TO CONTINUE OUR TKOF. ON THE INITIAL CLBOUT I THINK THAT BOTH WERE DISTR BY THE WARNING. AS PNF I WAS WATCHING THE STABILIZER TRIM INDICATOR AND BUSY WITH ATC WHILE THE COPLT WAS FLYING THE DEP THEN WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY DEP CTL TO START OUR L TURN TO CRI VOR. IT WAS WHEN BOTH REALIZED THAT WE WERE STARTING OUR L TURN TO CRI ONLY WITH 15 DEGS OF BANK ANGLE THE COPLT SET IMMEDIATELY 30 DEGS OF BANK ANGLE ON THE FLT GUIDANCE COMPUTER. AFTER THAT I TOLD THE COPLT TO ENGAGE NAV TO FLY DIRECT CRI VOR AND LEAVE IT ON THE 223 DEG RADIAL. BUT AT THIS POINT WE MADE A MISTAKE. DURING OUR PREFLT AFTER CRI VOR WE WERE CREATED A WAYPOINT ON THE CRI 223 DEG RADIAL AT 2 DME WITH THE PURPOSE TO CROSS THAT POINT AT OR ABOVE 2500 FT. AFTER THAT POINT WE HAD OUR NEXT WAYPOINT RBV VOR; SO WE WERE GOING AFTER THAT POINT DIRECT TO RBV VOR. (OUR COMPANY'S PROCS INDICATE THAT THE PF MUST HAVE HIS NAV DISPLAY ON MAP MODE AND THE PNF MUST HAVE HIS NAV DISPLAY ON ROSE OR ARC MODE (RAW DATA) TO MONITOR THE NAV.) AFTER THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AN ALT CHANGE THANKS TO THAT PROC; I NOTICED THAT WE WERE R OF COURSE; SO I TOLD THE COPLT TO CHANGE TO ROSE OR ARC (RAW DATA) AND PROCEED TO REINTERCEPT THE CRI 223 DEG RADIAL AT THIS POINT WAS WHEN WE WERE ADVISED BY DEP CTL THAT WE WERE R OF COURSE AND WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO REINTERCEPT THE SID. I BELIEVE THAT THE NON ADHERENCE TO A PUBLISHED PROC WAS DUE IN FIRST INSTANCE BY THE ACFT EQUIP PROB WHICH CAUSED A DISTR DURING THE INITIAL CLBOUT; SECONDLY; I THINK THAT WE NEED TO MAKE A MORE PRECISE DEP BRIEFING AND FINALLY TO FLY THIS PARTICULAR DEP ON RAW DATA BECAUSE IT IS EASY TO FLY ON ROSE OR ARC MODE DUE TO THE INTERP OF THE INSTS.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.