A MIL TRAINING FLT MAKES AN INITIAL APCH TO THE WRONG RWY AT RDU; NC.

Date: 2001-05 · Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng · Phase: approach

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

A MIL TRAINING FLT MAKES AN INITIAL APCH TO THE WRONG RWY AT RDU; NC.

Narrative

THE FLT WAS A TRAINING XCOUNTRY FLT FROM CHATTANOOGA; TN; TO RALEIGH/DURHAM; NC. THE FLT TO THE RALEIGH AREA WAS UNEVENTFUL. OUR REQUEST TO APCH CTL WAS FOR A VOR APCH BUT WERE TOLD WE SHOULD EXPECT AN ILS APCH TO RWY 23L. AT THAT TIME WE THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN TOLD RWY 23R AND FLEW OUR APCH ACCORDINGLY. WE THEN SET UP THE LOC FREQ FOR RWY 23R AND CONTINUED FOLLOWING APCH'S INSTRUCTIONS. WE HAD BEEN GIVEN DSCNTS FROM OUR INTERMEDIATE ALTS AND HDGS OF 350 DEGS; THEN 320 DEGS AND FINALLY 260 DEGS AT 6000 FT. THERE WAS A LARGE AMOUNT OF TFC; AS COULD BE EXPECTED AT XC00 ON FRIDAY. WE THINK THIS WAS A FACTOR; AS SOME RADIO CALLS WERE STEPPED ON AND AT LEAST ONE WAS COMPLETELY MISSED. WE CONTINUED OUR APCH TO ILS RWY 23R. THE PLT COMMENTED TO OUR CREW THAT WE SEEMED TO BE A BIT HIGH FOR OUR DISTANCE OUT; AND ABOUT THAT TIME WE RECEIVED THE CALL TO CONTINUE OUR DSCNT TO 2000 FT. THIS MADE US BELIEVE THAT WE HAD MISSED A PREVIOUS CALL TO DSND; OTHERWISE THE CTLR WOULD HAVE SAID 'DSND TO' AND NOT 'CONTINUE TO' 2000 FT. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR OUR FULL STOP LNDG. THE NEXT IN THE SEQUENCE (AT ABOUT 7 OR SO MI) WAS A CALL FROM THE CTLR TO 'TURN AN ADDITIONAL 20 DEGS R FOR THE LOC.' THIS FURTHER CONFIRMED IN OUR MINDS THAT WE WERE GOING TO RWY 23R. SHORTLY AFTER THIS CALL; WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR (THIS WAS AT APPROX 4-5 MI AND WITHOUT THE FIELD IN SIGHT). WE CONTACTED TWR AND WERE IMMEDIATELY TOLD THAT WE WERE LINED UP FOR THE R RWY BUT WE WERE CLRED FOR THE L RWY AND THAT WE HAD ANOTHER ACFT JUST BEHIND US ON APCH TO RWY 23R. AT THIS TIME; WE WERE PROBABLY 3-4 MI ON FINAL AND WERE FINALLY ABLE TO SEE THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. I CALLED IN 'FIELD IN SIGHT; SIDESTEPPING TO THE L.' I MADE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN AND LINED UP VISUALLY WITH THE L RWY AND CONTINUED TO LAND UNEVENTFULLY ON THE L. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) LARGE AMOUNT OF FRIDAY XC00 TFC CONTRIBUTED TO RADIO COM PROBS; INCLUDING MISSED CALLS FROM APCH. WE FELT WE MISSED SOME CALLS THAT THE APCH CTLR MADE TO US DUE TO OTHER ACFT STEPPING ON THE CTLR'S CALLS. 2) WE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR AN APCH TO THE ILS RWY 23R. WE NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED (CONFIRMED BY RDU'S APCH CTL TAPE RECORDER) THAT WE WERE EVER CLRED TO THE L RWY. 3) ON A MODIFIED BASE LEG; WE WERE VECTORED TO A FINAL APCH INTERCEPT ANGLE OF 50 DEGS. THE POINT OF INTERCEPT WAS AT APPROX 7 MI; WHICH WAS OUTSIDE OF VISUAL RANGE OF THE RWY. NOTE: FAR AIM; CHAPTER 5-4-14; PARAGRAPH B1; STATES THAT 'ACFT WILL NOT BE VECTORED TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH AT AN ANGLE GREATER THAN 30 DEGS.' 4) AT A CRITICAL POINT IN FLT (ON THE 50 DEG VECTOR) WE WERE SWITCHED (FREQ) TO TWR WITH AN OVERSHOOT IMMINENT. NOTE: FAR AIM MANUAL; CHAPTER 5-4-14; PARAGRAPH B4 STATES THAT THE RADAR MONITOR CTLR WILL PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: 'ACFT OBSERVED TO OVERSHOOT THE TURN-ON OR TO CONTINUE ON A TRACK WHICH WILL PENETRATE THE NTZ (AN AREA OF 2000 FT WIDE LOCATED EQUIDISTANT BTWN PARALLEL FINAL APCH COURSES) WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO THE CORRECT FINAL APCH COURSE IMMEDIATELY.' NO SUCH CALL WAS MADE BY APCH CTL. INSTEAD; WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR AFTER OVERSHOOTING ON AN APCH ASSIGNED HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. CONCLUSION: THE FACTORS ARE THAT THE AIR CREW MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THEY WERE CLRED TO RWY 23R WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE CLRED FOR RWY 23L. FOR SAFELY OF FLT REASONS; THE CTLING AGENCY SHOULD RECEIVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM THE PLT (IN THE CASE OF SIMULTANEOUS PARALLEL APCHS) AS TO THE LNDG RWY. IF NO SUCH CONFIRMATION CALL HAS BEEN MADE; APCH CTL SHOULD QUERY THE PLT 'YOU ARE CLRED RWY 23L; ACKNOWLEDGE.' CONFIRMATION OF THE CORRECT RWY SHOULD BE A RESPONSIBILITY OF BOTH THE PLT AND THE APCH CTLR; ESPECIALLY DURING DUAL RWY OPS WITH OTHER ACFT LESS THAN 1 MI ABEAM.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.