B737 FLC ARE CONCERNED WITH TUL DEP CTL'S TECHNIQUE WHEN APPLYING VISUAL SEPARATION BTWN THEM AND ANOTHER ACR JET.

Narrative

DEPARTING TUL; WE WERE VECTORED HDG 260 DEGS AND TOLD TO MAINTAIN 5000 FT FOR TFC W AT 6000 FT. AS WE COMPLETED OUR TURN TO 260 DEGS AND PASSING 4000 FT; THE FO RPTED TFC IN SIGHT (I SAW IT TOO); AND TUL DEP CTL CLRED US TO CLB TO 15000 FT AND TO KEEP VISUAL SEPARATION. SINCE I 1) SAW THE TFC; 2) HAD DISCRETIONARY CLRNC TO CLB; AND 3) HAD EXCESS ENERGY AVAILABLE (I HAD PULLED PWR AT 4500 FT; 250 KTS FOR AN ANTICIPATED 5000 FT LEVELOFF); I DECIDED TO CONTINUE CLBING TO 15000 FT. AS WE NEARED THE 6000 FT TFC (A B737); IT BECAME APPARENT WE WERE ON CONVERGING HDGS; SO I SELECTED CLB PWR AND INITIATED A STEEPER CLB TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SEPARATION. TCASII RA DIRECTED A DSCNT; BUT WITH A SIGNIFICANT UPWARD VECTOR (15 DEGS NOSE HIGH AT 220 KTS); AND WITH TFC IN SIGHT; I DISREGARDED THE TCASII AND CONTINUED THE CLB; AS IT SEEMED THE SAFEST ALTERNATIVE. I ESTIMATE WE CLRED THE JET BY 2000 FT VERTLY AND 1/2 NM HORIZLY. THE JET'S SUBSEQUENT RAPID XMISSION SUGGESTED HE WAS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT THE INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) SOMEWHAT HAZY (APPROX 6 NM VISIBILITY) MADE ASPECT ANGLE DETERMINATION DIFFICULT. I INITIALLY THOUGHT OUR HDGS WERE WITHIN 90 DEGS. AS IT TURNS OUT; WE WERE CONVERGING; NOT DIVERGING. 2) TUL DEP'S ISSUING A CLRNC; ALBEIT A DISCRETIONARY ONE; THAT DID NOT ENSURE 'CLRNC;' IT SEEMS THAT OFTEN IN AREAS OF LESS DENSELY USED COMMERCIAL TFC; CTLRS HAVE 'LOOSER' RULES REGARDING CTLING ACFT AND SEEM TO ASSUME THAT COMMERCIAL PLTS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THEIR AIRSPACE. I THINK DEP CTL SHOULD HAVE HELD US AT 5000 FT REGARDLESS OF OUR HAVING SIGHT OF THE TFC; BECAUSE OF THE CONVERGING VECTORS; AND OUR LACK OF INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDING TFC; HDG; OR AIRSPD. 3) I WAS EAGER TO KEEP OUR CLB GOING; RATHER THAN BEING HELD AT 5000 FT INDEFINITELY; AND I DID NOT THINK WE WERE GOING TO CREATE A POTENTIAL CONFLICT; NOR DID I ANTICIPATE FLYING WITHIN TCASII RA PARAMETERS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 511716: THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE CLB ABOVE THE INBOUND TFC AS HE WAS THE PF AND THE TFC WAS IN VIEW ON HIS SIDE (XING ACFT L TO R). SHORTLY AFTER INITIATING THE CLB; TCASII ISSUED A TA ('TFC') ADVISORY; FOLLOWED BY A 'DSND; DSND' RA. AS PNF; I FELT THE CAPT HAD A BETTER SENSE OF THE SIT FROM HIS SIDE OF THE ACFT (WITH TFC IN SIGHT) AS WELL AS BEING MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE CLB CAPABILITY OF THE B737. IN RETROSPECT; I THINK WE WERE BOTH UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE B737 WAS GOING TO BEGIN A DSCNT; WHEN IN FACT IT DID NOT. I SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED THIS WITH ATC AS PNF. ALSO; I THINK MY TIMIDITY IN EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER A LOSS OF SEPARATION WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR; BUT BY THE TIME I BECAME UNCOMFORTABLE; WE WERE COMMITTED TO CLB.