DC8-71 FO FAILED TO GO DIRECT TO THE VOR DURING TRANSITION FOR A VISUAL APCH TO PARALLEL RWYS. APCH CTLR CAUGHT THE MISTAKE AND ALERTED THE FLC.

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A VISUAL APCH WAS BEING CONDUCTED TO RWY 18R AT MCO WITH MY FO AS PF. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED VISUALLY TO THE ORL VOR (5 NM N OF THE FIELD) AND THEN VISUALLY TO RWY 18R. A LOW SCUD OF STATUS (BROKEN) PARTIALLY OBSTRUCTED THE VIEW OF THE ARPT. I DIRECTED MY FO TO PROCEED TO THE VOR USING THE #1 RMI NEEDLE (SET TO THE VOR). HER SIDE WAS SET TO THE ILS RWY 18R TO PROVIDE VERT GUIDANCE. I WAS BUSY SETTING FLAPS; RADIOS AND RESPONDING TO CHKLISTS AND DID NOT NOTICE THAT THE FO WAS NOT PROCEEDING TO THE VOR. APCH CTL THEN ASKED IF WE WERE PROCEEDING TO THE VOR AND I DETECTED THE OVERSHOOT TO THE E OF FINAL TOWARD RWYS 18L AND 17. I REDIRECTED MY FO TO THE VOR AND THE APCH WAS CONCLUDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I HEARD APCH ADVISE ANOTHER ACFT ON VISUAL APCH TO EITHER RWY 18L OR RWY 17 OF OUR PRESENCE; BUT I AM NOT SURE OF ITS TYPE OF PROX. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) I HAD NOT FLOWN INTO MCO FOR MANY YRS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED A VISUAL APCH WITH LOW SCUD PARTIALLY OBSCURING MY VIEW OF THE ARPT. 2) MY FO WAS VERY INEXPERIENCED (AS ARE MANY OF OUR NEW CREW MEMBERS; MOVING DIRECTLY FROM LIGHT TWIN TYPES INTO A HVY JET). I OVERESTIMATED HER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND DID NOT PROPERLY MONITOR HER APCH. 3) FATIGUE IS ALWAYS A FACTOR IN MY FLT OPS. THIS WAS THE 4TH LEG OF AN ALL-NIGHT FLT; WHICH WAS PROCEEDED BY AN ALL-NIGHT FLT OF 3 LEGS. I HAD ABOUT 6 HRS OF ACTUAL SLEEP BTWN THESE FLTS! ALL LEGAL!