PA23 AND DC10 HAD LESS THAN LEGAL SPACING DEPARTING HNL.

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THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBES THE EVENT OF AN NMAC WHICH OCCURRED ON JUN/WED/01 BTWN 2 ACFT OPERATING WITHIN CLASS B AIRSPACE AT THE HNL ARPT. EVENT: CLRNC DELIVERY CLRED US TO DEPART HNL CLASS B AIRSPACE VIA THE STANDARD VFR 'SHORELINE 4' DEP WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: 'DEPARTING RWYS 4; MAINTAIN RWY HDG TO THE H-1 FREEWAY. DEPARTING RWY 8L MAINTAIN RWY HDG TO NIMITZ HWY. TURN R (T0) PARALLEL NIMITZ HWY PROCEEDING DIRECT TO THE CTR OF HONOLULU HARBOR. FLY 1 MI OFFSHORE PASSING ABEAM KEWALO BASIN THENCE DIRECT TO 1 MI DUE S OF DIAMOND HEAD. TURN L AND RESUME OWN NAV; REMAINING WITHIN 2 MI OF THE SHORELINE UNTIL DEPARTING THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. MAINTAIN 1500 FT WHILE WITHIN CLASS B AIRSPACE. DEP CTL FREQ WILL BE 124.8/317.6. INTENDED FOR TWIN ENG ACFT.' OUR DEP RWY WAS RWY 4R. ONCE TKOF CLRNC WAS RECEIVED FROM HNL TWR; TKOF WAS COMMENCED. AFTER LIFTOFF; WE UNDERSTOOD FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWR TO FOLLOW THE SHORELINE AND TO CONTACT DEP CTL. ALTHOUGH HIS (TWR'S) XMISSION WAS SLIGHTLY GARBLED; I ACKNOWLEDGED BY REPLYING THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW THE SHORELINE AND CONTACT DEP. AS WE MADE OUR INITIAL CLB AND TURN TO FOLLOW THE SHORELINE; I NOTICED A DC10 LIFTING OFF OF RWY 8R. I CONTACTED DEP CTL AND WAS ACKNOWLEDGED WITH RADAR CONTACT. IN ADDITION; DEP POINTED OUT THE DC10 TFC. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. I STEERED L SLIGHTLY TO ENSURE SEPARATION FROM THE DC10 AND IN DOING SO; MY VISUAL WITH THE DC10 BECAME OBSCURED BY MY ACFT'S R WING AND R SIDE FUSELAGE. UPON LEVELING OFF AT 1500 FT AND ROLLING WINGS LEVEL; I SAW THE DC10 DIVERGING AWAY FROM MY ACFT AT AN ESTIMATED ALT OF 500-600 FT BELOW MY ACFT. I HEARD A XMISSION FROM THE DC10 ACFT INDICATING THAT HE HAD TO LEVEL OFF AT 800 FT TO AVOID ANY FURTHER CONFLICT (WITH MY ACFT). IT WAS APPROX AT THIS TIME THAT THE DEP CTLR STATED TO ME THAT THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE FOR ME TO PROCEED TO PUNCHBOWL (CEMETERY) AND THEN TO RESUME THE SHORELINE DEP. IN MY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THIS XMISSION; I STATED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO RESUME/FLY THE 'SHORELINE' AND THAT THIS IS WHAT WE HAD INDEED ACKNOWLEDGED TO THE TWR PRIOR TO CONTACTING DEP CTL. IT IS UNCLR HOW CLOSE THE 2 ACFT ACTUALLY CAME TO ONE ANOTHER; BUT IN CONVERSATION I HAD WITH SOME MEMBERS OF THAT DC10'S FLC; IT WAS CLR THAT EVASIVE ACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN IN SOME FORM. IT IS APPARENT THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL CHAINS OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THIS SIT. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF THE EVENTS I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SIT: 1) THE DESIGN OF THE 'SHORELINE 4' DEP IS FLAWED IN THAT IT ALLOWS; IN SOME SITS; VFR ACFT DEPARTING VIA THIS PROC TO CONFLICT WITH DEPARTING ACFT FROM RWY 8R. 2) COMS BTWN ATC AND DEPARTING ACFT WERE GARBLED AND/OR COULD HAVE BEEN MORE CLRLY STATED SO AS TO ELIMINATE ANY CONFUSION DURING THE SEQUENCING OF DEPS OFF SEPARATE RWYS WITH PROCS THAT HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO RESULT IN A CONFLICT BTWN ACFT. 3) SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BTWN ATC AND DEPARTING ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. 4) COMPLACENCY/HUMAN FACTORS. HAWAII ENJOYS EXCELLENT FLYING CONDITIONS THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME AND IT IS EASY TO BE LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY ON BOTH SIDES OF THE EQUATION -- BOTH ATC AND PLT. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT; ALTHOUGH ATC NORMALLY PROVIDES SEPARATION BTWN IFR/IFR AND IFR/VFR ACFT IN CLASS B AIRSPACE; THE SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT MUST BE ADHERED TO AT ALL TIMES WHEN OPERATING IN VMC. HAD THIS NOT BEEN THE CASE IN THIS SIT; THE OUTCOME MAY HAVE BEEN LESS THAN DESIRABLE. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT SEE AND AVOID CAN HAVE LIMITATIONS. I BELIEVE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE SIT DESCRIBED ABOVE WAS MAINLY CAUSED BY POOR COM BTWN ATC AND THE 2 DEPARTING ACFT INVOLVED. I SUGGEST CORRECTING THE SHORELINE 4 DEP PROC TO EMPHASIZE STRICT RADIO DISCIPLINE AND PHRASEOLOGY IN PLT/CTLR COMS AS IT RELATES TO DEVS FROM THE ESTABLISHED PROCS. ALSO; THE ATC PROCS FOR SEQUENCING BTWN ACFT ON THE SHORELINE 4 DEP AND THOSE DEPARTING RWY 8R SHOULD BE REVIEWED SINCE THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT.