SA226 TC; METRO II FLC DISCOVERED; ON POSTFLT INSPECTION; THAT THERE WAS NO CARGO RESTRAINT NET SECURING THEIR CARGO. EACH CREW MEMBER BELIEVED THAT THE OTHER HAD CHKED LOAD SECURITY PRIOR TO FLT.

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WHILE ACTING AS SIC (PNF) ON A PART 135 FREIGHT FLT FROM BOI-SLC; I DISCOVERED THAT THE 'THROW OVER' CARGO NETS WERE MISSING FROM OUR ACFT. THIS DISCOVERY WAS MADE UPON LNDG/UNLOADING. THE CAPT AND I INADVERTENTLY DEPARTED WITHOUT HAVING CHKED THE CARGO NETS. ASSUMPTIONS WERE MADE BY EACH CREW MEMBER THAT THE OTHER CREW MEMBER HAD SUPERVISED CARGO LOADING AND SECURING PROCS. THE OCCURRENCE WAS DUE TO MISCOM AMONG THE FLC. BARRIER NETS WERE SECURE AND IN PLACE WHICH HELPED TO PRECLUDE VISUAL CONFIRMATION OF CARGO NETS FROM COCKPIT. UPON DISCOVERY OF THE SIT; MYSELF AND THE CAPT REQUESTED CARGO NETS TO BE FLOWN TO SLC VIA AIRLINE FOR INSTALLATION PRIOR TO CONTINUED FLT. NETS WERE SHIPPED AND INSTALLED AND FLT CONTINUED AS SCHEDULED. MISCOM BY FLC; IMPROPER CARGO LOADING BY GND PERSONNEL; AND FAILURE TO SUPERVISE CARGO LOADING AND PREFLT INSPECTION OF CARGO NETS DUE TO FLC MISCOM ARE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS SAFETY RELATED ISSUE. SIT WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL BTWN PIC; SIC; AND DIRECTOR OF OPS TO ENSURE PROB DOES NOT ARISE AGAIN IN THE FUTURE.