LNDG MD11 EXPERIENCED BLAST TURB FROM DEPARTING B747 ON RWY 31L AT JFK.
Synopsis
LNDG MD11 EXPERIENCED BLAST TURB FROM DEPARTING B747 ON RWY 31L AT JFK.
Narrative
LNDG AND DEPARTING RWY 31L (ALL OTHER RWYS CLOSED). NUMEROUS INBOUNDS; WITH DEPS WAITING. ACFT #1 CALLED ON FINAL. I ADVISED THE ACFT TO REDUCE TO FINAL APCH SPD; THAT THERE WOULD BE A HVY B747 DEP (ACFT #2) PRIOR TO HIS ARR; WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED. PREVIOUS ARR LANDED AND I INSTRUCTED ACFT #2 TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD; AND ADVISED THAT TFC WAS ON A 5 MI FINAL. WHEN THE ARR CLRED; I CLRED ACFT #2 FOR TKOF; 'WITHOUT DELAY.' HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS ROLLING; AND I THEN CLRED ACFT #1 TO LAND; WITH A CAUTIONARY WAKE TURB ADVISORY. ACFT #2 WAS 6000 FT FROM THE LNDG THRESHOLD AND AIRBORNE; WHEN ACFT #1 CROSSED THE THRESHOLD; LEGAL PER FAA 7110.65. WHILE ROLLING OUT; I ADVISED ACFT #1 TO TURN R; WHICH THE PLT ACKNOWLEDGED; ADDING ('...FOR YOUR INFO; THAT SEPARATION SUCKED.') I REPLIED THAT I HAD ASKED HIM TO REDUCE ON FINAL; THAT IT WAS LEGAL; AND IF IT WAS A PROB I WOULD HAVE ISSUED A GAR; OR THAT HE COULD HAVE INITIATED A GAR ON HIS OWN. HE THEN ADVISED THAT HE WAS AT FINAL SPD 164 KTS OUT OF 2500 FT; WHICH WAS BEFORE HE WAS ON MY FREQ. I ADVISED THAT; IN THE FUTURE; IF HE IS AT FINAL APCH SPD WHEN I ASK HIM TO REDUCE; TO ADVISE AT THAT TIME. I HAD THE OPTION OF ISSUING A GAR TO ACFT #1; BUT ANTICIPATED AND ULTIMATELY HAD; THE LEGAL RWY SEPARATION. I ISSUED TA'S TO BOTH ACFT; ISSUED A CAUTIONARY WAKE TURB ADVISORY AND FEEL THAT; AS THE PIC IS THE FINAL AUTH AS TO THE OP OF THE ACFT; HE HAD THE OPTION OF EXECUTING A GAR ON HIS OWN IF HE WAS UNCOMFORTABLE. AS THE SEPARATION WAS LEGAL; I SAW NO NEED TO ISSUE A GAR; AS THAT WOULD HAVE PLACED ACFT #1 IN THE AIR BEHIND ACFT #2 AND; DUE TO AIRSPACE CONSTRAINTS; BOTH ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO TURN L; WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE CONTINUED SEPARATION DIFFICULT.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.