A B737-300 CREW WAS FLYING A DIFFERENT FLT PLAN THAN ATC THOUGHT THEY WERE FLYING.

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THE PROB: SHORTLY AFTER TAKING OFF FROM DTW FOR PHL; IT WAS DISCOVERED; THROUGH TALKING TO DEP CTL; THAT THE ROUTING ATC HAD ON FILE WAS NOT THE SAME ONE THAT WAS RECEIVED ON THE RELEASE AND THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE CLRNC DELIVERY. OVER 1 HR PRIOR TO DEP; THE DISPATCHER CREATED THE RELEASE FOR THE FLT. IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE COMPANY AND THE FLT PLAN WAS FILED WITH THE FAA. THE COMPANY COMPUTER SYS ACCEPTED THE RELEASE BUT THE FLT PLAN WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE FAA. BEFORE THE DISPATCHER COULD CHANGE THE RELEASE AND RESUBMIT A NEW FLT PLAN TO THE FAA; THE GATE AGENT IN DETROIT PRINTED OUT THE RELEASE FOR THE AIRCREW. SINCE THIS WAS WELL BEFORE THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART; AND IN FACT THE WORKING CREW HAD NOT EVEN ARRIVED IN DETROIT YET; THE DISPATCHER DID NOT THINK THAT HAVING A RELEASE IN THE ACR SYS FOR SUCH A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME MATTERED. A NEW RELEASE WAS CREATED BY THE DISPATCHER AND SUBSEQUENTLY INPUT INTO THE ACR SYS. UNFORTUNATELY; THE COCKPIT CREW NEVER RECEIVED THE UPDATED RELEASE WHICH REFLECTED A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ROUTING. THE ERROR MIGHT HAVE BEEN DETECTED UPON OBTAINING THE CLRNC. UNFORTUNATELY; PRE-DEP CLRNC THROUGH THE ACARS WERE UNOBTAINABLE FOR SOME REASON AT THAT TIME. THE FORMAT OF THE PRE-DEP CLRNC MAY HAVE SHOWN THE ERROR. THE CLRNC WAS RECEIVED ON THE RADIO FROM CLRNC DELIVERY. THE CLRNC RECEIVED WAS 'CLRED AS FILED VIA GENEVA 2 DEP; MAINTAIN 10000 FT.' THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH TO FLAG THE DISCREPANCY. THE ERROR WAS ONLY DETECTED AFTER TKOF WHEN DEP GAVE A HDG TO INTERCEPT ON COURSE AND IT WAS NOT POINTING THE ACFT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE ATC FILED ROUTING WAS OBTAINED BY THE CREW AND SUBSEQUENTLY FLOWN TO DEST. WHY THE FLT PLAN CHANGED: THE ACFT HAD ITS RNAV EQUIP ON THE MEL. THIS CHANGED ITS NAV STATUS TO /A FOR ATC FILING OF FLT PLANS. THE ORIGINAL FLT PLAN HAD INTXN OF 2 JET ROUTES THAT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR AN RNAV EQUIPPED ACFT BUT NOT FOR A /A EQUIPPED ACFT. 1) IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A CREW TO HAVE AN INVALID RELEASE AND NOT KNOW IT. 2) SINCE RTE THAT WAS FLOWN WAS DIFFERENT THAN THE PLANNED RTE; THE CREW HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF THEY HAD ENOUGH GAS TO FLY THE RTE SINCE THE FMC WAS UNAVAILABLE; ESSENTIALLY ELIMINATING ANY AUTOMATED FUEL CALCULATIONS. ALSO THEY HAD NO HARD COPY OF THE FLT PLAN THAT WAS FLOWN THAT WOULD HAVE SHOWN FUEL BURN INFO. THE CREW DETERMINED THAT THEY HAD ENOUGH GAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE FUEL SLIP SHOWED MORE FUEL THAN THE RELEASE. IT WAS REASONED THAT THE ADDITIONAL GAS WAS NEEDED TO FLY THE FILED RTE. THE CREW DID ENSURE THROUGH THEIR OWN CALCULATIONS THAT ENOUGH FUEL WAS AVAILABLE TO FLY THE RTE. QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN: 1) WHY IS THERE NOT A PROC IN PLACE TO INSURE THAT WHEN A RELEASE IS CHANGED; THE CAPT IS INFORMED? 2) IS THERE A WAY FOR THE AIRCREW TO DETERMINE IF THEY HAVE THE MOST CURRENT VERSION OF THE RELEASE IN THEIR POSSESSION?